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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The relevance of the study of corporate governance cannot be underestimated. Firms need to be 
guided, controlled, and directed if they are to achieve their goals. Firms have to face numerous 
stakeholders, which range from creditors to suppliers, from employees to the government, from 
customers to special interest groups, and corporate governance balances the different needs, 
requirements, and claims stakeholders have. Any  research that  tries to understand and explain the 
processes within the firm will eventually be analysing some form of corporate governance such as 
monitoring managers, monitoring the board of directors, and remuneration. Most  corporate 
governance studies focus on improving overall firm performance. One of the main factors analysed 
in corporate governance is the board of directors, which is going to be the focus of this dissertation. 
When a firm achieves its goals, it is the board of directors who are to be praised. If the firm does not 
achieve its goals or performance is below what was expected, it is the board of directors to blame. 
There is a link in everybody’s mind between performance and the board of directors. This makes 
boards an extremely relevant factor to be analysed.
The majority of research in corporate governance uses agency theory (Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Eisenhardt, 1989; Dalton et  al., 1998; Rhoades et al., 2000; Daily  et al., 2003; Hillman and Dalziel, 
2003; Stenvenson and Radin, 2009; Dalziel et  al., 2011); whereas there is growing trend of 
researchers who use resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Singh et al., 1986; 
Oliver, 1991; Pennings et al., 1998; Oliver and Holzinger, 2008). I posit one theory cannot explain 
all the processes boards go through and it is necessary a holistic framework since theories have 
limitations and therefore, we need to use several theories to be able to have a deeper understanding 
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of the internal processes in corporate governance in general and in board of directors in particular. 
Agency theory stresses the importance of monitoring as the means to reduce agency costs and 
improve firm performance. There must be monitoring since firms owners are not involved in the 
day to day activity of the firm, whereas managers are; which may  lead to managers pursuing self 
interest goals. (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Dalziel et al., 2011) Board analysis has focused mainly on 
agency theory  in the last  years, in particular, board composition, insiders and outsiders; and board 
size, the number of members the board has. Even though monitoring management is highly relevant 
for the firm and it may lead to improved performance, this theory overlooks other functions boards 
have, in particular those related to resource dependence theory and social theory.
Resource dependence theory supports the idea of the firm being affected by external factors in the 
environment and that it needs resources from this environment to survive. Board members bring 
resources to the firm which in turn will be used to achieve specific goals. The resources firms have 
and how they manage them can lead to better firm performance and to achieve an advantage over 
competitors (Pennings et al., 1998; Oliver and Holzinger, 2008). This, the bottom line, is what 
makes resource dependence theory relevant. Firms want to succeed and in order to do so they need 
to be better than competitors and among the many resources firms have the board of directors is one 
of the critical ones. This dissertation will focus on former government officials and outsiders as 
resources firms can use to improve performance.
Social theory is another theory which in the last few years has also been used to better understand 
the processes both, within the firm as well as relationships outside the firm, which may help 
improve performance. Social capital is the people we know, contacts, through whom we receive 
opportunities to use our financial and human capital (Burt, 1992). It is not the person itself but those 
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he or she is related to the real source of his or her advantage (Portes, 1998). Social capital has four 
benefits related to resource dependence theory: advise and counselling, provision of firm legitimacy, 
channels of communication between the firm and external organisations, and it helps to obtain 
resources outside the firm (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Hambrick and D'Aveni, 1992; Westphal, 
1999; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Haynes and Hillman, 2010).
Interlocks are a concept closely related to social capital. An interlocking directorate occurs when the 
same person sits in two or more boards. When there are interlocks among firms, a network is 
created. A network represents the ties and relationships (or lack of them) among the different 
members of the network. Social networks are not natural phenomena, they are created by 
individuals through investment strategies oriented to group relations (Portes, 1998). Social capital 
and economic behaviour are so constrained with each other than studying them independently will 
lead to misunderstanding since economic behaviour is modified by social relationships 
(Granovetter, 1985). Interlocks are relevant because there is then a strategy to create these 
networks, and from the firm’s point of view, this strategy may be used to achieve goals, such as 
access to better information (Acquaah, 2007), improving performance (Kim and Cannella, 2008), or 
political advantages (Lester et al., 2008). This is what makes social capital relevant when analysing 
corporate governance. Its goals include improving performance and political advantages.
Most previous studies have focused on analysing the board of directors from only one perspective, 
and therefore ignore reality. For example, agency  theory focuses on the role of the board as an 
internal control mechanism, but does not acknowledge its role as resource provider or social links. 
Resource dependence theory focuses on the resources boards bring to the firm, but ignores the 
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monitoring or social functions. Social theory focuses on social links, but ignores monitoring or the 
resources brought by board members.
Using the theoretical approaches mentioned above, we provide a comprehensive framework that 
explains the function of board of directors. More explicitly, this dissertation will focus on two 
specific strategies. First, hiring former government officials to the board in order to obtain benefits 
which will lead to better firm performance; second, the importance of outsiders as a resource for the 
firm. Regarding the first strategy, former government officials are defined as elected national 
officials, including Prime Ministers, cabinet ministers, Members of Parliament, Senators, and 
Secretaries of State. Outsiders are non-managerial members of the firm and non-executive directors. 
I posit  boards choose former government officials not because of their business expertise, not 
because of their expertise in specific areas, but because they have links with outside groups, in 
particular political parties, which helps firms to manipulate the political environment. I also posit 
firms, once actively involved in the political environment, they  will continue to do so over time, and 
that large firms, due to more factors in the environments they face, will hire former government 
officials as board members to take advantage of their knowledge and political links outside the firm; 
that firms in highly regulated sectors will co-opt former government officials; and that  firms with 
former government officials in their boards have better financial results than those firms without 
them. All these hypotheses are firmly rooted in resource dependence theory as well as social theory.  
The second group  of hypotheses focuses on analysing outsiders and their importance to the firm. 
While outsiders have mostly been analysed from agency point of view, that is, their main goal is to 
monitor management, I propose, based on resource dependence theory, they  provide a valuable 
resource, interlocks, and further posit  outsiders may increase financial performance. Outsider 
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analysis in the literature focuses on the monitoring function, but ignores their role as resource 
providers and social links. I posit board size is related to the number of interlocks the firm has; that 
it is outsiders who provide most  of these interlocks and that a higher percentage of outsiders lead to 
better firm financial performance.  
This dissertation analyses a number of characteristics board of directors have as well as why  some 
members are chosen to be part of the selected group of directors in large stock trading firms in 
Spain. Board of directors, through interlocks, create networks. The main players in this networks 
will be analysed. At the same time, a group whose importance has increased in board of directors in 
the last decades, former government officials, will be analysed to better understand the reasons 
boards have to hire them. 
This dissertation provides a number of contributions to the literature and practitioners. The findings 
in this dissertation are expected to enrich the pool of growing knowledge on the use of resource 
dependence theory, agency theory, and social capital by  Spanish firms as a strategy by corporate 
boards for both scholars and practitioners. By using several theories to explain the processes within 
the firm both, scholars and practitioners can better understand why firms do what they do, and 
understand changes in the composition of board of directors. Understanding which resources board 
members bring to the firm and how those resources are to be used by  the firm can, for example, 
help  firms to profile the candidates they are to hire. If the firm needs better links with institutions 
and political parties former government officials can help build those bridges. It is important, 
according to resource dependence theory, to know which board members provide resources to 
firms, helping scholars and practitioners better understand, among other things, how firms select 
their board members. Resource dependence theory is used at  a macro level, that is, the environment 
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is an external force which affects all aspects of the firm. At the same time, the firm needs resources 
from the environment to survive and improve performance. From agency theory point  of view, 
management must be monitored to avoid agency costs. Agency theory is then the micro level of the 
firm. The link between the macro level, resource dependence theory, and the micro level, agency 
theory, is provided by  the board of directors. Board’s duty is twofold, on one hand they must 
monitor management, on the other hand, they must screen the environment to obtain resources for 
the firm. The main contribution of this dissertation relates to a better understanding of the 
mechanisms used corporate governance, in particular by boards, to improve performance in the 
firm. To do so, this dissertation uses a holistic approach, resource dependence theory  along with 
agency theory and social theory. Theories have limitations and it  is necessary  to use several theories 
to be able to better understand the internal processes in corporate governance in general and in 
board of directors in particular.
The structure of this dissertation is as follow. In Chapter 2 I present the theoretical background and 
hypotheses using resource dependence theory, agency theory and social theory. Chapter 3 explains 
the methodology used, that is, sample, definitions, data collection, and statistical analysis; Chapter 4 
presents the findings. Chapter 5 is an open discussion on the dissertation findings and finally, 
Chapter 6 explains the limitations and provides ideas for future research.
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND 
HYPOTHESES
2.1. Introduction
2.2 Resource dependence theory and agency theory
2.2.1 Board analysis: composition of the board
2.2.2 Board analysis: size
2.2.3 Board effectiveness
2.3 Social theory
2.3.1 Interlocks and networks
2.1 Introduction
“We define governance as the determination of the broad uses to which organizational resources 
will be deployed and the resolution of conflicts among the myriad participants in organizations 
“(Daily et  al., 2003: 371). Even thought the majority of research in corporate governance uses 
agency theory, in the last few years a multitheoretic approach is used to complement this theory, for 
example, resource dependence theory, based on the resources directors bring; or stewardship  theory, 
introducing mechanisms to reduce agency loss. Overall, we find that board of directors is the most 
analysed mechanism in governance (Daily et al., 2003).
Boards of directors are one of the many resources firms have and they serve two important 
functions. On one hand, they monitor management on behalf of shareholder and, on the other hand, 
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they  provide resources to the firm (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Stenvenson and Radin, 2009). 
Different theories will emphasise either one of these functions. For example, agency theory (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983) stresses the importance of monitoring as the means to reduce agency costs and 
improve firm performance. Whereas resource dependence theory  supports the idea of the firm being 
affected by external factors in the environment and that it needs resources from this environment to 
survive (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). At the same time, if those resources are valuable and difficult 
to imitate, the firm may gain a competitive advantage over its competitors (Hitt and Duane, 2002).  
These two theories, resource dependence theory and agency theory, focus on two different roles 
boards have. As Fracassi and Tate (2012) indicate “A well-functioning board of directors provides 
both valuable advice to management and a check on its policies. An effective director should not 
just “rubber stamp” management’s actions, but should take a contrarian opinion when 
management’s proposals are not in the interest of the firm’s shareholders.” (Fracassi and Tate, 2012: 
187). One general theory cannot explain all the processes within the firm since all theories have 
some limitations. For example, agency theory  “predictions are not  always consistent and findings 
are mixed” (Dalziel et al., 2011: 1220). In this dissertation the general background of resource 
dependence theory, that is, firms need external resources and the procurement of these resources is 
vital for a firm’s survival, as well as other theories, agency and social theory, in order to have a 
better understanding of some of the processes firms go through. The intention is to partially 
integrate these theories to improve our knowledge of the actions taken by firms.
Next, the three main theories used in this thesis, resource dependence theory, agency  theory, and 
social theory, will be reviewed to be followed by an analysis of the boards based on these theories.
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2.2 Resource dependence theory and agency theory
Resource dependence theory will stress the importance of providing resources as the main function 
boards have (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Grant (1991) lists six categories for resources: financial, 
physical, technological, reputation, organisational, and human. Board members bring resources to 
the firm which in turn will be used to achieve specific goals. "When an organization appoints an 
individual to a board, it expects the individual will come to support the organization, will concern 
himself with its problems, will variably present it to others, and will try  to aid it" (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978: 163). There are also a number of benefits with the new appointee: lower uncertainty 
(Pfeffer, 1972), increased legitimacy (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), lower transaction costs 
(Williamson, 1984), better advice (Mintzberg, 1983; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989), and better access 
to capital (Mizruchi and Stearns, 1988). This theory emphasises that firms must face demands from 
different external actors and therefore, the firm needs to adapt to uncertainty in the environment by 
either manipulate it or try to influence it to obtain critical resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; 
Singh et al., 1986; Oliver, 1991). A number of studies have proven that changes in the environment 
cause changes in corporate strategy  (Hillman et  al., 2001). That is, firms respond to changes in their 
environments. But firms are not always passive. Some firms, very large ones in particular, can use a 
number of mechanisms to try to change the environment for their own benefit.
  
Resource dependence theory proposes that boards are to manage external dependencies, help 
reducing environmental uncertainty and the transaction costs associated with environmental 
interdependency. If firms want to survive they  must cope with environmental uncertainty  (Hillman 
et al., 2000), defined as "the degree to which future states of the world cannot be anticipated and 
accurately predicted" (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978: 67). Furthermore, as Pennings et al. (1998) show, 
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the resources firms have and how they manage them can lead to better firm performance. But it  is 
not enough that the firm has specific resources which differentiates it from other firms. It must also 
be able to use those resources to achieve an advantage over competitors (Oliver and Holzinger, 
2008). “In short, resource-based theory focuses on understanding the link between valuable, rare, 
and costly-to-imitate (idiosyncratic) firm resources, firm performance, and sustained competitive 
advantage. That is, in what ways can firms acquire ... resource-based rents through the possession 
of valuable, rare, and inimitable resources” (McWilliams et al., 2002: 713). 
According to agency theory, firm owners are not involved in all day to day activities in the firm. 
Managers, on the other hand, are. Ownership and control are separated in most large firms and this 
causes those who have control, managers or agents, to pursue self interested actions which may not 
benefit principals or owners (Dalton et al., 1998). “One party (the principal) delegates work to 
another (the agent), who performs that work” (Eisenhardt, 1989: 58). Agency theory focuses on two 
problems, the goals principals and agents have differ and it is expensive for the principal to 
supervise agents and their actions (Eisenhardt, 1989). Agency theory  has two main lines of thought: 
positivist, which focuses on situations where principals and agents may have conflicting goals 
leading to governance mechanisms; and principal-agent research, which is “concerned with a 
general theory that can be applied to employer-employee” (Eisenhardt, 1989: 60). 
Managers have the opportunity to pursue actions which will benefit them instead of the firm, 
causing what is called “agency costs”. To avoid this conflict or situation, managers need to be 
monitored (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1989; Dalton et al., 
1998; Rhoades et al., 2000). The main contribution of agency theory  is that  it “reestablishes the 
importance of incentives and self-interest in organizational thinking” (Eisenhardt, 1989: 64). This 
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leads, among other things, to the importance of information and to performance based 
compensation. Therefore, one of the duties of the board is to monitor management and agency 
theory  is based on the premise that management can be properly  monitored (Rhoades et al., 2000). 
The monitoring activities mostly accepted by  scholars are: monitoring the CEO, monitoring 
strategy implementation, evaluating and rewarding the CEO and top managers of the firm, and 
planning CEO succession (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Board’s incentives are commonly used to 
enforce the monitoring function (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). 
The two main areas of research for the board of directors have been first, monitoring management; 
second, implementing strategy; and third, links with the external environment (Ruigrok et al., 
2006). To do so, researchers focus their analysis on a number of characteristics all boards share, that 
is, their composition and their size.
2.2.1 Board analysis: composition of the board
Following resource dependence theory and agency theory, directors have two functions: monitoring 
and resource providers. Scholars then try to analyse how directors fulfil these functions. A review of 
the recent literature related to board analysis shows that it has focused on board composition and 
board size (Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Johnson et al., 1996; Dalton et al., 1998; Filatotchev and 
Bishop, 2002; Boone et al., 2007; Coles et  al., 2008; Chen et al., 2009). Board composition 
classifies board members as outsiders or insiders. Insiders are members of the board who also have 
a managerial role in the firm. Outsiders are non-managerial members of the firm and non-executive 
directors, and their functions include monitoring the CEO and management on behalf of 
shareholders and providing resources, such as knowledge and advice, to the firm (Combs et al., 
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2007; Kor and Misangyi, 2008; Stenvenson and Radin, 2009). The ratio of outsiders to insiders has 
not yet found a “magical” number. Empirical results do not always match. As Stenvenson and Radin 
(2009) show, some authors have found evidence for inside directors increasing the economic 
performance of the firm and that outside directors are not always related to better performance. 
There is a long history of research in this area, board composition, in the U.S. which is now 
expanding to other regions and countries. That is, corporate governance practices are spreading 
using the Anglo-American model (Chizema and Kim, 2010; Chizema and Shinozawa, 2012).  
There are a number of arguments in favour of boards being controlled by insiders. Insiders have in-
depth knowledge about the firm, sector and industry; the day-to-day operations within the firm, and 
its processes. Insiders have a better knowledge and information about the firm and that helps them 
to better monitor management (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Daily and Schwenk, 1996) and 
studies have also found that insiders are associated with higher firm performance (Dalton et al., 
1998). Other reasons to choose insiders over outsiders are, for example, norms of reciprocity may 
cause outside board members to feel obligated to support the CEO who was responsible for 
nominating them to a board (Westphal, 1999); outsiders cannot have as much knowledge of the 
company as insiders do (Westphal, 1999; Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003); no statistically  significant 
relation between firm value and independence (Fracassi and Tate, 2012); managerial hegemony 
theory, which states that since managers control the information board members receive, outsiders 
become more dependent upon management and thus, less informed (Rhoades et al., 2000), and 
inside directors can provide advice and counsel which will increase the economic performance of 
firm (Westphal, 1999). Finally, many  outside directors also serve in other boards. This causes the 
“busyness effect”, which means serving on multiple boards overcommits an individual (Ferris et al., 
2003; Adams et al., 2010). The busier the director the less effort and time he or she can devote to 
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the company  and they are often inadequately prepared to participate in board meetings (Carpenter 
and Westphal, 2001; Adams et al., 2010).
However, outsiders may have external connections, which in some cases have been developed 
through multiple board appointments, overcoming the busyness effect. This is of importance since it 
helps firms by providing access to critical resources such as relevant and high-quality information, 
which reduces information asymmetries and helps initiate new business relationships (Haunschild 
and Miner, 1997; Musacchio, 2004; Kor and Sundaramurthy, 2009; Shropshire, 2010). On the other 
hand, there are also a number of studies which insist on the necessity of board independence. 
Outsiders bring different resources to the firm since they  have different backgrounds, experiences, 
and expertise (Dalton et al., 1998; Rhoades et al., 2000; Kor and Misangyi, 2008). Inside directors 
expertise lies within the firm, whereas outside director expertise lies outside the firm (Hillman et 
al., 2000; Kor and Misangyi, 2008). Outside directors help prevent uncertainty by the boosting 
communication between the firm and stakeholders, their skills and experience, and the links they 
create with other firms (Pearce and Zahra, 1992). Inside directors may not be able or willing to 
monitor and evaluate CEOs and top management since they  may be afraid of potential conflicts of 
interest. Ties with the CEO weaken the intensity of board monitoring (Dalton et al., 1998; Westphal, 
1999; Rhoades et al., 2000; Fracassi and Tate, 2012) and these ties are stronger among inside 
directors. Outsiders bring experience, prestige and contacts which are necessary for the firm 
(Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). As for agency theory, links with the external environment reduce 
transaction costs associated with the firm's external linkages, for example, regulatory  agencies 
(Hillman et  al., 2000). Then, the role of outsiders in firm performance is not clear. Whereas 
“Outsiders are expected to be more vigilant than insiders because they are purportedly less 
dependent on the CEO and are the formal representatives of shareholders.” (Finkelstein and 
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Mooney, 2003: 101), we also find that “...outside directors are thought to engage in less vigilant 
monitoring and to exert less control over top managers with whom they have close personal 
ties.” (Westphal, 1999: 7). Still, there is near consensus in the literature that effective boards will be 
composed of greater proportions of outside directors (Dalton et al., 1998), grounded largely in 
agency theory. Overall, the presumption is that  outsiders will behave differently than insiders 
(Adams et al., 2010). The ratio of outsiders to insiders has no clear number. For example, as 
Rhoades et  al., (2000) explain, when some boards tried to balance this ratio they  failed to achieve 
the benefits of either outsider or insider dominated boards. However, since board members are a 
link to the external environment, when there are changes in the environment it follows there might 
also be changes in board structure, size and composition, in order to fulfil their main duties, that is 
monitoring and advice, and to address environmental uncertainties and dependencies (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978; Hillman et al., 2000; Boone et al., 2007).
Nevertheless, the best  example that outsiders are not a guarantee of success is provided by 
Finkelstein and Mooney (2003). They  used data filed the previous year to the scandal and, as the 
following table shows, having a majority of outsiders in the board did not stop these firms from 
failing. 
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Adapted from Finkelstein and Mooney (2003) 
 
Outsiders are expected to be more vigilant than insiders because they  do not share so many 
professional and social ties with the CEO (Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003). Despite the previous 
table, there is empirical support of outside directors and better profitability, higher returns on 
equity; and a positive relationship with firm performance (Dalton et al., 1998). Boards may turn to 
outsiders to enrich decision-making (Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003). During the actual economic 
crisis, governance reforms have mandated an increase in director independence to strengthen 
monitoring (Fracassi and Tate, 2012). More outside directors increase board involvement by  raising 
the level of monitoring and control (Westphal, 1999). “Outside directorships are perceived to be 
valuable because they  provide executives with prestige, visibility, and commercial contacts.” (Fich 
and Shivdasani, 2006: 693); better monitoring and advising can affect positively firms growth (Kor 
and Sundaramurthy, 2009); and empirical evidence shows a positive relationship between director’s 
prestige and firm performance (Certo et al., 2001).
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2.2.2 Board analysis: size
The other feature scholars analyse is board size, which is defined as the number of members the 
board has. Again, as with board composition, scholars do not fully agree on the “right” size for 
boards. For example, when boards have more than seven or eight members, they are less likely to 
be effective in their functions (Jensen, 1993). By  contrast, according to Coles et al. (2008), either 
very small or very large boards are optimal; Boone et al. (2007) argue that high-growth firms will 
have smaller boards due to the high monitoring costs associated and that  board size will increase 
with firm’s growth; Ferris et al. (2003) provide evidence of large boards not being effective and that 
small boards can monitor management effectively. There is no clear answer to the right board size 
debate besides that one size does not fit  all and that firm size affects board size. Different studies 
focus on different sectors and activities and their results prove that one board structure does not fit 
all firms. In general, larger boards may bring more experience and knowledge, and therefore, 
provide better advice to the firm (Ruigrok et al., 2006; Coles et al., 2008), but  at  the same time, 
larger boards are difficult to manage by CEOs, it  may take them longer to reach agreements, and 
boards may have problems with the monitoring function. 
2.2.3 Board effectiveness
“People often question whether corporate boards matter because their day-to-day impact is difficult 
to observe. But when things go wrong, they can become the center of attention.” (Adams et al., 
2010: 59). The general rationale is that board of directors can influence firm outcomes (Dalton et 
al., 1998). There are a number of factors to consider when board effectiveness is analysed. Boards 
have functions and duties they must fulfil. Research in this area mostly analysed the relationship 
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between the insider to outsider ratio and firm’s performance (Rhoades et al., 2000) and how 
different combinations of board composition (insider, outsider, affiliated, independent / 
interdependent) would improve firm performance. In this line, further research is needed to 
understand how different profiles of directors help  to improve firm performance (Hillman et al., 
2000). 
Finkelstein and Mooney (2003) list  five processes which are necessary for the board to be effective: 
engage in constructive conflict, avoid destructive conflict, work together as a team, know the 
appropriate level of strategic involvement, and address decisions comprehensively. Westphal (1999) 
uses the collaboration model as a link between board and firm performance. According to this 
model, “social ties may  ultimately  enhance firm performance by enabling boards to extend their 
involvement beyond decision control to decision management” (Westphal, 1999: 11). In his study 
he shows a positive relationship  between board monitoring of CEOs, the level of advice and 
counsel, and firm performance. Kim and Cannella (2008) list three factors that make boards 
effective: its ability to perform its service tasks effectively, its ability to work effectively as a group, 
and its ability to provide valuable resources or information from the external environment. Oh et al. 
(2006) introduce the concept of group social capital “as the set of resources made available to a 
group through group members’ social relationships within the social structure of the group itself, as 
well as in the broader formal and informal structure of the organization” (Oh et al., 2006: 570). 
According to them, an increase in group social capital resources will lead to greater effectiveness. 
Overall, according to Hillman and Dalziel (2003) there are two paths researchers follow to find a 
link between board of directors and firm performance. The most analysed path refers to monitoring 
and incentives and it  is therefore agency theory; the second one is related to resource dependence 
theory where boards are “providers” of resources. 
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The relationship between board structure (size and composition) and firm financial performance is 
not clear with little consistency in results, which shows the importance of considering different 
theoretical approaches to explain this relationship (Dalton et al., 1998; Rhoades et  al., 2000; Kim 
and Cannella, 2008), which is the aim of this dissertation since one theory cannot explain it all.
2.2.4 Former government officials and nonmarket strategies
Social ties increase the provision of advice and counsel from outside directors on strategic issues 
since personal relationships between colleagues increases the level of advice-seeking behaviour 
(Westphal, 1999). The strategic choices managers make reflect their backgrounds and experience 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Therefore, managers' social ties, contacts, and networks will in turn 
affect firms' strategic choices and performance (Peng and Luo, 2000). Board’s monitoring function 
has been extensively  analysed but there is less research into the strategic function boards have 
(Ruigrok et al., 2006). Resource dependence theory  explains that the greater the environmental 
uncertainty, the more likely it is that  firms will rely  on managerial ties when entering exchange 
relationships (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). In this line of thought the political environment also 
implies some degree of uncertainty since firms cannot fully predict future political changes. It 
follows that  boards will choose future members with strong external ties with the political 
environment to be able to minimise the effect changes in the political environment may  have on the 
firm. That is, when selecting an outsider to the board, when the firm is politically active, it will 
choose a person with strong ties with this particular environment. 
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Following resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) makes sense then that board 
will try to access valuable resources and use these resources to achieve its goals. When selecting 
directors with ties to important  institutional players, firms can help  create favourable environmental 
contexts (Kim and Cannella, 2008). Former government officials are defined as as elected national 
officials, including Prime Ministers, cabinet ministers, Members of Parliament, Senators, and 
Secretaries of State. They  are a resource since they  provide a link between the firm and the political 
environment. Relationships with governments are no longer viewed as a cost but as an opportunity. 
Therefore, the strategy  is to hire former government officials as outsiders because they bring 
knowledge and, most important, links with the political environment, which in turn the firm can use 
for its own benefit. There is then a calculated strategy, hiring former government officials, who 
bring specific resources to the firm, which are used, in turn, to manipulate the political environment. 
As Oliver and Holzinger (2008) posit, this is because political environments have become more 
complex and influential, forcing firms, large firms in particular, to take action since the free-rider 
option is no longer effective enough. Free-riders are “firms that took no action and incurred no 
costs” (Lenway  and Rehbein, 1991: 896) in strategic political management but reap the benefits as 
if they had done so. Overall, large firms have enough incentives to be politically  active whereas 
smaller firms have incentives to be free riders (Schuler, 1996). By hiring former government 
officials firms become then proactive in their political environment.
Hillman et al. (2000) classify directors in three different groups: business experts, support 
specialists, and community influentials. Business experts serve on other large boards. They provide 
skills, knowledge, and communication channels with other firms, as well as an increase in firm’s 
legitimacy. Support specialists lack general management experience but they  provide expertise in 
specific areas, capital markets, law, insurance and public relations, of the firm and they do not form 
CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
19
the foundation on which the strategy is built. Community influentials have links with other firms, 
not including competitors or suppliers. The resources they supply do not stem from direct 
managerial experience but from knowledge, experience and connections to community groups and 
organisations. In this group Hillman et al. (2000) include former government officials. They provide 
valuable nonbusiness perspectives and they serve as vehicles of co-optation for the organisation.
The proposed hypothesis is directly related to Hillman et al., (2000) classification. Former 
government officials are not mainly chosen to participate in boards due to their educational 
background since in general they are not business experts. Former government officials are mainly 
chosen as board members because of their links with the community and, in particular, strong links 
with their former political party. “The division of the work of the board into committees represents 
a certain amount of horizontal differentiation within the board ... If organizational design is 
considered to facilitate efficiency and effectiveness in organizations, examination of board 
organization may yield fruitful insights about board functions and outcomes” (Valenti and Horner, 
2010: 121). It makes sense then that board members should be appointed to committees where they 
can add value to these committees. This dissertation further proposes former government officials’ 
educational background does not match the committees they are in. That is, they  are not chosen as 
support specialists but as community influentials. The hypotheses state:
H1a: Former government officials are, due to their educational background, community 
influentials
H1b: Former government officials’ background does not match their committee 
activities.
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As Getz (1993) indicates, there are a number of benefits for organisations from hiring former 
government officials. Cooptation, that is the absorption of disruptive elements which can probably 
lead to favourable governmental action (Pfeffer, 1972; Mizruchi, 1996; Hillman et al., 1999; Kim 
and Cannella, 2008); legitimacy, the new board member may bring prestige and reputation to the 
organisation (Bazerman and Schoorman, 1983; Zucker, 1987; Mizruchi, 1996; Hillman et al., 1999; 
Hillman et al., 2000; Certo et al., 2001); legitimacy building (Suchman, 1995); reducing the 
likelihood of failure and increase survival (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Baum and Oliver, 1991); 
advise and counsel (Westphal, 1999); better access to information (Mizruchi, 1996; Hillman et al., 
1999) and a reduction in information uncertainty (Hillman et al., 1999) as well as concessions and 
privileges (Musacchio and Read, 2007); private information, gathered from personal contacts, and 
access to diverse skill sets (Uzzi and Dunlap, 2005), opposite to public information, which everyone 
has access to; help to bring change in institutions or influence political decisions (Hillman et al., 
1999; Ingram and Clay, 2000); “increase overall market size, to gain advantage over rivals within 
the industry, to reduce the threat of new entrants, to reduce the threat of product substitution, and to 
increase bargaining power over suppliers and customers” (Shaffer et al., 2000: 129); to obtain 
competitive advantage (Clougherty, 2003); lowering the cost of dealing with government 
(Musacchio and Read, 2007); advice and counsel regarding the public policy (Hillman et al., 1999); 
helpful in acquiring resources on more favourable terms (Goodstein and Boeker, 1991; Hillman and 
Dalziel, 2003) valuable nonbusiness points of view (Hillman et al., 2000) and better financial 
performance (Hillman et al., 1999). All these benefits may encourage firms to become politically 
active and try to shape the political environment for their own interest. 
The next hypothesis is related to board size and composition. Larger firms overall have larger 
boards (Ferris et al., 2003) since large firm size is associated with more complex operations and 
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environments (Dalton et al., 1998). As mentioned before, resource dependence theory  (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978) believes outside directors are a critical link to the external environment. “...one 
would expect that as the potential environmental pressures confronting the organization increased, 
the need for outside support would increase as well” (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978: 168), which is 
true for larger firms since they  have to face more complicated environments. Therefore, outsiders 
provide, among other things, information and personal links to outside groups which may help the 
firm to achieve its goals and to adapt, if necessary, to changes in the environment. Former 
government officials can provide valuable advice and counsel regarding the public policy 
environment of a firm, aid the firm with their knowledge of government procedures and their 
insight in predicting government actions, improve financial performance, create communication 
channels to existing government officials, provide valuable nonbusiness perspectives on specific 
issues, and reduce transaction costs (Hillman et al., 1999; Hillman et al., 2000; Peng and Luo, 2000; 
Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001; Hillman, 2005; Lester et al., 2008). Overall, it can be said these are all 
resources and it is in line with the resource dependency theory outlined by Pfeffer and Salancik 
(1978). The hypothesis states: 
 H2: Larger firms will include more former government officials as outsiders.
In other words, due to the complicated environments large firms face, not only outsiders will be a 
better choice for the board but also, former government officials are, among the different options 
among outsiders, the best bet due to their “influence” in the community.
Firms are interest driven (Oliver, 1991) and they strive for survival and benefits, that  is, continued 
success (Dacin et al., 2007; Adams et al., 2010). Firms are not isolated even though “...traditional 
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strategy research has viewed firms as autonomous entities seeking to build resources and stake out 
market positions that lead to sustainable competitive advantage” (Gulati et al., 2000: 212). One of 
the most relevant factors in their environment is government. “Governmental entities have power 
over the opportunity  sets faced by firms and shape their competitive environments” (Hillman et al., 
1999: 67). Governments “set the rules of the game” (Rodriguez et al., 2005) and nearly every  aspect 
of the business life is shaped by governments: policy, regulations, and laws (Cook and Barry, 1995; 
Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Lester et  al., 2008). “The actual and potential impact of the government on 
business encourages firms to keep informed about  government regulations, policies, and emerging 
public policy issues” (Hillman et al., 1999: 68). Not to forget that government intervention in 
business has increased in the last decades (McWilliams et  al., 2002). It is understandable that 
organisations may want to change this political environment for their own purposes. Environmental 
uncertainty is the inability of a firm to accurately  asses future states of the world or future changes 
in the external environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Koka et al., 2006). When firms are able to 
modify  legislation in their own favour they have a more possibilities to survive in environments 
clouded with uncertainty (Hillman et al., 1999). 
“Strategic political management refers to the set of strategic actions that firms plan and enact for the 
purpose of maximising economic returns from the political environment” (Oliver and Holzinger, 
2008: 496). Also known as corporate political activity (CPA) or nonmarket strategies, it implies 
shaping government policy  favourably to the organisation (Hillman et al., 2004). CPA stands for 
corporate political action. These political strategies can be complements and substitutes for market 
strategies (Baron, 1995; Shaffer et al., 2000). They  are based on the idea that  firms must not simply 
react to policy decisions (Hillman et al., 1999). Nonmarket strategies may lead to, among other 
things, an increase in legitimacy  and influence. It is difficult to quantify these effects on the firm 
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although they may  affect firm performance (Hillman et al., 1999). On the other hand, market 
strategies aim to create value through economic performance (Baron, 1995). “The complete 
equilibrium includes both market  and nonmarket competition, and hence the returns to market and 
nonmarket strategies are necessarily interrelated. To explore the synergies between market and 
nonmarket strategies, first  note that there is no direct return to nonmarket strategies” (Baron, 1997: 
337). Strategies are long term whereas tactics are short term and involve smaller commitment of 
resources (Hillman and Hitt, 1999). Furthermore, “...strategies of nonmarket participation can be 
grouped into those focusing on the provision of information and those focusing on the provision of 
politically valuable resources and support.” (Baron, 2001: 48). 
These strategies are not  limited to one specific action since firms face different institutional 
controls, that is, “the means by  which pressures are imposed on organisations” (Oliver, 1991: 168). 
As Schuler et al. (2002) indicate, different types of political behaviours can be followed at  the same 
time. That is, the board chooses to involve the firm, through different strategies, in the political 
process to improve performance. Shaffer et  al. (2000) show there is a positive relationship between 
nonmarket strategies and performance. The goal of these strategies is to influence political 
processes in such a way  they will reflect firm’s goals (Baysinger, 1984). There are examples of 
organisations involved in political activities in a number of countries besides the U.S., such as the 
European Union, Japan, South Korea, Kuwait, and Russia (Hillman et al., 2004). Also, there are 
different strategies firms may follow to influence the political environment, that is, firms can use 
different strategies to modify  the environment (Kim and Cannella, 2008). The level of involvement 
itself, for example, is a strategy. But this is not the case everywhere, “in some countries, such as 
Sweden, Japan, and Germany, businesses formally participate in the public policy process. In many 
others, such as the United States, Canada, and Mexico, firms "compete" with a variety of other 
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interest groups informally  to affect public policy” (Hillman and Hitt, 1999: 826). Spain, in this 
context, belongs to the second group.
Meznar and Nigh (1995) classify  political activities into buffering, proactive political actions, 
resisting or controlling; and bridging, reactive political actions, that is, the firm adapts to policies. 
Moreover, organisations have to decide on whether to participate alone or collectively  (Hillman and 
Hitt, 1999; Hillman et al., 2004). As Hillman and Hitt (1999) indicate that after a firm decides to 
become politically  active, the next question is how are they going to do it. Oliver (1991) defines a 
number of strategies organisations may use to face government institutions. They are acquiescence, 
accede to institutional pressures; compromise, balance or bargain with external constituents; avoid, 
attempt to preclude the necessity of conformity; defy, resistance to institutional processes; and 
manipulate, active response to pressures. Manipulation is further divided into co-opt, influence, and 
control. When organisations hire former government officials, they engage in co-opt, that is, 
importing influential constituents. Moreover, firms don’t  limit themselves to only  one specific 
strategy. They may use a combinations of strategies which may include, for example funding 
campaigns, mobilise constituencies or use lobbyists (Hillman and Hitt, 1999). 
Modifying the political environment is not new to firms. They have always been involved in such 
activities but it has not been until recent years that this involvement has been studied. There are 
many examples of how firms have used these strategies in order to achieve competitive advantage. 
Controls on the use of child labour in Britain’s textile industry (McWilliams et al., 2002) favouring 
large manufacturers; Intel lobbying in the U.S. to avoid antitrust  litigation (Yoffie and Kwak, 2001) 
which turned to be good for the company but not so good the consumer; large organisations 
lobbying for expensive legislation (Solid Waste Disposal Act) which would drive small 
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organisations off the industry  in the U.S. (McWilliams et al., 2002); the steel industry lobbied for an 
increase in tariffs, up  to 30 percent, on steel imports in the U.S. (Bonardi et al., 2005), again, good 
for the companies involved but not so good the consumer; a positive relationship between firms 
making contributions to Democrats under the Clinton administration and foreign trade mission 
participation (Hillman et al., 2004); Lockheed Martin spending $55 million in lobbying in the U.S. 
since 1999 and winning $90 billion in defence contracts and Boeing’s lobbying investment of $57 
million and winning $81 billion in contracts (Miller, 2006); Wal-Mart proposed to increase the 
minimum wage in the U.S. (Bonardi et al., 2006) which caused competitors to increase their costs; 
and British Petroleum with a proactive political strategy in the 1990s leading to new regulation in 
the industry increasing the costs for its rivals (McWilliams et al., 2002). Most of these examples 
involve rising rivals’ costs through either monopolising a resource that is necessary to competitors 
(resource dependence theory); differentiation, which leads to public recognition and high status; and 
the restricting the use of a resource by  competitors (McWilliams et al., 2002). Rising rivals’ costs, 
when the firm has a competitive advantage is good for business. But there are also not so successful 
stories, for example, the development of High Definition Television in the United States included 
political manoeuvring, alliance formation and disbanding, and technological change (Dowell et al., 
2002).
Shaffer et al. (2000) found statistical evidence of how nonmarket strategies improve firm’s 
performance. The benefits of nonmarket strategies spill over to other firms which end up  being free 
riders, mostly small firms (Schuler, 1996). There are two options firms have. They can use 
individual action or they can push for collective action. Individual actions loads all the costs on one 
firm whereas in collective action the costs are shared by a number of firms (Hillman and Hitt, 
1999). Collective actions have two types of benefits: collective, those that benefit all parties, and 
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selective benefits, those which benefit only those who participate. Financial cost is then the 
determining factor for firms to decide if they want to become politically  active. Also, firms tend to 
lobby individually when they fear sensitive information may reach the general public or competitors 
(Figueiredo and Tiller, 2001). Overall, it can be said all these actions lead to “dynamic processes by 
which a firm influences or complies with its political environment for the purpose of generating 
future value or protecting the current value of the firm from future loss or erosion” (Oliver and 
Holzinger, 2008: 497). 
When firms manage the political environment effectively they may achieve favourable subsidies, 
reduce threat of market  entry, improve firm legitimacy, reduce threat of product substitutes, and 
increase market share (Oliver and Holzinger, 2008). Other contingency  factors which may lead to 
political activity  include firm size since it is large firms that have the resources to do so (Yoffie, 
1987; Oliver and Holzinger, 2008). Size is important since it represents political as well as 
economic power (Hillman et al., 2004). Other factors include how often legislation changes (Oliver 
and Holzinger, 2008); the negative effects of a passive strategy when competitors engage in 
political action, the net impact on firm’s competitive performance and strategy, firms are part of an 
industry strongly affected by public policies, firms are larger, have an international scope, political 
environments become more complex and influential, government is an important costumer, firms 
are more reliant on governmental decisions, and industry  concentration, where concentrated 
industries tend to be more politically active (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001; Schuler et al., 2002; 
Keim and Hillman, 2008; Oliver and Holzinger, 2008; Adams et al., 2010). It  is important to 
understand that, overall, “government policies are not exogenous constraints that firms must take as 
given. In all democratic governments in the world, firms can play an active role in shaping public 
policy” (Keim and Hillman, 2008: 50). As Oliver and Holzinger (2008) show, firms may  have a 
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number of reasons to get involved in political activity. These include to make their interests known 
to government, to gain collective or private benefits, to access resources from political institutions, 
to purchase government policy or secure government inaction, to reduce costs, to stop unwanted 
regulation, and to increase firm control and autonomy, or, as Keim and Hillman (2008) posit, rivals 
in the marketplace use political strategies to influence government policies, which, in turn, affects 
market opportunities.
One explanation for a number of firms following the same strategy can be found in imitation. 
Williamson et  al. (2003) classify imitation in three groups: frequency-based imitation, when 
organisations imitate actions already taken by large numbers of other firms; trait-based imitation, 
firms imitate larger firms in their field because their behaviours are perceived as legitimate; and 
outcome-based imitation, where firms mimic practices because they are believed to have produced 
positive outcomes. Lieberman and Asaba (2006) give two categories of imitation: information-
based theories, the believe that competitors may have better information; and rivalry-based 
theories, to maintain competitive parity. Overall, larger organisations are more likely to be imitated. 
Firms engage in political activities when they are highly dependent on government regulation and 
are large in size (Bonardi et  al., 2005); when the political market is attractive (Bonardi et al., 2005), 
that is, firms perceive they may achieve their goals; when “information, access, influence, reduced 
uncertainty and transaction costs, etc.” (Hillman et al., 1999: 67); when they  can rise rivals’ costs 
(McWilliams et al., 2002); and when there is some degree of economic motivation and institutional 
facilitation (Christensen, 1997).
Oliver (1991) lists a number of strategic responses firms may  use to either adapt or change the 
environment. These strategies range from adherence to rules and regulations, known as acquiesce, 
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to trying to defy or manipulate institutions. There are advantages of noncompliance, which include 
autonomy over decision making and flexibility  to permit continual adaptation as new contingencies 
arise. Manipulation, the most active response, pretends to control institutional pressures. It includes 
co-op, persuade an institutional constituent to join its board of directors; influence, modify values 
and criteria of acceptable practices or performance; and controlling, efforts to establish power and 
dominance over the external constituents. 
Keim and Hillman (2008), in a similar study, list three possible responses to public policy: passive 
reaction, where managers react by adjusting their activities and plans to new rules and legislations 
post-hoc; positive anticipation, where managers monitor the formation of government policy to 
anticipate and adjust their strategic planning within the firm; and proactive public policy shaping, 
where firms, anticipate changes as well as try to shape policy and institutions to their own 
advantage.
Previously, the majority of firms adopted a free-rider strategy and never became politically active 
since firm relations with government were viewed as a cost (Oliver and Holzinger, 2008). However, 
this behaviour has changed. In the U.S., the number of public company  firms which include former 
government officials has increased from 14% in 1973 to 53% in 1998 (Lester et al., 2008). These 
numbers can not be ignored. Such an increase indicates that former government officials are a 
valuable resource firms pursue and use (Lester et al., 2008). As Keim and Hillman (2008) show, the 
main contingency factor is the importance of the issue and how it affects the firm. For issues with 
relatively little impact on the firm, managers may choose passive reaction. As the level of 
importance increases managers may choose to anticipate political decisions. Issues which may 
affect significantly operations or future plans may be dealt with a proactive public policy. 
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The benefits from having former government officials sitting on board of directors seem to increase 
in highly regulated sectors. Highly regulated sectors have traditionally been the utilities sector, 
electricity, where their pricing and even profits are regulated by the state (Agrawal and Knoeber, 
2001), banking, and financial services (Edwards, 1977; Okhmatovskiy, 2010), and chemicals (Blau 
et al., 2000). “Firms that receive a significant portion of their revenues or face elevated levels of 
regulatory scrutiny have high motivation to manage that dependency through CPA” (Hillman et al., 
2004: 840). In fact, the literature recognises that political institutions play to some extent opposing 
roles in an economy (Wiseman et al., 2012). On one hand, political institutions promote economic 
exchanges by supporting an infrastructure of intermediations that increases the transparency of 
economic transactions. But, at the same time, political institutions regulate economic exchanges by 
circumscribing and even preventing certain types of economic transactions from occurring, as it 
happens in highly regulated sectors. Under such circumstances, political intervention constrains 
managerial autonomy. Firms have to face a powerful stakeholder having a political or social agenda 
that may hamper the managerial discretion and ability to satisfy other stakeholders (Finkelstein and 
Boyd, 1998). These constrains could come not only by government regulation but also by 
government involvement in the corporate governance of individual firms through ownership  and 
board ties (Okhmatovskiy, 2010). That explains the important role former government officials play 
as board members. They could represent “the man of the government at firms” but, inversely they 
can lobby politics and regulations according with firms’ interests. 
H3: Firms in highly regulated sectors will have more former government officials in 
their boards.
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This dissertation argues that including former government officials as board members signals that 
firms are involved in either positive anticipation, that is, former government officials through their 
external communication channels have access to better and timely information the firm can use in 
their own benefit; or firms are involved in proactive public policy shaping, that is, former 
government officials due to their links with their political parties are in a good position to help firms 
to shape future public policy. Nevertheless, “the balance between benefits and costs associated with 
ties to the government depends on many contextual factors and it is difficult to predict the balance 
of benefits and costs for a specific country, in a specific industry, and during a specific period of 
time based on prior studies in different contexts” (Okhmatovskiy, 2010: 1025). Firms are not 
isolated and they  are affected by  the environment. One of the most relevant factors in the 
environment is government and firms have the option to try  to shape government policy for their 
own benefits. Firms hire former government officials to co-opt the political environment and to 
improve performance. The research linking governance structures and financial performance relies 
on accounting-based financial indicators (Dalton et  al., 1998) and return on assets is one of the most 
commonly used. Thus, the hypothesis is:
H4: Firms with former government officials in their boards have better financial results 
(ROA) than those firms without former government officials in their boards.
When an individual is appointed to a board he is expected to support the organisation and try to aid 
it (Lester et al., 2008). Boards of directors, according to agency theory, serve two functions: 
monitoring and providing resources (Fama and Jensen, 1983). On the other hand, according to 
resource dependence theory, the procurement of external resources is vital for firm survival and 
performance (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). According to Hillman et al. (2003), the link between firm 
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performance and the board of directors follows two paths. The first one is related to agency theory 
and monitoring management. Effective monitoring increases performance. The second path is 
related with resource dependence theory, where boards are providers of resources which in turn 
increases firm’s performance. “Appointing a former politician to a corporate board solidifies a tie to 
his political party. Through these directors, firms can influence rule-making and gain access to 
timely  information about government contracts, industrial and trade policies, and changes in 
regulatory policies and enforcement” (Stark and Vedres, 2012: 702). In other words, former 
government officials bring rare resources to the firm which in turn can be used to modify  the 
regulatory environment.
Overall, former government officials seem to be a resource firms may want to obtain in order to 
improve general performance. Once firms use political strategies they tend to be long term in scope 
(Schuler, 1999). After all, political behaviour is considered a nonmarket type of strategy aiming to 
improve the performance of the firm (Baron, 1995). Along with Oliver (1991) manipulating 
category and Hillman et al. (2000) classification of directors, as Kim and Cannella (2008) posit, the 
most extreme way to control the source of the dependence is to absorb it, that  is, co-optation, This 
dissertation posits the following hypothesis:
H5: Once involved in politically strategic management, firms will continue to do so.
2.3 Social theory
When analysing boards, the literature has focused on their size and composition. However, this 
analysis ignores other factors or features that are important to understand boards and their decisions. 
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One of the main questions in social theory is how institutions and firm behaviour are affected by 
social relationships (Granovetter, 1985) since “...the social world presents itself as a highly 
structured reality” (Bourdieu, 1989: 19). Organisations are made of people and, therefore, all the 
actions taken by  the organisation, by its board, are guided by one of its more important resources: 
people. Economic behaviour is continuously modified by social relationships (Granovetter, 1985). 
Social network studies have their roots in sociology when exploring social groups, roles, status, 
social exchange, influence, and other forms of relationships among individuals (Lavie, 2006). The 
social network approach views organisations in society  as a system of objects, that is, people, 
groups, and organisations, joined by a variety  of relationships, and these relationships are bound to 
affect them (Kilduff et al., 2006). “A network perspective is also useful to strategy scholars who 
focus on contracting and governance issues and how these choices influence firm 
performance” (Gulati et al., 2000: 212). This will lead to a better understanding of the strategic 
behaviour of firms.
Social capital is the people we know, contacts, through whom we receive opportunities to use our 
financial and human capital (Burt, 1992). Human capital is defined as “an individual’s expertise, 
experience, knowledge, reputation, and skills” (Lester et al., 2008: 1001). Social capital refers to 
“the sum of actual and potential resources embedded within, available through, and derived from, 
the network of relationships possessed by that individual” (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998: 243). It 
requires an investment of both economic and cultural resources (Portes, 1998). Furthermore, it is 
not the person itself but those he or she is related to the real source of his or her advantage (Portes, 
1998). Likewise, when a high level of social capital is achieved there is a motivation to maintain 
those relationships (Kostova and Roth, 2003). Studies show that there has been an increase in the 
use of social capital by corporate board members in recent years in a number of countries, for 
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example, the U.S. (Lester et  al., 2008) and Australia (Stening and Wan Tai Wai, 1984; Kiel and 
Nicholson, 2003) among other countries. 
Social capital has four benefits (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) related to resource dependence theory. 
First, advise and counselling, which are linked to firm’s performance (Westphal, 1999). 
Appointments to boards facing strategically  similar environments enhance the directors’ ability to 
advise management (Haynes and Hillman, 2010). Second, the provision of firm legitimacy and 
reputation (Hambrick and D'Aveni, 1992; Daily and Schwenk, 1996; Yeo et al., 2003). Third, social 
capital provides channels of communication and conduits of information between the firm and 
external organisations which provides the board with strategic information otherwise unavailable 
(Hillman and Dalziel, 2003); access to broader sources of information improves information's 
quality, relevance, and timelines (Oh et al., 2006; Kim and Cannella, 2008; Kor and Sundaramurthy, 
2009). And fourth, social capital helps to obtain resources outside the firm (Hillman and Dalziel, 
2003), being financial resources one of the most important. As Adams et  al. (2010) explain, when 
directors have links with or are affiliated with banks lending to the firm, the firm’s overall debt ratio 
is lower. The greater the uncertainty  in the firm’s environment, the more likely  the firm will rely on 
managerial networking to reduce this uncertainty (Acquaah, 2007), all of which improve 
performance. The most analysed benefit of social capital is related to financial theory, whereas 
firms with positive net value are able to obtain credit at competitive rates. Social capital theory  adds 
to this since “banking transactions are embedded in social relations that uniquely shape credit 
access and costs in ways that are inadequately incorporated into financial theory” (Uzzi, 1999: 481). 
One simple example can help us understand the importance social capital has. “Before Microsoft 
was a household name. Bill Gates had a singular distinction in his network-his mother, Mary Gates, 
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who sat on the board of United Way with John Akers, a high-level IBM executive. At the time, 
Akers was helping to lead IBM into the desktop  computer business. Mary Gates talked to Akers 
about the new breed of small companies in the computer industry, which she felt  were under 
appreciated competitors of the larger firms with which IBM traditionally partnered. Maybe she 
changed Akers's vision of who to go to for the new IBM PC's DOS, or maybe her comments 
confirmed what he already knew. In either case, after their conversation, Akers took proposals from 
small companies, one of which was Microsoft. The rest is history: Microsoft won the DOS contract 
and eventually  eclipsed IBM  as the world's most powerful computer company. Without Bill Gates's 
potent network, a sensational new operating system might have faded into obscurity” (Uzzi and 
Dunlap, 2005: 53). It is people you know, your social capital, what can give you an advantage in 
certain situations. In this case, Bill Gates’ mother was the starting line.
Social capital and economic behaviour are so constrained with each other than studying them 
independently will lead to misunderstanding since economic behaviour is modified by social 
relationships (Granovetter, 1985). “Social capital refers to the idea that individuals’ social contacts 
convey  benefits that create opportunities for competitive success for them and for the groups in 
which they are members” (Labianca and Brass, 2006: 596). According to Valenti and Horner 
(2010), board social capital encompasses two types of relationships: internal social capital, which 
are ties with persons within the firm; and external social capital, which are ties with persons outside 
the firm. Personal contacts with people outside the organisation are useful to deal with uncertainty 
(Granovetter, 1985; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). In his study, Granovetter (1985), acknowledged 
how behaviour and institutions are affected by social relations, defining embeddedness as “...the 
argument that the behaviour and institutions to be analysed are so constrained by ongoing social 
relations that  to construe them as independent is a grievous misunderstanding” (Granovetter, 1985: 
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482). In other words, it shows a clear relationship between firms and institutions with deep roots in 
social capital.
2.3.1 Interlocks and networks
Interlocks are a concept closely  related to social capital and have become one of the main indicators 
of social ties among firms. It  cannot be said that interlocks are random. Their prevalence is too high 
and their increasing number cannot be ignored (Shropshire, 2010). “An interlocking directorate 
occurs when a person affiliated with one organisation sits on the board of directors of another 
organization” (Mizruchi, 1996: 271). In other words, a person is a board member in at least two 
firms. 
There are benefits for firms when they use interlocks. Interlocked firms share behaviours and 
strategies, such as acquisitions, diversification, golden parachutes and poison pills, and decision 
processes. Director interlocks are also used to transfer information between firms, cement ties 
within the upper capitalist class, increasing innovation, disseminate practices, gaining access to new 
markets, decreasing transaction costs, and share similar strategies and behaviours. Therefore, they 
are used to manage environmental uncertainty, gain access to diverse skills and resources otherwise 
not available to the firm, facilitate communication across firms, agreed take-overs, provide 
legitimacy, and lobbying regulatory bodies (Heracleous and Murray, 2001; Filatotchev and Toms, 
2003; Ruigrok et al., 2006; Kang, 2008; Shropshire, 2010; Cárdenas, 2012). In other words, inter 
organisational imitation (Haunschild, 1993), which is new institutionalism, as well a the use of 
resources, which is resource dependence theory. The following table, adapted from Heracleous et  al. 
(2001) is a summary of the reasons for firms to use interlocks.
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Table 2. Reasons for interlocks.
Reason Definition
Collusion To engage in practices that restrict competition
Cooptation To co-opt sources of environmental uncertainty
Monitoring For inter-organisational control
Legitimacy To increase legitimacy through prestigious connections
Career advancement For the person, interlocks can help advance one’s career
Social cohesion Social ties among members of the upper elitists classes
Adapted from Heracleous et al. (2001) 
Some authors have studied the negative effects of interlocks. The most important one is the 
busyness effect: board members cannot properly monitor the firm if they have several firms to 
monitor (Ferris et al., 2003; Harris and Shimizu, 2004). Other authors, such as Fracassi and Tate 
(2012) and Subrahmanyam (2008), focus on other possible negative effects such as the loss of firm 
value; or Barreto and Baden-Fuller (2006) who in their study of Portuguese banks found a negative 
relationship  between imitation and bank profitability. One final negative effect interlocks may  have 
is related to “reputational penalties”, when firms are negatively  affected just by being related 
through interlocks to firms alleged with financial reporting fraud (Kang, 2008). Nevertheless, and 
despite these negative examples, the literature on interlocks mostly focuses on the benefits, which 
outweigh the negative effects.
When there are interlocks among different firms, a network is created. “We define a network as a 
set of nodes and the set of ties representing some relationship, or lack of relationship, between the 
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nodes. The nodes are actors (individuals, work units, or organizations)” (Brass et  al., 2004: 795). 
Social networks are not natural phenomena. They must be created by individuals through 
investment strategies oriented to group relations to create the network, which they will use as a 
source of other benefits in the future (Portes, 1998). There is then a strategy to create these 
networks, and from the firm’s point of view, this strategy may be used to achieve goals, such as 
access to better information (Acquaah, 2007), improving performance (Kim and Cannella, 2008), or 
political advantages (Lester et al., 2008). Perhaps the most analysed use of interlocks is the transfer 
of information “...social networks are important for information flow between firms and 
investors” (Cohen et al., 2008: 976). The main advantages of networks include increase innovation, 
influence the nature of competition, lowering transaction costs, adapt to the environment, increasing 
efficiency, and access to critical resources, all of which leads to higher performance (Heracleous 
and Murray, 2001).
Networks have been analysed with a focus on different issues: corporate behaviour (Baker, 1990); 
the spread of strategies (Davis, 1991); knowledge transfer (Inkpen and Tsang, 2005); financial 
effects (Musacchio and Read, 2007); firm performance (Cronin and Popov, 2005); information 
processing (Stenvenson and Gilly, 1991); hiring patterns (Williamson and Cable, 2003); 
communication channels and power structures (Cárdenas, 2012); and multilevel review studies 
(Brass et  al., 2004; Provan et al., 2007). Nevertheless, there is a gap in the literature since network 
studies focus on individual firms and there are no studies on the impact of interlocks on the 
economy as a whole (Cárdenas, 2012). Network studies have been classified into two groups: 
egocentric or organisation-level and network-level approaches (Provan et al., 2007). Organisation-
level approaches help  us understand which network positions might be most or least influential or 
how the positions of organisations in a network might  shift over time. Structural characteristics that 
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are commonly  analysed in networks are in-degree and out-degree centrality, closeness centrality, 
betweenness centrality, broker relationships, and cliques. By contrast, network-level approaches 
focus not on individual organisations but on explaining the properties and characteristics of the 
network as a whole. Network properties include density, fragmentation and structural holes, 
governance, centralisation, and cliques (Provan et al., 2007). In general, in line with performance-
related outcomes, network research has mainly focused on the structure of networks (Cross and 
Cummings, 2004) viewing them as a “living being” who, as Kilduff (2006) indicates, changes 
continuously. The following table defines the main concepts:
Table 3. Summary and explanation of common network terms.
Characteristics Definition
In-degree and out-degree 
centrality
Degree centrality is based on the number of direct links 
maintained by an organisation with others in the network
Closeness centrality
Central organisations have short “paths” (connections) to all 
other organisations in the network
Betweenness centrality
An organisation serves as a gatekeeper within the network. It 
must maintain intermediary links between organisations that 
are not directly connected with one another.
Multiplexity
The strength of the relationship the firm maintains with 
network partners, based on the number of types of links. These 
are indicators of the strength and durability of the firm’s links.
Broker relationships
Organisations that span “structural holes” are considered to be 
brokers, often occupying positions of considerable influence
Cliques
Clusters of three or more organisations connected to one 
another
Density
The overall level of connectedness among organisations in the 
network
CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
39
Characteristics Definition
Fragmentation and structural 
holes
Fragmented networks may exhibit connections among 
organisations that are themselves unconnected or only loosely 
connected to other clusters of connected organisations. This 
means that the network has many structural holes
Governance
The mechanism used to govern and / or manage the overall 
network
Centralisation
The extent to which one or a few organisations in the network 
are considerably more centrally connected than others.
Source: Provan et al., (2007)
Networks have characteristics that can be analysed. The most analysed characteristics by the 
literature are density and centrality. Density is the level of connectedness among organisations in 
the network (Freeman, 1978). “Density is an important indicator of the reliance of companies on 
interlocks” (Musacchio and Read, 2007: 856). Density can help us define clusters, which are 
regions in the network with high density and few links to other clusters (Hoppe and Reinelt, 2010). 
Centralisation tells us how a few firms in the network are more centrally  connected than other firms 
(Freeman, 1978). Centralised networks have a dense core, while decentralised networks are more 
dispersed. In highly centralised networks information is monopolised by a few actors, whereas in 
lowly centralised networks more actors participate in the sharing of information (Cárdenas, 2012). 
In a highly centralised network if one of the most centralised actors disappears, the whole network 
if affected. This is not the case for decentralised networks since new paths are created easily. These 
two variables, density and centralisation, provide information about the structure of the network. 
Density analyses the whole network whereas centralisation analyses the ties among actors (Valenti 
and Horner, 2010). Other characteristics have also been widely analysed. For example, betweenness 
centrality tells us how often one individual is most likely to be a relay point between two or more 
other network members (Hoppe and Reinelt, 2010). In other words, when two actors are willing to 
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interact, they  must go to other actors between them. These other actors have high betweenness 
centrality (Haunschild and Beckman, 1998). On the other hand, closeness measures how quickly 
actors can communicate with all others in a network (Haunschild and Beckman, 1998). The factors 
all network analysis have in common is that networks have to be created and the focus is on large 
firms (Cárdenas, 2012).
One of the major factors firms must consider when establishing their strategies is merely  other firms 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). That is, firms follow competitors’ strategies because they perceive 
them as successful. Nevertheless, as Shropshire (2010) shows, even though institutional theory 
provides a perspective on board interlocks, research in this area has been limited to imitation and 
legitimacy. Haunschild and Beckman (1998) use information to explain the imitation process: “If 
director interlocks are an influential source of information then, one consequence of this 
information is that we should see firms adopting the practices and structures previously  adopted by 
their interlock partners” (Haunschild and Beckman, 1998: 817). It is also important  to note that a 
few firms within the network and their leaders play a central role in the transfer of rules and 
practices (Provan et al., 2007). That is, the core of the network leads its evolution when other firms 
in the network imitate or introduce practices already used by the leaders.
“The tradition of research on board interlocks comes largely from institutional theory, which 
suggests that the imitation of practices across interlocked firms follows normative, coercive, and 
mimetic pressures” (Shropshire, 2010: 248). According to mimetic pressures, firms imitate other 
firms in the sector because they perceive their strategies as successful (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 
Oliver, 1991; Lieberman and Asaba, 2006; Shropshire, 2010). Nevertheless, even though it is 
generally  accepted by scholars that imitation spreads among firms through interlocks, it  is difficult 
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to measure the level of imitation. Density and centralisation influence how information “moves” 
through the network (Provan et al., 2007). This is also important for resource dependence theory 
since it may help  explain which resources firms need to increase their density and centralisation. 
Likewise, some members of the network can provide better information than others (Stenvenson 
and Gilly, 1991). For example, dense networks make it easier for information to be shared by firms. 
Those firms with a low degree of centrality do not share many directors with other firms, becoming 
then peripheral firms in the network or, in an extreme case, when centrality is null (they do not 
share any directors at all), they are isolates. Even though most research focuses on central firms in 
the network, it is important to analyse those firms that are isolated (Aguilera, 1998).
Network structure, its evolution, and board characteristics are important. The evolution of the 
network can help  us understand its changes and the goals pursued with those changes. By contrast, 
changes in board characteristics will affect the network since new interlocks might be created or old 
ones might cease to exist. Networks come in a variety of forms and as Heracleous et al. (2001) 
indicate, there is little research on their impact  on, among other factors, firm performance. 
Networks can also be used to analyse power and control relationships (Cárdenas, 2012), so we can 
better understand how top management works and its economic effects. Cárdenas (2012) creates a 
typology  of corporate networks identifying elitist networks, based on unity, centralisation and 
control; and pluralist networks, based on autonomy, decentralisation and communication ties. 
Based on this typology countries are grouped as follows:
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Table 4. Country, typology, and most central positions in the network. 
Country Central position Typology
Germany Metallurgy corporations Elitist
Canada Oil and banks Elitist
Italy Banks Elitist
Australia Banks Pluralist
France Various sectors Elitist
Sweden Economic holdings Pluralist
United States No central firms Pluralist
United Kingdom No central firms Pluralist
Spain Utilities Elitist
Japan No central firms Pluralist
   Adapted from Cárdenas (2012)
Another typology is the one proposed by  Heracleous et al. (2001). They posit a network typology 
based on two dimensions: interdependence, where the output of one firm is the raw materials of 
another; and durability, “the extent to which these networks persist in the long term, and with 
broadly  similar participants” (Heracleous and Murray, 2001: 142). The different combinations 
high / low interdependence or durability lead to specific types of networks (edge of chaos, 
embedded, brokered, atomistic, and association) which show clear and distinct characteristics.
The following hypotheses focus on which board characteristics cause firms to have a central 
position in the network. The two main board characteristics analysed are size and composition, that 
is, the insiders / outsiders ratio. Here, board size is the number of active board directors at the end 
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of the year, while insiders are board members with management duties in the firm and outsiders are 
board members who do not have management duties in the firm. It is reasonable to think that 
different board characteristics will affect which decisions are made by the firm and, therefore, its 
position in the network. Boards define and implement the strategy  of the firm (Stiles, 2001; Kor, 
2006; Ravasi and Zattoni, 2006; Ruigrok et  al., 2006), and through the human and social capital 
outside board members bring to the firm, they may influence the actions of the board and its 
effectiveness (Kor and Sundaramurthy, 2009). In her study, Kor (2006) finds that board 
composition, along with other factors such as top management team composition, has a direct effect 
on the firm’s R&D investment intensity. Adams et al. (2010), in their study  of U.S. firms, find that 
most board members are believed to be involved in setting the strategy of the firm.  
When firms have a high degree of centrality, it means they share more directors with other firms 
than the rest: they have more interlocks. The benefits of a high degree of centrality, having a central 
position in the network, include managing environmental uncertainty, better access to quality 
information, gaining access to diverse skills and resources, providing legitimacy for the focal firm, 
facilitating communication across firms, allowing board members better control over resources, and 
firms becoming highly visible in the network (Aguilera, 1998; Shropshire, 2010). The result is that 
those firms that are centrally located, sharing more ties with other firms, are the most powerful 
actors in the network (Stenvenson and Radin, 2009).
Research supports the view that interlocks provide information, which in turn affects how firms 
adopt strategies and structures (Haunschild and Beckman, 1998). To increase their centrality, firms 
may choose board members with multiple interlocks. Therefore, firms will have large boards to reap 
the benefits of interlocking directorates. The composition of U.S. boards has been analysed in a 
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number of studies. Finkelstein and Mooney (2003), analysing firms from Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 
500, find that outsiders account for 75% of directors on the average board. Fich and Shivdasani 
(2006) focus on a director’s interlocks and firm performance and find that outsiders form the 
majority  on U.S. boards. Further, outsiders with multiple appointments, interlocks, are not more 
likely to occur in firms that are performing poorly. Boone et al. (2007) find that as firms grow and 
become more complex so do their boards. In the U.S., Fortune 500 firms had an average board size 
of over 11 in 2005, whereas small firms had an average board size of six (Stenvenson and Radin, 
2009). There seems to be a link between firm size and board size.
As for the Spanish case, one recent study about board size and composition was undertaken by 
Acero Fraile and Alcalde Fradejas (2010). Their study  shows the great diversity in size and board 
composition among Spanish firms. The average size of the board is 9,68 members and there are 
more outsiders than insiders. Their results, which highlight than one size does not fit all, also show 
that larger firms have larger boards with a higher percentage of outsiders. The fact that outsiders 
form the majority  on boards can be traced back to the number of “recommended” rules large firms 
may follow (Olivencia’s report in 1998, Aldama’s report in 2003, and unified code for corporate 
government in 2006). In general, these rules were not compulsory. Some of them though (i.e., 
corporate government annual report) became compulsory in 2003.
Interlocks, which are the bricks in the network’s structure, may be created by  any member of the 
board, insiders or outsiders. It is important, according to resource dependence theory, to know 
which board members provide this resource to firms, helping scholars and practitioners better 
understand, among other things, how firms select their board members. The board is then an 
essential link between the firm and the external resources that the firm needs (Kiel and Nicholson, 
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2003). One of the basic premises of resource dependence theory is that it “recognizes the influence 
of external factors on organizational behavior and, although constrained by their context, managers 
can act to reduce environmental uncertainty and dependence” (Hillman et al., 2009: 1404).
Haunschild and Beckman (1998) analyse when interlocks matter instead of the benefits of 
interlocks. Likewise, based on the previous literature, the hypotheses proposed are related to 
specific characteristics of the board that lead to a particular network structure. Overall, differences 
in board composition and size may  affect the resources the firm is able to obtain, which is one of 
the major pillars of resource dependence theory. As for Spanish firms, even though there is little 
research in the area, Acero Fraile and Alcalde Fradejas (2010) show that there seems to be a 
relationship  between firm size and board size on Spanish boards: the larger the firm, the larger is the 
board. Overall, larger firms will need access to a greater range of resources than smaller firms 
(Stening and Wan Tai Wai, 1984; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). This, again, follows resource 
dependence theory. 
Nevertheless, there seems to be no agreement on how board size affects interlocks. On one hand, 
Kiel and Nicholson (2003) in their study of Australian firms show a positive correlation between 
board size and interlocks. In other words, “larger boards are associated with larger companies, more 
diverse companies and more heavily interlocked boards” (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003: 199). The 
results of their analysis show that a larger board size is associated with a greater proportion of 
outside directors and a greater number of interlocks. Their analysis includes a very  significant 
result, that  is, high levels of board interlocks are positively correlated with firm performance. On 
the other hand, Haunschild and Beckman (1998) show that firm size decreases the impact of the 
interlock. In other words, interlock information is less influential for large firms than it is for 
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smaller firms. Even though their study focuses on the relevance of interlocks in the dissemination of 
practices, acquisitions, it  is important because it opens the door to the very relevant question of how 
firm size affects the number of interlocks the firm has. All in all, there is no agreement on how size 
affects interlocks.
Following Kiel and Nicholson’s (2003) explanation of the correlation between board size and firm 
size it is expected to find a direct relationship between board size and interlocks. That is, the 
number of board members (board size) is a way to increase the number of ties the firm has. This is 
then a strategy used by  the firm to increase interlocks, which in turn will increase the firm’s degree 
centrality. Overall, board size and composition adapt to facilitate firm success and boards are 
structured efficiently (Boone et al., 2007). To increase their centrality, firms may  choose board 
members with multiple interlocks. Therefore, firms will have large boards to reap the benefits of 
interlocking directorates. The variables analysed are board size, number of interlocks, degree 
centrality, and firm’s size. The hypotheses are:
H6a: Board’s size is positively related to the number of interlocks the firm has. 
H6b: The larger the board, the higher is the firm’s degree centrality.
H6c: Firm’s size affects board’s size.
Following Kiel and Nicholson’s (2003) study of Australian firms, it is expected to find that 
outsiders provide most of the interlocks to the boards of Spanish firms. Now outsiders are used to 
analyse the number of interlocks the board has as well as firm’s performance. The next hypotheses 
are:
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H7a: Outsiders on corporate boards provide most of the interlocks the board has.
H7b: Higher percentage of outsiders in the board leads to firm’s higher financial results 
(ROA).
Previous studies based on Spanish firms focus on board characteristics and its functions, that is 
monitoring and advice providers (Acero Fraile and Alcalde Fradejas, 2010); the evolution of 
economic development, comparing three different models: Anglo-Saxon, Continental European, 
and Japanese (Aguilera, 1998); type of network (Cárdenas, 2012), or how social networks 
determine a director’s compensation (Crespí and Pascual-Fuster, 2011). The hypothesis proposed 
relates to the density of the network. As Venkatraman and Chi-Hyon (2004) show in their work 
about the video game sector, the density  of ties in a network tends to increase over time. This can be 
partly understood using institutional theory. In her analysis of strategic responses to institutional 
processes, Oliver (1991) defines a strategy, acquiescence, and includes imitate among the different 
tactics firms can use to achieve this. In this case, “imitation, which is consistent with the concept of 
mimetic isomorphism, refers to either conscious or unconscious mimicry of institutional models, 
including, for example, the imitation of successful organizations” (Oliver, 1991: 152). Furthermore, 
networks are less stable over time and firms continuously revise their alliances (Heracleous and 
Murray, 2001). Therefore, following institutional theory, in particular imitation, we expect that the 
overall density  of the network will increase during the period analysed. More firms, imitating each 
other, will increase the number of their interlocks, causing the network to increase its density. 
H8: Network density increases over time.
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Likewise, the next hypothesis also follows new institutionalism to help  explain similar behaviours 
in firms that belong to the same industry. Therefore, the number of isolates, due to the benefits of an 
imitating strategy, will be reduced in the period to study. This imitation strategy can help us 
understand how firms compete in their industries (Shaffer et al., 2000). One of the reasons firms 
imitate each other is environmental uncertainty, which “has been defined as the inability  of a firm’s 
managers to accurately assess the external environment of the organization or the future changes 
that might occur in that environment” (Koka et al., 2006: 723). Under uncertainty, firms invite on 
their board representatives of the various resources they depend on to reduce environmental 
uncertainty and maintain their position in the market (Drago et al., 2011). Under the environmental 
conditions of uncertainty, firms will imitate those strategies that  have been implemented by other 
firms and that have proven to be successful. Overall, the imitation of successful strategies can help 
explain these two hypotheses.
H9: An imitating strategy (increasing interlocks) causes the number of isolated firms to 
decrease over time.
Even though at first glance there seems to be a link between network density  and the number of 
isolates (e.g., higher densities may have fewer isolate firms), these two variables do not have a 
direct relationship. Density refers to the overall level of connectedness among organisations in the 
network. Therefore, firms may have more links with other firms, while the number of isolates in the 
network is not reduced or it might even increase over time.
One of the major advantages of networks is access to financial capital at a reduced cost. Economic 
transactions become embedded in social relations that affect the allocation and valuation of 
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resources (Uzzi, 1999). In the United States, networks work as complements to financial markets 
(Musacchio, 2004). Networks provide firms not only  access to a number of resources such as 
knowledge or technologies, but also access to financial markets (Inkpen and Tsang, 2005), which 
otherwise may be closed to them. The main advantages of social capital are linked with financing. 
Sociological theory argues that banking transactions and social relationships are embedded, making 
them no longer independent. Firms are more likely to obtain credits at lower than average interest 
rates if they have social ties with banks, which agrees with resource dependence theory. In other 
words, those firms with social ties and relationships with people upon which their transactions 
depend are more likely to obtain credit loans at a below market rate (Uzzi, 1999). Having an outside 
director from a lending firm helps reduce the cost of lending in a twofold way: it will increase the 
ability  of the firm to access finance and the director, at the same time, will protect the interest of the 
bank (Adams et al., 2010).
Musacchio (2004) proved that in Mexico and Brazil when firms had in their corporate boards 
directors with banking backgrounds and ties, they  also had easier access to credit loans. When firms 
are in good relationships with banks, they increase their access to funds since monitoring costs and 
information asymmetries are reduced for banks. In Mexico, for example, firms used informal 
institutional ties to gather information. Firms obtained funds through friends and personal 
connections. The main business figures in Mexico often were politicians who helped firms achieve 
their goals and increase their benefits. When Mexican firms had politicians on their boards of 
directors, the firm’s costs linked to dealing and negotiating with the government were reduced 
(Musacchio and Read, 2007).
CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
50
Mizruchi and Stearns (1994), in their longitudinal study, analyse large U.S. firms to determine that 
corporate borrowing depends on four factors: the expected return on borrowing, a firm should not 
borrow unless its expected returns exceed the cost of the fund; the availability of internal funds, 
where a firm’s level of retained earnings is inversely related to its level of borrowing; the strategic 
orientation of the CEO, where firms whose CEOs come from financial backgrounds have higher 
levels of borrowing than firms whose CEOs come from non-financial backgrounds; and the firm’s 
board composition, firms with financial representation on their boards of directors borrow more 
than firms without financial representation. They find that when outside directors from financing 
firms are on the board, the company  is more likely  to borrow from these firms since financial firms 
are more willing to lend when they can closely  monitor their loans and firms are more willing to 
borrow when they believe board members from financing firms can provide better advice on 
borrowing.
Uzzi (1999), analysing which U.S. firms get funds and their costs, finds that when there are social 
ties between firms and their banks, firms have easier access to capital and at  a lower cost. The key 
factor is to understand that economic transactions become embedded in social relations, which 
affect the allocation and valuation of resources. “Social embeddedness is defined as the degree to 
which commercial transactions take place through social relations and networks of relations that use 
exchange protocols associated with social, noncommercial attachments to govern business 
dealings” (Uzzi, 1999: 482). These social relationships allow, among other things, for the exchange 
of private information, which in turn allows banks and firms to find solutions to financial problems 
that are not available through normal market relationships. “The transfer of private knowledge 
promotes value creation in exchanges by revealing to exchange partners the unique possibilities 
they possess for matching their competencies and resources” (Uzzi, 1999: 483).
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In 1981, in a study of 456 Fortune 500 firms in the United States, over 70% of the firms had at least 
one board member who also sat on the board of a financial institution (Mizruchi, 1996). Mizruchi 
goes one step further and indicates that there are both explicit  and inadvertent  reasons for the 
formation of interlocks. In addition, one of the first network studies, Mariolis (1975), finds that in 
1969 among U.S. firms, commercial banks were the most central firms in the network. “This 
indicates that banks do serve an integrating function in the economy” (Mariolis, 1975: 437). Out of 
the 20 most central firms, eight were banks, seven industrial firms, three insurance firms, and two 
utilities. Both studies, which show the relationships among firms and financial institutions in the 
U.S., are good examples of the importance of interlocks, particularly  in the banking system, how 
they  have been analysed in other countries, and the long history of studies in this area, which we are 
lacking in Spain.
On the European side, Ziegler et al. (1985) examine directorship interlocks in Germany. They show 
that banks, as in the U.S., are the most central firms in the network. Later, Windolf and Beyer 
(1996) find that banks, as well as insurance firms, are at the core of the network. “The centrality of 
banks and insurance companies in those networks is often taken as an indicator of the importance of 
financial institutions” (Windolf and Beyer, 1996: 220). On the Spanish side, Aguilera (1998), in her 
study of 190 Spanish firms, finds that large Spanish domestic banks and utility  companies are at the 
core of the network. Out of the 13 most central firms in the network, six are banks and four are in 
the utility  sector, with one each in the oil, food and tobacco, and telecommunication sectors. This is 
an important  characteristic of the structure of the network and it can help  scholars understand and 
analyse the different strategies firms pursue in order to achieve their goals, since access to financial 
resources is one of the most important factors firms have to consider. But Aguilera’s analysis 
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occurred at a moment of transition in the Spanish economy and society which might  not be the case 
now. This dissertation posits that networks change over time since board of directors also change 
over time. The hypothesis proposed is also related to the characteristics of the network. In this case, 
to the most central members of the network.
H10: Banks have a central position in the network.








To test the hypotheses outlined previously data was obtained from a number of sources. Firms in the 
Spanish Stock Exchange are analysed. But not all firms in the stock exchange are analysed, only the 
larger ones, the most relevant ones listed in CNMV. This implies the firms analysed here are all 
large in size, a predetermined bias. Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV) is the 
regulating institution for the several stock exchanges in Spain. CNMV and Bolsa de Madrid 
(Madrid’s Stock Exchange) have a classification system of sector and sub-sector. The sub-sector 
category was used herein to classify  firms (insurance, banking, real estate, and so on). The sample 
for 2004 included 181 firms and the sample for 2009 included 156 firms. These are the two years to 
analyse.
3.2 Definitions
The following definitions are used: Board size represents the number of members of the board of 
directors as listed in the annual corporate government report filed by  the firm. Outside directors are 
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members of the board of directors listed in the annual corporate government report filed by the firm 
as outsiders. Inside directors are members of the board of directors listed in the annual corporate 
government report  filed by  the firm as insiders. Board interlocks are individuals who are board 
members in at least  two different firms. There is no differentiation between outsiders or insiders, 
that is, the individual can be an outsider or insider in any of the firms and still an interlock is 
created. Firm size refers to the market-value-weighted index level of the firm (capitalisation). This 
data is obtained through firm’s corporate reports.
Density is the degree to which members are connected to all other members. Centralisation is the 
“extent to which a set of actors are organised around a central point” (Caroline, 1996: 333). Both, 
density  and centralisation are calculated using UCINET network software. A network is a set of 
individuals, firms in this study, and the relationship or lack of relationship among them. An isolate 
is a firm with no interlocks with other firms. Performance can be measured financially and 
strategically (Peng and Luo, 2000). Return on assets is used here due to its accuracy. 
Regulated industries are “firms that receive a significant portion of their revenues or face elevated 
levels of regulatory  scrutiny have high motivation to manage that dependency through 
CPA” (Hillman et  al., 2004: 840). Former government officials are elected national officials, 
including Prime Ministers, cabinet ministers, Members of Parliament, Senators, and Secretaries of 
State. Committee membership, that is when a board member listed as a member of a committee by 
the firm in the annual corporate government report filed by  the firm. Sociometry is “the method for 
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ascertaining the relationship  between units” (Tichy et al., 1979: 510). Firms were labeled as 
“politically active” if any of the boards members was previously a former government official. 
3.3 Data collection
As Tichy  et al. (1979) indicate, there are different data collection methods: Positional analysis, 
which uses information provided by the firm; reputational method, which uses judgements of 
selected community  members through interviews; decisional analysis, which focuses in the process 
of decision making; and interactional methods, which focus on the flow of interactions and its 
feedback. The advantages and disadvantages of each method are shown in the table below.
Table 5. Data collection methods.
Method Strength Weaknesses
Positional analysis Easy access Least accurate
Reputational Simplicity of design and data collection Status bias often built in
Decisional analysis Issue specific
Ignores indirect, subtle 
influence
Interactional analysis Reliability of data Requires high trust
Adapted from Tichy et al. (1979)
This dissertation will be using positional analysis. The sources are official reports filed by the firm 
to the regulator and it then overcomes the main weaknesses of this method, that is, accuracy. If the 
regulator finds errors in the reports firms will be sanctioned. The threatened penalty for disobeying 
the law leads to information accuracy.
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The first step  was to identify  the firms for the sample. CNMV produces a yearly  report in which 
firms are classified according to their capitalisation levels, from most capitalised (market-value-
weighted index level) to least capitalised, that is, their size. This annual report was used to select  the 
sample of firms for both years. Not all firms in the Spanish stock exchange are listed there, only the 
larger ones. The reports are at http://www.cnmv.es/portal/Publicaciones/Informes.aspx. These 
reports also analyse at  the aggregate level some of the key features of the largest firms in the 
Spanish stock exchange such as the number of board meetings, board composition according to 
gender, number of committees, average number of members in each committee, wages for board 
members, insiders / outsiders ratio, board size, and so on. Access to the CNMV webpage is free and 
the annual reports can be downloaded without any additional charge. 
Once the annual reports for the years 2004 and 2009 had been downloaded and analysed, the next 
step was to identify  the firms to be included in the sample by name and to create a database. The 
result was, as previously  mentioned, 181 firms in 2004 and 156 in 2009. Arcelor Mittal S.A. is not 
included in either year because it does not have to provide specific information to CNMV due to 
being a Luxembourg-based firm. Appendix I is the list of firms for 2004 and appendix II is the list 
of firms for 2009.
Once a list of all firms had been made, the next step  was to obtain, also from CNMV, their 
Corporate Government Annual Report. The reports are at  http://www.cnmv.es/portal/Consultas/EE/
BusquedaIGC.aspx. CNMV requires since 2004 firms to submit this report  yearly with specific 
information about their corporate governance practices and detailed information about board 
members. There is a standard form for firms to fill and turn in. Access to the CNMV webpage is 
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free and the reports can be downloaded without any additional charge. The following table is an 
example of the information gathered through firm’s corporate government reports. The complete list 
of fields is in Appendix III for 2004 and in Appendix IV for 2009.




ABENGOA, S.A. Other market services 7 2 5
ABERTIS 
INFRAESTRUCTURAS, S.A. Parking and highways 19 1 18
ACCIONA, S.A. Construction 11 4 7
The following table is a summary of the information gathered through CNMV.
Table 7. Summary of the information collected through CNMV for 2004 and 2009.
2004 2009
Firms 181 156
Board Members 1.748 1.626
Average size of board 9,657 10,423
Number of insiders 364 20,82% 301 18,51%
Number of outsiders 1.384 79,18% 1.325 81,49%
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The previous table shows us the average board size has increased from 9,657 in 2004 to 10,423 in 
2009 while the number of insiders and outsiders has decreased in both years but barely changed in 
percentage values.  
Furthermore, Spanish law classifies outsiders into share-capital, representing shareholders; 
independent, chosen because of their expertise and knowledge; and “other outsiders”, which cannot 
be included in any of the previous groups. The following graphs show their relevance in both years, 
and we can see share-capital outsiders are a majority.








Graph 2. Outsider’s classification in 2009.
A database was created with the relevant  information gathered through CNMV. This database 
includes the following fields: Name of the firm, their ID number (CIF - código de identificación 
fiscal), activity sector, capitalisation (market-value-weighted index level), total number of board 
members as well as their names, last  names, and gender; number of insiders, number of share-
capital outsiders, number of independent outsiders, number of other outsiders, number of interlocks 
the firm has with other firms not  in the same business group, number of interlocks the firm has with 
firms in the same business group, number of interlocks provided by  insiders, and number of 
interlocks provided by outsiders. The software used to create and use this database is FileMaker Pro 
11 Advance.
The next step, on the political side, was to create a database with the names of all former 
government officials from 1977 to 2009, that is eight terms plus the constituent term. Former 
government officials are elected national officials, as explained before, including Prime Ministers, 









The Spanish Parliament’s web page, http://www.congreso.es/portal/page/portal/Congreso/Congreso/
Diputados/DiputadosTodasLegislaturas?_piref73_1335406_73_1335403_1335403.next_page=/wc/
menuAbecedarioInicio, provided biographical information about Members of Parliament (name, 
last name, education, background, and political party  affiliation), the Spanish Senate’s web page, 
http://www.senado.es/web/composicionorganizacion/senadores/composicionsenado/
senadoresdesde1977/consultaorden/index.html, provided the same biographical information (name, 
last name, education, background, and political party affiliation) for senators, and I contacted the 
Moncloa Palace communication office (official residence for the Prime Minister of Spain since 
1977) and they provided a list of former Secretaries of State from 1977 to 2008. The result was a 
total of 3.727 former government officials and their corresponding biographical information. The 
software used to create and use this database was FileMaker Pro 11 Advance. 
Now, both databases were cross referenced in order to know which board members had been former 
government officials. The result was 124 board members, 61 of them in 2004 and 63 in 2009, who 
had previously been former government officials. Appendix V provides the full list for 2004 and 
Appendix VI is the full list for 2009. The following table is a summary of the information.
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Table 8. Summary of the information regarding firms and former government officials.
2004 2009
Firms 181 156
Firms with former 
government officials 45 24,86% 42 26,92%
Number of former 
government officials 61 63
% firms with former 
government officials 24,86% 26,92%
We can see there is a slight increase in the percentage in the number of former government officials, 
from 24,86% in 2004 to 26,92% in 2009, regardless of the decrease in the number of firms. The 
number of former government officials increases from 61 in 2004 to 63 in 2009 even though the 
number of firms has decreased from 181 in 2004 to 156 in 2009. There is then an overall increase in 
the number of former government officials.
On the financial side, SABI (Sistema de Análisis de Balances Ibéricos) at https://sabi.bvdinfo.com/
version-2015106/Search.QuickSearch.serv?_CID=1&context=1ORTBUC0XF4WGZL was 
accessed. SABI is a database with general information and annual financial statements of over one 
million Spanish firms. The information includes company financials and financial strength 
indicators. Firms were located through their ID numbers and were able to create a database which 
included name of the firm, ID number (CIF) and ROA for those firms. ROA is one of the most 
common accounting measures of market performance. Banking firms are excluded.
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The result  was three databases which could be cross referenced using firm’s ID number (CIF) with 
key information. This databases included the firm’s name, ID number, activity sector, firm size 
(capitalisation level), number of board members (board size), and names of all board members, 
number of insiders, number of outsiders, types of outsiders (share-capital, independent, and “other 
outsiders”), gender, number of committees, average number of members in each committee, names 
of those committees, political affiliation if any, background (education) of those former government 
officials, who creates interlocks, number of interlocks per firm, number of interlocks provided by 
insiders, number of interlocks provided by outsiders, and return on assets for the specific years.
3.4 Statistical analysis
To analyse networks and following previous research, social network analysis was used. “Social 
network analysis … is a set of theories, tools, and processes for understanding the relationships and 
structures of a network” (Hoppe and Reinelt, 2010: 601). Social network analysis programs 
represent the structures of relationships among firms. Nodes here are firms. The links in the 
network are directed, that is, firm A has a board member that is also in firm B (an interlock). 
Directed links can be one-way, as in the previous example, or two-way, namely firm A has a board 
member in firm B and firm B has a board member in A. This dissertation used two-way directed 
links. Further, links were valued, meaning if, for example, three members of company’s A board are 
also in company’s B board, the value of the interlock is three, and so on.
In line with other studies such us Musacchio and Read (2007), the interlocks to be analysed were 
the ones firms have with other unrelated firms. There are a few exceptions to this rule, mostly in 
2004. That is, when two firms that belong to the same business group share interlocks and both are 
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listed in CNMV as firms to be analysed, they are considered to be independent for the purpose of 
the analysis. For example, Banco Español de Crédito, S.A., Banesto, is mostly owned by Banco 
Santander, S.A. In theory, the interlocks between these two firms should not be considered since 
they  both belong to the same business group. However, both firms are listed in the CNMV reports, 
and therefore, for the purpose of this study, they are considered to be independent.
A social network analysis program, UCINET (University of California at Irving Networks), was 
used to analyse interlocks. UCINET is a menu-driven program where all data are described as 
matrices. A free trial version of the program can be found at https://sites.google.com/site/
ucinetsoftware/downloads. The total number of shared directors, not the total number of other firms 
to which a given corporation is linked to, was used to calculate interlocks. Integrated with UCINET 
is the NetDraw program for visualising networks. UCINET provides both statistical, for example, 
matrix algebra and multivariate statistics, and graphic results that can be analysed to understand 
networks. According to Tichy et al. (1979) network analysis relies on sociometric data. When 
mapping these relationships among units a graph is created. UCINET is used to calculate both 
variables, density and centralisation, of the networks analysed here for 2004 and 2009. 
IBM SPSS Statistics, version 19 was used for the further statistical analysis such as regression 
analysis. SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) provides the results of Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient, which can help us understand the linear correlation, if any, between two 
variables. Pearson’s correlation coefficient measures the strength of the linear relationship between 
two variables and ranges from -1 to +1 inclusive, where a value of 0 shows no linear relationship, a 
value of 1 shows a perfect  positive linear relationship among the two variables, and a value of -1 
shows that one variable increases as the other decreases. Regression analysis explains variability  in 
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the dependent variable with the explanatory variable. SPSS output provides Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient (ranging from -1 to +1) as well as the levels in which it is statistically significant  (p < 
0,01 will be used here). Regression analysis will be used to explain variability in the dependent 
variable, number of interlocks the firm has, with the explanatory variable, board size, that is, there 
is a link between board size and the number of interlocks the firm has. Larger boards lead to higher 
number of interlocks. This is hypothesis H6a: Board’s size is positively related to the number of 
interlocks the firm has. Regression analysis will also be used to explain variability in the dependent 
variable, firm’s degree centrality, with the explanatory  variable, board size for both years. This is 
hypothesis H6b: The larger the board, the higher is the firm’s degree centrality. Finally, regression 
analysis is used for H7b: Higher percentage of outsiders leads to higher financial results (ROA), 
that is, to explain variability in the dependent variable, performance, with the explanatory variable, 
higher percentage of outsiders.
SPSS is also used for Levene's test, which assesses the assumption that  variances of the populations 
from which different samples are drawn are equal. The null hypothesis is then that the population 
variances are equal. The significance level (p-value) of Levene’s test helps us decide if we have to 
reject or accept the null hypothesis. If the resulting p-value is less than the significance level (! of 
0,05 will be used here), the differences in sample variances are unlikely to have occurred based on 
random sampling and the null hypothesis of equal variances is rejected. Levene’s test in SPSS 
provides two lines of information, one where equal variances are assumed and a second one where 
equal variances are not assumed. The resulted p-value tells us which file we should focus on. 
Next, when using Levene’s test we need to look at the results for the t-test for equality of means. 
Once again the p-value will tell us if we need to accept or reject the hypothesis. The null hypothesis 
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is then that the population variances are equal. The rule is that if p-value " ! , then we have to reject 
H0. When p # ! then we cannot reject the null hypothesis. The variables analysed with Levene’s test 
will be the number of former government officials in regulated industries versus the number of 
former government officials in non regulated industries for both years (H0: µNumber of former 
government officials in regulated industries = µNumber of former government officials in non 
regulated industries, H1: µNumber of former government officials in regulated industries $ 
µNumber of former government officials in non regulated industries). Levene’s test will be used for 
the third hypothesis, H3: Firms in highly regulated sectors will have more former government 
officials in their boards; and the fourth hypothesis, that is H4: Firms with former government 
officials in their boards have better financial results (ROA) than those firms without former 
government officials in their boards (H0: µROA with former government officials = µROA without 
former government officials, H1: µROA with former government officials $ µROA without former 
government officials).
One way ANOVA is used to tell us if there is a statistically significant difference between groups. 
When using ANOVA the observed variance in a variable is partitioned into components attributable 
to different sources of variation, in other words, whether or not the means of several groups are 
equal. In order to be able to use ANOVA a few conditions must be met. First the sample must be 
tested for to see if the dependent variable is normally distributed using the Kolmogorov-Smirnova 
test. Then tested for homogeneity  of variances with Levene’s test. SPSS will be used for these tests. 
SPSS output includes the Shapiro-Wilk. The main difference with the Kolmogorov-Smirnova test is 
the size of the sample. 
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The Kolmogorov-Smirnova test  (normality test) analyses samples which are then standardised and 
compared with a standard normal distribution. When the significance level is greater than 0,05 then 
the sample is normally distributed. If it is below 0,05, the data significantly deviates from a normal 
distribution. Levene’s test has been explained before. When the significance level is greater than 
0,05 we cannot reject H0, that is, there is homogeneity of variances.
SPSS ANOVA’s output provides two tables. One with descriptive analysis of the data, that is, mean, 
standard deviation, and maximum and minimum values; and a second table with two lines of 
information, between groups and within groups. If the significance level is below 0,05 then we 
know that there are significant differences between the groups as a whole. ANOVA will be used to 
test the relationship between firm size, dependent variable, and board size. No further analysis will 
be used, for example, multiple comparisons with the Tukey post-hoc test  since that is not the focus 
of the analysis. ANOVA is used for H6c: Firm’s size affects board’s size.
Finally, firm size will be used in a number of cases as a contingency factor, that is, firms will be 
grouped according to their size and possible different  behaviours will be tested, meaning firm size 




The first hypothesis proposes former government officials are, due to their educational background, 
community  influentials and the second hypothesis proposes that former government officials’ 
background does not match the activities of the committee they are in. Former government 
officials’ educational background was gathered from the Congress and Senate web pages, and once 
we know which former government officials are also board members, the following tables were 
created.
Table 9. Educational background of former government officials.
Degree 2004 % 2009 %
Both 
Years %
Economy 16 26,22% 17 26,98% 33 26,61%
Economy / Business 0 0% 3 4,76% 3 2,41%
Engineering 10 16,39% 6 9,52% 16 12,9%
Law 27 44,26% 28 44,44% 55 44,35%
Law / Economy 4 6,55% 6 9,52% 10 8,06%
Medicine 2 3,27% 0 0% 2 1,61%
Not provided 2 3,27% 3 4,76% 5 4,03%
Total 61 100% 63 100% 124 100%
CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS
68
Graph 3. Educational background of former government officials, 2004 and 2009.
There were 61 and 63 former government officials in 2004 and 2009 respectively. Most former 
government officials in both years have backgrounds in law, 44.26% in 2004 and 44.44% in 2009. 
But the firms are not law related, that is, none of the firms in both years are law firms. There is no 
match between the individual background and the firm main activity. Furthermore, when the 
committees firms have were analysed, assigning them a required degree and cross referenced those 
degrees with the ones former government officials participating in those committees have the 


























Audit 25 37,31% 23 33,33%
Appointments and remuneration 17 25,37% 27 39,13%
Executive 17 25,37% 9 13,04%
Strategy and investment 2 2,98% 2 2,89%
Related-party transactions 1 1,49% 3 4,34%
International 2 2,98% 2 2,89%
Safety 1 1,49% 1 1,44%
Compliance 1 1,49% 1 1,44%
Risk 1 1,49% 1 1,44%
Total 67 100% 69 100%


















The reason the number here, 67 and 69, do not match the number of former government officials for 
those years, 61 and 63, is due to some former government officials being members of more than one 
committee.
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Graph 5. Does former government official’s background match committee’s degree 
requirements?
These tables show that  most former government officials belong to committees which do not match 
their educational background. This dissertation posits these tables and graph show that most former 
government officials are selected to the board not because of their specific industry expertise or 
because they  are business experts, but because of their links outside the board and the firm which 
may help the firm achieve its goals. Former government officials are then community  influentials. 
There is also full support for the hypothesis 1b, that is, former government officials’ background 
does not match their committee activities, since most educational backgrounds (58,21% in 2004 and 
52,17% in 2009) do not match committee requirements, which leads to former government officials 
are, due to their educational background, community influentials.
The second hypothesis proposes that  larger firms will include more former government officials 
than smaller firms. Firms were ranked according to their stock capitalisation, that  is their size, and 

























IBEX 35 24 39,34% 32 50,79%
Group 1 13 21,31% 6 9,52%
Group 2 7 11,48% 6 9,52%
Group 3 3 4,92% 12 19,05%
Group 4 14 22,95% 7 11,11%
Total 61 100% 63 100%
*Size: 
Ibex 35: largest capitalization in the stock exchange
Group 1, stock capitalization above 1000! million
Group 2, stock capitalization 500 to 1000! million
Group 3, stock capitalization 250 to 500! million
Group 4, stock capitalization less than 250! million
Graph 6. Percentage of former government officials for 2004 and 2009 based on firm size.
 
Size:
Ibex 35: largest capitalization in the stock exchange
Group 1, stock capitalization above 1000! million
Group 2, stock capitalization 500 to 1000! million
Group 3, stock capitalization 250 to 500! million













Graph 7. Types of former government officials, both years together.
Table 13. Number of former government officials and gender distribution.
2004 2009
Male Female Male Female
Minister 23 0 22 2
Senate 6 0 6 1
Congress 18 0 14 2
Secretary of State 14 0 16 0
Total 61 0 58 5
As table 12 shows, larger firms, IBEX 35 and Group 1, account for over 60% of former government 
officials in boards for both years with a very clear increase in 2009 in the number of former 












both years, that  is, larger firms have more former government officials in their boards than smaller 
firms. 
The third hypothesis proposes that  firms in highly regulated sectors will have more former 
government officials in their boards than those firms in not highly  regulated sectors. Highly 
regulated sectors include utilities sector, electricity, banking and financial services, and chemicals. 
After gathering the relevant information the following tables were created.






Oil, Gas and other sources 6 9,84% 7
Transport and distribution 6 9,84% 5
Banking 5 8,20% 14
Construction 5 8,20% 7
Advertising, press and R.T.V. 5 8,20% 6
Electricity 5 8,20% 4
Real estate 4 6,56% 21
Metals 3 4,92% 5
Leisure, tourism and hospitality 3 4,92% 4
Telecommunications 3 4,92% 4
Textile, clothing and footwear 2 3,28% 8








Food 2 3,28% 5
Portfolio and Holding 1 1,64% 11
Paper and graphic arts 1 1,64% 8
Electronics and software 1 1,64% 3
Food and beverage 1 1,64% 3
Parking and highways 1 1,64% 3
Insurance 1 1,64% 2
Retail 1 1,64% 2
Chemical industry 1 1,64% 1
Paper, wood and chemical 1 1,64% 1
Pharmaceuticals 1 1,64% 1
Total 61 100% 130






Electricity and Gas 9 14,28% 5
Banks / Savings 7 11,11% 9
Construction 6 9,52% 8
Real Estate and Other 6 9,52% 25








Transport / Distribution 5 7,93% 3
Paper and printing 4 6,34% 5
Leisure / Travel / Hospitality 3 4,76% 3
Food & Beverage 2 3,17% 11
Oil 2 3,17% 2
Pharmaceutical Products 2 3,17% 7
Renewable Energy 2 3,17% 4
Communication Media and Advertising 1 1,58% 5
Mineral / Metals / Processing 1 1,58% 8
Textile / Clothing / Footwear 1 1,58% 6
Electronics / Software 1 1,58% 3
Telecommunications and Other 1 1,58% 3
Equipment goods 1 1,58% 7
Portfolio and Holding 1 1,58% 10
Building materials 1 1,58% 3
Chemical Industry 1 1,58% 2
Insurance 1 1,58% 2
Total 63 100% 139
                 
In 2004 six sectors have 52.46% of all former government officials. These sectors include utilities 
and banking, which are highly  regulated. In 2009 again six sectors have 60.32% of all former 
government officials. Now, highly regulated sectors such as utilities and banking, are the top of the 
list. To test this hypothesis I use Levene's test  which assesses the assumption that variances of the 
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populations from which different samples are drawn are equal. The null hypothesis is then that the 
population variances are equal. The following table shows the results for 2004, SPSS output.
H0: µNumber of former government officials in regulated industries = µNumber of former 
government officials in non regulated industries
H1: µNumber of former government officials in regulated industries ! µNumber of former 
government officials in non regulated industries
Table 16. t test for 2004, firms in regulated sector have more former government 
officials in their boards.
Levene's test t-test for Equality of Means














1,075 15,799 0,298 0,251 0,234
The significance level (p-value) of Levene’s test is 0,347 for 2004. This value is not lower than ! 
(0,05), then we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the variability of the two groups is equal and 
we focus on the first line (italic). The p-value for the t-test is 0,266. The rule is that if p " ! , then 
reject H0 (the null hypothesis is then that the population variances are equal). Since 0,266 is not 
lower than 0,05 we cannot reject the null hypotheses, that is, there is no difference in the number of 
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former government officials among firms in regulated sectors and firms in non regulated sectors. 
There is then no support for this hypothesis for the year 2004, that is, firms in highly regulated 
sectors will have more former government officials in their boards than those firms in not highly 
regulated sectors. The following table shows the results for 2009, SPSS output.
H0: µNumber of former government officials in regulated industries = µNumber of former 
government officials in non regulated industries
H1: µNumber of former government officials in regulated industries ! µNumber of former 
government officials in non regulated industries
Table 17. t-test for 2009, firms in regulated sector have more former government 
officials in their boards.
Levene's test t-test for Equality of Means














1,159 12,395 0,268 0,431 0,372
The significance level (p-value) of Levene’s test is 0,044 for 2009. This value is lower than ! 
(0,05), then we can reject the null hypothesis that the variability of the two groups is equal and we 
focus on the lower line (italic). The p-value for the t test is 0,268. The rule is that if p  " ! , then 
CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS
79
reject H0. Since 0,268 is not lower than 0,05 we cannot reject the null hypotheses, that is there is no 
difference in the number of former government officials among firms in regulated sectors and firms 
in non regulated sectors. There is then no support for this hypothesis for the year 2009. In both 
years the results show firms in highly regulated sectors do not have more former government 
officials in their boards than firms in not highly regulated sectors.
The fourth hypothesis proposes that firms with former government officials in their boards have 
better financial results (ROA) than those without former government officials in their boards. This 
is a direct link between former government officials and performance. The results do not support 
this hypothesis for either year. The following tables are adapted from SPSS output and explained 
afterwards.
Table 18. t-test for 2004, former government officials in boards lead to higher ROA.
Levene's test t-test for Equality of Means














-0,914 44,417 0,366 -2,983 3,263
Levene's test assesses the assumption that variances of the populations from which different 
samples are drawn are equal. 
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H0: µROA with former government officials = µROA without former government officials
H1: µROA with former government officials ! µROA without former government officials
The null hypothesis is that the population variances are equal. As we can see from the previous 
table, for the year 2004 with a significance level of 0,05 Levene’s test has a significance level of 
0,025 (smaller than 0,05) which allows us to reject the null hypothesis, that is, variances are not 
equal. This means we have to focus on the second (italic) line of results provided by SPSS. Here we 
find a t value of -0,914 and 44,4 degrees of freedom with a significance level of 0,366 (greater than 
0,05). The conclusion is we can not reject the null hypothesis (the rule is that if p  " !, then reject 
H0), that is, there is no difference in results (ROA) among those firms with former government 
officials and those without former government officials in their boards for the year 2004. 
Table 19. t-test for 2009, former government officials in boards lead to higher ROA. 
Levene's test t-test for Equality of Means














-0,103 75,456 0,918 ,27466 2,66321
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As for 2009, Levene’s test has a significance level of 0,614 (greater than 0,05), which does not 
allow us to reject the null hypothesis, that is, variances in the two groups are equal. This means we 
have to focus on the first (italic) line of results. Here we find a t value of -0,098 and 142 degrees of 
freedom with a significance level of 0,922 (greater than 0,05). The conclusion is that we can not 
reject the null hypothesis, that is, there is no difference in results (ROA) among those firms with 
former government officials and those without former government officials in their boards for the 
year 2009. The results show there is no difference in performance, measured as return on assets, 
between firms that have former government officials in their boards and those firms which do not 
have former government officials in their boards.
The next hypothesis, H5, states that once involved in politically strategic management, firms will 
continue to do so. There were 45 firms in 2004 which had a former government officials in their 
boards. There were 42 firms in 2009 which had a former government officials in their boards. The 
following tables list these firms.
Table 20. Firms in 2004 with former government officials in their boards.
Firm
Number of former 
government officials
Acerinox, S.A. 1
ACS, Actividades de Construcción y Servicios S.A. 2






Number of former 
government officials
Antena 3 de Television, S.A. 1
Avanzit, S.A. 1
Banco Español de Credito, S.A. 1
Banco Pastor, S.A. 1
Banco Santander Central Hispano, S.A. 3
Campofrio Alimentación, S.A. 1
Cartera Hotelera, S.A. 1
Cementos Molins S.A. 1
CIE Automotive, S.A. 1
Cintra Concesiones de Infraestructuras de Transporte, S.A. 1
Compañía Española de Petróleos, Sociedad Anónima 2
Compañia Logistica de Hidrocarburos CLH, S.A. 3
Corporación Mapfre, S.A. 1




Española del Zinc, S.A. 1
Fomento de Construcciones y Contratas, S.A. 1
Gestevisión Telecinco, S.A. 1
Grupo Empresarial Ence, S.A. 1
Grupo Ferrovial S.A. 1





Number of former 
government officials
Metrovacesa, S.A. 1
Miquel y Costas & Miquel, S.A. 1
Natraceutical, S.A. 1
Obrascón Huarte Lain, S.A. 1
Promotora de Informaciones, S.A. 1
Red Eléctrica de España, S.A. 2
Repsol YPF S.A. 2
Sociedad Anonima Hullera Vasco-Leonesa 1
Sogecable S.A. 2
Sol Melia S.A. 3
Tavex Algodonera, S.A. 1
Tele Pizza, S.A. 1
Testa Inmuebles en Renta, S.A 2
Union Fenosa, S.A. 1
Uralita S.A. 1
Urbanizaciones y Transportes, S.A. 1
45 firms 61
Table 21. Firms in 2009 with former government officials in their boards.
Firm
Number of former 
government officials
Abengoa, S.A. 1




Number of former 
government officials
Adolfo Dominguez, S.A. 1
Avanzit, S.A. 1
Banco Español de Credito, S.A. 2
Banco Pastor, S.A. 1
Banco Santander, S.A. 4
Befesa Medio Ambiente, S.A. 1
Campofrio Food Group, S.A. 1
Cementos Molins, S.A. 1
CIE Automotive, S.A. 1
Compañia Española de Petroleos, S.A. 1





Fersa Energias Renovables, S.A. 2
Fomento de Construcciones y Contratas, S.A. 2
Gamesa Corporacion Tecnologica, S.A. 1
Gas Natural SDG, S.A. 1
Gestevision Telecinco, S.A. 1
Grupo Empresarial Ence, S.A. 3
Iberia Lineas Aereas de España, S.A. 3
Inbesos, S.A. 1




Number of former 
government officials
Inypsa Informes y Proyectos, S.A. 1
Mapfre, S.A. 1
Martinsa-Fadesa, S.A. 1
Miquel y Costas & Miquel, S.A. 1
Natraceutical, S.A. 1
Obrascon Huarte Lain, S.A. 1
Realia Business, S.A. 1
Red Electrica Corporacion, S.A. 4
Repsol YPF, S.A. 1
Reyal Urbis, S.A. 1
Sol Meliá, S.A. 3
SOS Corporacion Alimentaria, S.A. 1
Tecnicas Reunidas, S.A. 2
Testa Inmuebles en Renta, S.A. 2
Vueling Airlines, S.A. 2
Zeltia, S.A. 1
42 firms 63
Some firms were bought, for example, Ferrovial bought Cintra, some firms stopped their activities 
in the Spanish Stock Exchange, such as Aldeasa, S.A., and so on. The result is the following table.
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Table 22. Evolution of former government officials in boards. 2009 compared to 2004.
Number of former 
government officials Firms %




There is partial support for the fifth hypothesis: 69,23% of the firms continued to have or increased 
the number of former government officials in their boards. 
The sixth(a) hypothesis proposed that board size is positively  related to the number of interlocks the 
firm has. IBM SPSS statistics and regression analysis was used to explain variability in the 
dependent variable, number of interlocks, with the explanatory  variable, board size. Both years 
were analysed independently. Pearson’s correlation coefficient was used to test the hypothesis.
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Board 9,6575 4,3861 181
Interlocks
5,1492 6,2249 0,4873* 0,000
2009
Board 10,4231 3,9087 156
Interlocks
0,5034 0,5433 0,5278** 0,000
*Significant at 0,01 level (bilateral)
**Significant at 0,01 level (bilateral)
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Graph 9. Regression line, board size and number of interlocks in 2009.
In both cases, Pearson’s correlation coefficient is significantly  different from zero, and in both 
cases, there is a positive association between the two variables, slightly  stronger in 2009 than in 
2004. In other words, when the number of board members increases, the number of interlocks the 
firm has also increases. There is thus support  for the sixth(a) hypothesis, the number of interlocks is 
positively related to board size.
The sixth(b) hypothesis proposed the larger the board, the higher is the firm’s degree centrality, that 
is, larger boards have a more central position in the network. IBM SPSS statistics and regression 
analysis was used to explain variability in the dependent variable, firm’s degree centrality, with the 
explanatory  variable, board size. Both years were analysed independently. Pearson’s correlation 
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Table 24. Basic statistics for the correlation analysis. The larger the board, the higher is 










Board 9,6575 4,3861 181
Degree 0,3287 0,3711 0,5041* 0,000
2009
Board 10,4231 3,9087 156
Degree 0,5034 0,5433 0,5278** 0,000
  * Significant at 0,01 level
  ** Significant at 0,01 level
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Graph 11. 2009 regression analysis. The larger the board, the higher is the firm’s 
degree centrality
In both cases, as table 24 shows, Pearson’s correlation coefficient is significantly  different from 
zero, and in both cases, there is a positive association between the two variables, stronger in 2009 
than in 2004. In other words, when the number of board members increases, degree centralisation 
also increases. There is thus support for the six(b) hypothesis for both years, the firm’s degree 
centrality in the network is positively related to board size. The larger the board, the higher is the 
firm’s degree centrality. 
Hypothesis six(c) establishes that firm’s size and the size of the board are directly related. Firms 
were grouped according to their size and use ANOVA to test this hypothesis. First I test if the 
dependent variable is normally  distributed using the Kolmogorov-Smirnova test, and then testing 
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IBEX 35 34 14,91 3,83 0,657 21 8
Group 1 22 11,27 3,15 0,672 19 6
Group 2 18 10,28 3,14 0,740 15 5
Group 3 17 9,29 3,08 0,746 18 5
Group 4 90 7,22 3,20 0,337 20 1
Total 181 9,66 4,386 0,326 21 1






IBEX 35 0,143 34 0,077 0,942 34 0,07
Group 1 0,174 22 0,083 0,955 22 0,398
Group 2 0,153 18 0,200* 0,938 18 0,267
Group 3 0,174 17 0,181 0,899 17 0,066
Group 4 0,128 90 0,001 0,939 90 0
*. Lower limit with significance
a. Lilliefors test correction
Due to the size of the sample this dissertation uses the results provided by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 




Table 27. Levene’s test for homogeneity of variances in 2004.
F df1 df2 Sig.
1,302 4 176 0,271
Since the significance level is greater than 0,05 (0,271 > 0,05) we cannot reject H0, that is, there is 
homogeneity of variances in 2004.





Between groups 1538,967 4 384,742 35,198 0,000
Within Groups 1923,795 176 10,931
Total 3462,762 180
The significance level of 0,000, lower than 0,05, tells us there is a statistically significant difference 
in the mean between board size and firm size in 2004. There is then support for the hypothesis, that 
is, the larger the firm, the larger the board size in the firms analysed in 2004.
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Table 29. Descriptive statistics for 2009.
Size Firms
Board 
members Mean S.D. Max Min
IBEX 35 34 490 14,41 3,569 24 9
Group 1 14 154 11,00 2,512 16 7
Group 2 17 181 10,65 2,090 14 6
Group 3 24 268 11,17 3,017 19 5
Group 4 67 533 7,96 3,062 20 3
Total 156 1626 10,42 3,909 24 3






IBEX 35 0,111 34 ,200* 0,961 34 0,262
Group 1 0,144 14 ,200* 0,974 14 0,93
Group 2 0,155 17 ,200* 0,96 17 0,633
Group 3 0,141 24 ,200* 0,965 24 0,549
Group 4 0,133 67 0,005 0,933 67 0,001
*. Lower limit with significance
a. Lilliefors test correction
Due to the size of the sample this dissertation uses the results provided by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test which show that all categories except Group 4 (the smaller size firms) are normally distributed.
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Table 31. Levene’s test for homogeneity of variances in 2009.
F df1 df2 Sig.
1,234 4 151 0,299
Since the significance level is greater than 0,05 (0,299 > 0,05) we cannot reject H0, that is, there is 
homogeneity of variances in 2009.





Between groups 967,76 4 241,94 26,089 0,000
Within Groups 1400,317 151 9,274
Total 2368,077 155
 
The significance level of 0,000, lower than 0,05, tells us there is a statistically significant difference 
in the mean between board size and firm size in 2009. There is then support for the hypothesis, that 
is, the larger the firm, the larger the board size.
The seventh(a) hypothesis proposed that outsiders on corporate boards provide most of the 
interlocks the board has. As can be seen in next table, in 2004 outsiders provided 82,40% of all 
interlocks and in 2009 the percentage increased to 88,76%. In both years, outsiders provided most 
of the interlocks firms have. There is then full support for the seventh(a) hypothesis.
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2004 20,824% 17,597% 79,176% 82,403%
2009 18,512% 11,231% 81,488% 88,769%
Graph 12. Percentage of interlocks provided by outsiders for both years. 

















Graph 14. Types of outsiders in 2009.
Hypothesis seven(b), proposes that higher percentage of outsiders in the board leads to higher 
financial results (ROA) by the firm. IBM  SPSS statistics and regression analysis was used to 
explain variability in the dependent variable, performance, with the explanatory  variable, higher 
percentage of outsiders. Both years were analysed independently. Pearson’s correlation coefficient 
was used to test the hypothesis. 
Table 34. Basic statistics for the correlation analysis. Higher percentage of outsiders 









Outsiders 0,76304 0,2021 159

















Outsiders 0,79833 0,1439 143
ROA -0,2058 14,9436 0,05812 0,49049
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Graph 16. 2009 regression analysis. Higher percentage of outsiders leads to higher 
performance (ROA).
In both years Pearson’s correlation coefficients of 0,061 for 2004 and 0,058 for 2009, have very  low 
values, close to 0, along with such high significance levels, 0,44 for 2004 and 0,49 for 2009, there is 
no relationship among the variables or this relationship is negligible. There is no support for 
hypothesis 7b for either year.
The eighth hypothesis proposed that network density increases over time, following a particular 
strategy stated by firms, the number of interlocks would increase. The following table, adapted from 
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The two values analysed here, density and network centralisation, refer to specific features of the 
network, that is, the structure of the network. With a small increase in density, there is support for 
the hypothesis, namely network density  increases over time. The following graphs, NetDraw 
output, show the network created by the samples through their interlocks for the years analysed as 
well as the isolated firms. The different colours are groupings of firms, for example, isolates are 
blue.
Graph 17. Interlocks in 2004. Squares represent firms. Lines represent interlocks.
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Graph 18. Interlocks in 2009. Squares represent firms. Lines represent interlocks.
As for the next hypothesis, which proposed that the number of isolates decreases over time, in 2004 
there were 49 isolates out  of 181 firms (27,07%) and in 2009 there were 44 isolates out of 156 firms 
(28,21%). There is no support for the hypothesis since the number of isolates does not decrease 
over time but increases. 
Table 36. Isolates grouped by year and size of the firm. 
Size* 2004 2009
Firms Isolates Firms % Isolates Firms %
IBEX 35 3 34 8,82% 1 34 2,94%
Group 1 1 22 4,55% 1 14 7,14%




Group 3 4 17 23,53% 7 24 29,17%
Group 4 40 90 44,44% 32 67 47,76%
Total 49 181 27,07% 44 156 28,21%
*Size: 
Ibex 35: largest capitalization in the stock exchange
Group 1, stock capitalization above 1000! million
Group 2, stock capitalization 500 to 1000! million
Group 3, stock capitalization 250 to 500! million
Group 4, stock capitalization less than 250! million
Graph 19. Isolated firms grouped by year and size of the firm
*Size
Ibex 35: largest capitalization in the stock exchange
Group 1, stock capitalization above 1000! million
Group 2, stock capitalization 500 to 1000! million
Group 3, stock capitalization 250 to 500! million




















Advertising, press and R.T.V. 1 13
Beverages and tobacco 2 2,5 2,1213
Construction materials 1 6
Engineering and others 1 6
Insurance 2 16 2,8284
Leisure, tourism and hospitality 1 11
Manufacture and assembly equipment 4 8,25 4,113
Metals 2 11 1,4142
Mineral / Metals / Processing 1 6
Oil, Gas and other sources 2 8 1,4142
Other consumer goods 1 6
Other market services 2 7,5 0,7071
Paper and graphic arts 3 6,33 2,0817
Portfolio and Holding 4 6 2,708
Portfolio companies 3 6 3
Real estate 11 7,64 4,2255
Real estate and other 2 4 4,2426










Textile, clothing and footwear 3 7 4,3589
Total 49 7,82
We can also see that in 2009 the real state sector is still the one with the highest number of isolated 
firms.






Engineering and Other 4 9,25 2,2174
Construction 1 10
Mineral / Metals / Processing 4 8,25 2,5000
Real Estate and Other 14 7 4,0950
Textile / Clothing / Footwear 2 7 2,8284
Telecommunications and Other 1 9
Equipment goods 2 5 2,8284
Banks / Savings 1 13
Food & Beverage 1 5
Investment Services 1 9
Portfolio and Holding 3 5,33 0,5774








Leisure / Travel / Hospitality 1 9
Agriculture and fisheries 1 9
Pharmaceutical Products 1 6
Renewable Energy 3 8,33 3,5119
Investment Funds 1 12
Insurance 1 14
Total 44 8,56
The tenth hypothesis proposed that banks have a central position in the network. The following 
tables, UCINET output, list the top 10% of firms (higher normalised degree) for 2004 and 2009, 
and their activity sectors.
Table 39. 2004 firms, top 10%. Normalised degree > 0,853. 
Firm Degree Activity
Promotora de Informaciones, S.A. 2,048 Advertising, press and RTV
Miquel y Costas & Miquel, S.A. 1,82 Paper and graphic arts
Unión Fenosa, S.A. 1,706 Utilities, Electricity
Telefónica, S.A. 1,479 Telecommunications
Banco Santander Central Hispano, S.A. 1,365 Banking
Inmo Dealer, S.A. 1,365 Real estate




Acs, Actividades de Construcción y 
Servicios S.A. 1,081 Construction
NH Hoteles, S.A. 1,024 Leisure, tourism and hospitality
Abertis Infraestructuras, S.A. 0,967 Car parks and motorways
Altadis, S.A. 0,967 Beverages and tobacco
Banco Popular Español, S.A. 0,967 Banking
Repsol YPF, S.A. 0,967 Oil, gas and other sources
Enagás, S.A. 0,91 Oil, gas and other sources
Ebro Puleva, S.A. 0,853 Food
Iberia Líneas Aéreas de España, S.A. 0,853 Transportation and distribution
Sogecable, S.A. 0,853 Advertising, press and RTV
Telefónica Móviles, S.A. 0,853 Telecommunications
Table 40. 2009 firms, top 10%. Normalised degree > 1,18. 
Firm Degree Activity
Miquel y Costas & Miquel, S.A. 3,112 Paper and printing
Promotora de Informaciones, S.A. 2,575
Communication Media and 
Advertising
ACS. Actividades de Construcción y 
Servicios, S.A. 2,146 Construction
Repsol YPF, S.A. 2,146 Oil
Abertis Infraestructuras, S.A. 1,824 Highways/Parking
Sacyr Vallehermoso, S.A. 1,824 Construction
Cartera Industrial Rea, S.A. 1,717 Portfolio and Holding




Corporación Financiera Alba, S.A. 1,395 Portfolio and Holding
Grupo Empresarial Ence, S.A. 1,395 Paper and printing
Iberdrola, S.A. 1,288 Electricity and Gas
NH Hoteles, S.A. 1,288 Leisure/Travel/Hospitality
Pescanova, S.A. 1,288 Food & Beverage
Banco Santander, S.A. 1,18 Banks/Savings
Fomento de Construcciones y Contratas, S.A. 1,18 Construction
Gas Natural SDG, S.A. 1,18 Electricity and Gas
Grupo Ferrovial, S.A. 1,18 Construction
Indra Sistemas, S.A. 1,18 Electronics/Software
Realia Business, S.A. 1,18 Real Estate and Other












Banking 14 7,73% 146 8,35% 117 12,55%
Real estate 21 11,60% 167 9,55% 68 7,30%
Construction 7 3,87% 88 5,03% 62 6,65%
Electricity 4 2,21% 67 3,83% 59 6,33%
Advertising, press and 
R.T.V. 6 3,31% 86 4,92% 56 6,01%
Oil, Gas and other 
sources 7 3,87% 86 4,92% 53 5,69%
Paper and graphic arts 8 4,42% 71 4,06% 45 4,83%














Telecommunications 4 2,21% 51 2,92% 40 4,29%
Food 5 2,76% 45 2,57% 39 4,18%
Portfolio and Holding 11 6,08% 82 4,69% 38 4,08%
Transport and distribution 5 2,76% 58 3,32% 36 3,86%
Parking and highways 3 1,66% 39 2,23% 30 3,22%
Other market services 6 3,31% 53 3,03% 26 2,79%
Other consumer goods 4 2,21% 33 1,89% 22 2,36%
Manufacture and 
assembly equipment 9 4,97% 77 4,41% 19 2,04%
Electronics and software 3 1,66% 32 1,83% 18 1,93%
Leisure, tourism and 
hospitality 4 2,21% 46 2,63% 18 1,93%
Construction materials 5 2,76% 53 3,03% 18 1,93%
Textile, clothing and 
footwear 8 4,42% 66 3,78% 18 1,93%
Drinks and Tobacco 1 0,55% 18 1,03% 16 1,72%
Food and beverage 3 1,66% 32 1,83% 16 1,72%
Portfolio companies 4 2,21% 25 1,43% 13 1,39%
Beverages and tobacco 7 3,87% 42 2,40% 9 0,97%
Telecommunications and 
other 1 0,55% 11 0,63% 7 0,75%
Metals 5 2,76% 55 3,15% 7 0,75%
Chemical industry 1 0,55% 8 0,46% 6 0,64%
Financing and Insurance 1 0,55% 6 0,34% 6 0,64%
Paper, wood and 
chemical 1 0,55% 11 0,63% 5 0,54%














Mineral / Metals / 
Processing 2 1,10% 17 0,97% 4 0,43%
Other services 2 1,10% 16 0,92% 4 0,43%
Retail 2 1,10% 21 1,20% 4 0,43%
Water 2 1,10% 27 1,54% 3 0,32%
Agriculture and fisheries 1 0,55% 5 0,29% 2 0,21%
Investment funds 1 0,55% 6 0,34% 1 0,11%
Engineering and others 1 0,55% 6 0,34% 0 0,00%
Renewable Energy 1 0,55% 10 0,57% 0 0,00%
Insurance 2 1,10% 32 1,83% 0 0,00%
Total 181 100% 1.748 100% 932 100%












Construction 8 5,13% 105 6,46% 65 10,00%
Portfolio and Holding 10 6,41% 86 5,29% 53 8,15%
Paper and printing 5 3,21% 51 3,14% 49 7,54%
Food & Beverage 11 7,05% 104 6,40% 49 7,54%
Real Estate and Other 25 16,03% 197 12,12% 45 6,92%
Communication Media 
and Advertising 5 3,21% 66 4,06% 40 6,15%
Banks / Savings 9 5,77% 124 7,63% 37 5,69%














Equipment goods 7 4,49% 59 3,63% 27 4,15%
Oil 2 1,28% 29 1,78% 26 4,00%
Electronics / Software 3 1,92% 35 2,15% 24 3,69%
Pharmaceutical Products 7 4,49% 61 3,75% 22 3,38%
Mineral / Metals / 
Processing 8 5,13% 83 5,10% 21 3,23%
Engineering and Other 8 5,13% 85 5,23% 20 3,08%
Highways / Parking 1 0,64% 20 1,23% 16 2,46%
Transport / Distribution 3 1,92% 44 2,71% 15 2,31%
Textile / Clothing / 
Footwear 6 3,85% 51 3,14% 15 2,31%
Leisure / Travel / 
Hospitality 3 1,92% 34 2,09% 14 2,15%
Building materials 3 1,92% 38 2,34% 13 2,00%
Telecommunications and 
Other 3 1,92% 36 2,21% 11 1,69%
Other Services 5 3,21% 40 2,46% 11 1,69%
Equipment 
Manufacturing 1 0,64% 11 0,68% 9 1,38%
Biotechnology 1 0,64% 12 0,74% 9 1,38%
Water and other 2 1,28% 26 1,60% 8 1,23%
Other Consumer Goods 2 1,28% 19 1,17% 5 0,77%
Retail 1 0,64% 10 0,62% 4 0,62%
Chemical Industry 2 1,28% 10 0,62% 4 0,62%
Renewable Energy 4 2,56% 40 2,46% 4 0,62%
Investment Services 2 1,28% 24 1,48% 2 0,31%














Agriculture and fisheries 1 0,64% 9 0,55% 0 0,00%
Investment Funds 1 0,64% 12 0,74% 0 0,00%
Total 156 100% 1626 100% 650 100%
In both years, banks are no longer at the core of the network. There are only  two banks in 2004 and 
only one in 2009. There is then no support for the tenth hypothesis, banks do not have a central 
position in the network. There has been a shift in the structure of the network in recent years.
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The hypotheses presented here are strongly  rooted in resource dependence theory. The resources 
available to the firm can be financial, human, and so on. Resources are limited, resources are 
valuable for the firm, and the appropriate use of these resources as well as obtaining them can give 
an advantage to firms. After all, firms are not isolated individuals able to do as they wish. There are 
competitors, there are shareholders, there are customers, there are suppliers, there are governments, 
there are always a number of different  stakeholders with different claims on the firm who can limit 
its activities or provide opportunities. Firms need to know which resources are available to them 
and how to better use them to gain a competitive advantage. This dissertation analyses one of the 
many resources firms have, its board of directors. They provide knowledge, expertise, and links 
with the outside which can help firms to survive, grow, and perform better through time. 
But one theory cannot explain everything that  happens in the board. That’s why this dissertation 
besides resource dependence theory also uses agency theory, which has been for years the leading 
theory  to study  boards, as well as social theory, where links with the outside can be more important 
than expertise in certain areas; and new institutionalism, firms imitate each other. The purpose is to 
combine these theories to better understand the different paths firms follow to improve 
performance. This leads to a holistic framework since theories have limitations and therefore, we 
need to use several theories to be able to have a deeper understanding of the internal processes in 
corporate governance in general and in board of directors in particular. Resource dependence 
theory, social theory  and agency theory provide complementary  insights into the functioning of the 
board. “...no single theory offers a complete explanation of the corporate governance–corporate 
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performance relationship, but rather elements of each theory can be seen to apply in different 
circumstances” (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003: 201). Resource dependence theory is used at a macro 
level, that is, the environment is an external force which affects all aspects of the firm by either 
limiting its actions or by  providing opportunities to the firm. At the same time, the firm needs 
resources from the environment to survive and improve performance. Agency  theory, at the micro 
level, stresses the need to monitor management to avoid agency costs. The link between the macro 
level, resource dependence theory, and the micro level, agency theory, is provided by the board of 
directors. Board’s duty  is twofold, on one hand they  must monitor management, on the other hand, 
they  must screen the environment to obtain resources for the firm. Board’s importance makes it the 
main focus of analysis in a number of theories.
The results provide mixed support  for the resource dependence theory hypotheses. This dissertation 
has divided the hypotheses in two groups. The first group deals with former government officials 
and their relevance in the the board. The second group of hypotheses deals with interlocks and the 
network they create. Former government officials have become in recent the years a relevant factor 
to study since their numbers have continuously  increased in boards, not only in Spain but in all 
Western countries. But just because a board chooses a former government official to sit in the board 
it does not mean the firm is going to “fly the party  flag”, similar to what Stark and Vedres (2012) 
found in their study of Hungarian boards. There must be a reason, a strategy, for firms to hire them. 
Firms must perceive they are obtaining some advantage when appointing former government 
officials to their boards. “...to remain competitive, organizations must repeatedly acquire high-
quality human assets from external sources, even though information ambiguity and information 
asymmetry make this process difficult” (Williamson and Cable, 2003: 354). Former government 
officials are then a scarce resource firms use for their own benefit. Nevertheless, as we have seen, 
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former government officials do not improve performance. At the same time, former government 
officials and all other members of the board when sitting in different boards they create interlocks 
and a network is then created. This is another strategy firms use, a resource they have, in order to be 
able, for example, to better know the environment or to have access to better financing conditions. 
Here, for example, we find agency theory  since links with banks lead to board members’ increase 
supervision of management.
This dissertation argues that former government officials play an important  role not by  providing 
expertise and knowledge about the industry to the firm, hypothesis 1b, but by providing links with 
the external environment, hypothesis 1a. These links may help the firm to better understand and 
later on adapt or try  to modify the political environment. Therefore, former government officials 
are, after all, a vital resource firms use. Table 9, table 10, and table 11, along with graph 3 and graph 
4 lead to graph 5, which can help  us understand hypothesis 1a, that is, former government officials 
are, due to their educational background, community influentials as well as hypothesis 1b, former 
government officials’ background does not match their committee activities. What we see in those 
tables and graphs is that in both years, most former government officials have a background 
education in law, whereas the firms are not law related. Furthermore, former government officials 
participate in committees which do not match their educational background. This dissertation posits 
these tables and graphs show that most former government officials are selected to the board not 
because of their specific industry expertise or because they  are business experts, following Hillman 
et al. (2000) typology, but  because of their links outside the board which may help  the firm achieve 
its goals. Former government officials are then community influentials, hypothesis 1a. There is also 
full support for the hypothesis 1b, that is, former government officials’ background does not match 
their committee activities, since most educational backgrounds (58,21% in 2004 and 52,17% in 
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2009) do not match committee requirements. Former government officials are community 
influentials. They  are hired because of the people they know and the relationships they have outside 
the firm, in particular, with their own political parties. According to resource dependence theory this 
a way for firms to be able to scout the political environment as well as a way to try to modify it if 
necessary. It is in most cases a proactive strategy which should lead to better performance. 
Further analysis of the data shows that most former government officials who in 2009 participate in 
a committee do it, in most cases, in the appointments and remuneration committee. In 2004, the 
committee with the highest number of former government officials was the audit committee. These 
two committees, along with the executive one, account for over 85% of all former government 
officials. These results are relevant for both, scholars and practitioners. It helps understand scholars 
some of the processes and strategies within the board. Board members are a resource for the firm 
and they are expected to support the firm and to provide resources. On the other hand, practitioners, 
once they know the objectives firms have and the resources they need, they can easily select board 
members in the future. When selecting a new board member, based on the strategy and objectives 
the firm has, they may choose a former government official.
The second hypotheses proposes that larger firms will include more former government officials as 
outsiders. This is directly  related to resource dependence theory. The rational behind this hypothesis 
is that  larger firms face complicated external environments and therefore need a specific resource, 
former government officials, in order to, if necessary, manipulate these environments so they do not 
affect the overall performance of the firm. Also, these resources, former government officials, are 
scarce and expensive, therefore, only larger firms can afford to use it. The results show, table 12, 
that larger firms account for over 60% of all former government officials in both years.
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Further analysis of the information gathered for this hypothesis shows that it is former ministers and 
congress members the groups that provide most of the former government officials, while senate 
members provide only 10,48% of the former government officials. Another interesting fact is that 
none of the former presidents is in a board, even though two of them have worked as high 
management directives for firms, a group not included in this sample. Yet further analysis shows us 
that the former government officials club is mainly a men’s club, with only  five women as former 
government officials in 2009. That is, there is barely any diversification in boards when it  comes to 
gender. Trend that at least in 2009 is changing. 
This hypothesis is firmly rooted in resource dependence theory. Even though former government 
officials are a valuable resource for the firm, not all former government officials are equally 
relevant. This is very important information and contribution. Former ministers and members of the 
congress are more prone to join boards than senate members. At the same time, table 13 shows us 
there is major gap among genders. Women are barely represented in boards. For scholars, the results 
show how larger firms cope with the external environment, through hiring former government 
officials and which specific former government officials are chosen. It can also help practitioners to 
narrow down the candidates since, as mentioned before, not all former government officials are 
equally relevant.
The third hypothesis proposed that firms in highly regulated sectors, utilities sector, electricity, 
banking and financial services, and chemicals, will have more former government officials in their 
boards. Highly regulated sectors imply the government uses continuous and extensive control over 
the firms as well as as ever changing and rigid laws. It makes sense for firms to try  to co-opt some 
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of the members of the political environment, former government officials, who can bring 
knowledge and expertise which might not be available to other board members. Resource 
dependence theory explains this and new institutionalism explains why the number of firms using 
this strategy continues to grow through imitation. A strategy perceived as successful is imitated by 
other firms. Unfortunately, table 16 and table 17 show there is no support  for this hypothesis, which 
is contrary  to what resource dependence theory states. For scholars the results are relevant since 
they  seem to contradict resource dependence theory. I posit, nevertheless, that even though there is 
no direct link between industry regulation and the number of former government officials, resource 
dependence theory still applies since former government officials must provide other resources to 
the firm. For practitioners the implications are clear. In order to manage a highly supervised 
industry they must find other means besides former government officials. Investing in this 
particular resource may not be the best option for the firm.
The fourth hypothesis states that  firms with former government officials in their boards have better 
financial results (ROA) than those firms without former government officials in their boards. This 
would be a reinforcement of resource dependence theory since it  is a direct link between the 
resources board members bring to the firm and firm’s financial performance. Unfortunately, table 
18 and table 19 do not support this hypothesis for either year since there is not significant difference 
in results (ROA) among firms with former government officials and firms without former 
government officials in their boards, which again is contrary to resource dependence theory. This is 
very important information and contribution. Firms strive to survive and succeed, and gathering the 
necessary  resources, former government officials, is intended to help them achieve their goals. If 
there is not such a link between former government officials in the board and better financial 
performance practitioners may choose the free rider approach, that is, let other firms get politically 
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involved and rip  the benefits within the industry. Even though the free rider approach is normally 
used by smaller firms from a resource dependence point of view it would make sense for firms to 
chase other resources which might be more necessary to the firm. The free rider approach has a 
disadvantage though, that is, it is no longer a proactive approach but firms react to changes in the 
environment. Different management styles may prefer to be actively involved, using political 
strategies and hiring former government officials, or on the other extreme, the free rider option, and 
react to changes in the political environment. 
The fifth hypothesis states that once involved in politically  strategic management, firms will 
continue to do so. This makes sense from a resource dependence theory point of view. Former 
government officials are a rare and expensive resource, therefore, once the firm has invested time 
and money to obtain this resource it may  want to continue to use it for a long period of time. The 
results, table 22, partially confirm this hypothesis. For scholars, it helps them understand how firms 
achieve their long term objectives whereas practitioners need to understand former government 
officials are a scarce resource and that nonmarket strategies imply  a long term relationship between 
the board member and the firm.
Overall, the first group of hypotheses show us larger firms have more former government officials 
in their boards than smaller firms and most important, former government officials are not chosen 
because of their expertise and background, not  chosen because the industry the firm is in is highly 
regulated, not chosen because they  directly  lead to better financial performance. Former 
government officials are chosen because of their links with the external environment. This links 
resource dependence theory and social theory.
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The second group of hypotheses is related to outsiders in the board and the network they  create. 
Outsiders, according to resource dependence theory, bring resources to the board. Hypotheses 6a, 
and 6b are concerned with the effects of board size on the number of interlocks the firm has and 
firm’s degree centrality. That is, larger boards have more interlocks than smaller boards and larger 
boards lead to higher degree centrality. It is implied here, 6b, that  larger boards have more interlocks 
than smaller boards since degree centrality  is based on the links to other firms. Board size is the 
control variable then. Table 23 shows us that for both years there is a direct and positive correlation 
between the number of interlocks (dependent variable) and board size (independent variable). It is 
important for both, scholars and practitioners, to understand that larger boards do not necessary 
mean more interlocks. There are firms, such as Corporación MAPFRE, S.A., one of the largest 
firms (IBEX 35) in the sample, which in 2004 had a large board, 18 members, but no interlocks. 
The average number of board members for 2004 is 9,657. The implications for scholars and 
practitioners are related to firm’s strategies. Firms can have large boards but it  does not necessary 
mean they have more interlocks. But when firms select new members to the board who already  sit 
in other boards, interlocks, they  are pursuing a specific strategy, increase their contacts with other 
firms. The reasons can be found in the main advantages interlocks have, that is, better access to 
better information and, when those links are with banks, better credit conditions.
Hypothesis 6b, the larger the board, the higher the firm’s degree centrality, is also supported by the 
results. In both years, table 24, we find that Pearson’s correlation coefficient is significantly 
different from zero, and in both cases, there is a positive association between the two variables. 
Interlocks are a resource firms have and use, and larger boards rip the benefits from this resource. 
Practitioners may  consider the profile of the person to hire for the board and take into consideration 
other board appointments this person has. This is relevant for both, resource dependence theory and 
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human resource management. One of the benefits interlocks have is access to information. From a 
resource dependence point of view, increasing and improving those resources as well as their 
correct management is one of the functions boards have. At the same time, by hiring board 
members with other board appointments the firm is intentionally following a strategy which leads to 
a higher degree centrality within the network.
There is a direct relationship  between board size an the number of interlocks and firms’ degree 
centrality. Larger boards have more interlocks than smaller boards as well as larger boards leading 
to firms with a higher degree centrality. Hypothesis 6c tries to identify if firm size is the relevant 
factor to board size, in other words, larger firms have larger boards. Once again, rooted in resource 
dependence theory which states that larger firms will be exposed to more uncertainties in the 
environment and therefore will need a wider range of resources, interlocks and degree centrality, in 
order to be able to survive and increase performance. Table 28 and table 32, after the ANOVA 
analysis, show us in both years there is a statistically  significant difference in the mean between 
board size and firm size in the groups analysed, that is, larger firms have larger boards. This also 
appeals to agency  theory since one of the functions boards have, besides providing resources, is to 
supervise management. It makes sense then than larger firms, with larger management units, require 
larger boards to supervise them. The results for this hypothesis are in line with similar analysis in 
other countries which implies that governance practices are becoming standardised across borders, 
that is, larger firms have larger boards. Resource dependence theory explains why larger firms need 
more resources and agency theory explains why larger boards are necessary  to monitor larger 
management units in large firms. For practitioners these findings are relevant because they can them 
understand the need for a larger board in larger firms. Since boards have to monitor management, 
larger firms will have larger and more management units to be monitored, which in turn leads to 
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larger boards. It can also help  understand the specific roles different board members have and the 
degree of specialisation, that is, some board members focus on providing resources whereas other 
board members focus on monitoring management.
Hypotheses 7a and 7b are related to board composition, in particular, outsiders are analysed, which 
are supposed to both, provide resources to the firm and better be able to supervise management. 
Hypothesis 7a states that outsiders on corporate boards provide most of the interlocks the board has. 
This is a direct link to resource dependence. In this case, outsiders are perceived as a source of a 
rare and valuable resource, that is, interlocks. This function should not interfere with monitoring. 
According to agency theory, the board has the duty to monitor management on behalf of the 
owners. Table 33 provides the results which support this hypothesis. As in the case of the previous 
hypotheses, this is an example of resource dependence theory at work. Interlocks are valuable and 
necessary  resources for the firm and firms prefer to use outsiders to obtain this resource. The 
explanation is simple and provides insights to both, scholars and practitioners: Insiders have 
managerial duties within the firm and therefore, due to time constraints, they might not be sit on 
other boards. This leads to specialisation, outsiders provide those links, interlocks, with other firms, 
whereas insiders monitor management.
Further analysis of the different types of outsiders, graph 13 and graph 14, shows that in both years 
the percentage of share capital outsiders, those who represent shareholders with ownership, are the 
highest. This is in line with the structure boards have in Spanish firms, where most boards members 
are appointed by shareholders, followed in both years by independent outsiders, those chosen by the 
board with no ownership  ties. Shareholders control boards which in turn choose outsiders to provide 
a valuable resource, interlocks, to the firm. Outsiders are then co-opted into the firm. Again, the 
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implications for scholars and practitioners help us understand the profiles firms search for when 
they  are selecting a new member to the board. Multiple appoints in different boards is then an asset. 
Since the regulator does not impose restrictions on the number of appointments a board member 
may have, it is the firm who has to balance multiple appointments with the busyness effect. Both, 
scholars and practitioners can benefit from this insights. 
Hypothesis 7b states that a higher percentage of outsiders in the board leads to higher financial 
results (ROA). Unfortunately, the hypothesis had to be rejected for both years. Table 34 as well as 
graph 15 and graph 16 show us there is no correlation between the percentage of outsiders and 
higher performance. As in the case of H4, firms with former government officials in their boards 
have better financial results (ROA) than those firms without former government officials in their 
boards, this results are contrary  to resource dependence theory. This is very  important information 
and contribution. This means that the benefits of having a higher percentage of outsiders, for 
example, better access to information, do not lead directly  to better financial results. For 
practitioners the implication is that the board needs to find a balance in the ratio insiders to 
outsiders, which might be different in each industry, sector, and for each firm. One of the necessary 
conditions to survive all firms need to fulfil is not to waste resources. If more outsiders in the board 
does not lead to better financial results, boards should consider using those resources somewhere 
else. Scholars may help to pinpoint those areas which may need further resources, leading to an 
overall improvement in firm performance.
Former government officials as well as other members of the board may be members of more than 
just one board. This is an interlock and they create a network which can be analysed in different 
ways. Networks change over time. As Brass et al. (2004) indicate, in order to understand network 
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change we need to focus on both, the individuals who create the network and the larger context 
networks are embedded in. The following hypotheses are related to the bricks that make up these 
networks, that is, firms and board members. These hypotheses are directly related to resource 
dependence theory  since the creation of interlocks allows firms better access to resources as well as 
social theory, but also related to new institutionalism, since there is an imitation factor, as well as 
agency theory, where it can be argued that board members with several appointments are not 
effective enough in supervising management. H8 states that network density increases over time. 
Table 35 shows the results which provide support for the hypothesis. Density, which is 
connectedness among organisations in the network, is 1,08% for 2004 and 1,19% for 2009. That is, 
only 1,08% and 1,19% of all possible ties are present. The Freeman centralisation measure used in 
UCINET gives us a percentage of the total possible value (100%). These are not dense networks. 
The small change in density in the time period provides support for the hypothesis. Resource 
dependence theory, obtaining external resources, as well as new institutionalism, imitation of 
practices, and social theory, links with the external environment, are present here. The implications 
for practitioners lie somehow in between the three of them. On one hand, if firms want better access 
to information they  need to increase the number of interlocks the board has which leads to higher 
centrality of the firm in the network. At the same time, the network also changes, increasing its 
overall density. “...it is imperative that network researchers understand how whole networks 
operate, how they might best be structured and managed, and what outcomes might result” (Provan 
et al., 2007: 512). On the other hand, the strategy itself might not be access to better information but 
imitation. Firms imitate those practices perceived as successful which in turn leads to higher 
centrality of the firm and an overall increase in network density. Either way, networks are not stable 
entities. They change over time as their members pursue different strategies. Resources, such as 
information, are sought by firms and having board members sitting in other firms may grant them 
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access to such resources. Therefore firms may encourage their board members to seek other 
appointments or hire new board members who already have multiple appointments. At the same 
time, other firms imitate this strategy, increasing interlocks, since they perceive it as successful. 
One of the main advantages of decentralised networks is that more actors participate in the sharing 
of information, that is, when an actor is removed there are still other paths for information to flow 
to. 
The ninth hypothesis, an imitating strategy (increasing interlocks) causes the number of isolated 
firms to decrease over time, is directly  related to the previous one. If firms are using an strategy to 
increase their interlocks in the board and there is imitation by other firms then, the number of firms 
which do not have any interlocks at  all, which are isolated, should decrease over time. Nevertheless, 
as table 36 shows, this is not the case. The percentage of isolated firms actually increased in the 
period and the hypothesis has to be rejected. Further analysis, using firm size as a control variable 
shows that in each year, the number of isolates increases as the capitalisation level of the firm 
decreases. That is, the smaller the firm, the more chances there are to become isolated. There is then 
a link between firm size and the tendency to be isolated. Larger firms are less isolated than smaller 
firms. Resources, interlocks or people who already have interlocks, are difficult to create and they 
require an investment that smaller firms may not be able to use. Practitioners can use this 
information to consider the need to create interlocks or not. Since interlocks require the deployment 
of considerable resources, firm size might be then a determinant factor, that is, larger firms have 
more diversified environments and at the same time have access to more resources which leads to 
increasing needs for, for example, information. Interlocks are how firms can have access to external 
information. When firms are grouped by  sector, table 37 and table 38, we find that in both years the 
sector with the higher number of isolates is the real estate sector. 
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The results for the tenth hypothesis, banks have a central position in the network, have a number of 
ramifications. The hypothesis was rejected for both years, that is, banks are not the firms with the 
higher degree of centralisation nor are at the core of the network. This results are contrary  to what 
Aguilera (1998) found. This can be explained due to two main factors. First, samples are not 
identical. Aguilera (1998) uses “... the 100 largest  Spanish non-financial corporations ranked by 
sales, the 60 largest Spanish banks, and the 30 largest  Spanish insurance companies ranked by 
assets in 1993” (Aguilera, 1998: 323), whereas the sample used here is of the largest firms in the 
Spanish stock exchange as listed by the CNMV in 2004 and 2009. Though similar, they  are not the 
same. Second, it must be understood that Aguilera’s study was in a period of transition in the 
Spanish economy, that is, Spain was moving away  from publicly owned enterprises to private firms. 
The State was selling, privatising, its stakes. Therefore, a number of changes in the strategies 
followed by firms occurred which would lead to a change in the network. Nevertheless, it would 
make sense for banks to be the most central firms in the network since one of the most important 
advantages of interlocks is access to better credit conditions when banks have a board member in 
the target firm. Banks then, in a bank led economy, should be central, as Spain used to follow a 
Continental model. Nevertheless, as Musacchio (2004) explained in his study of interlocks in Brazil 
and Mexico, “companies with access to other financing options reduced their reliance on bank 
connections. This supports the idea that connections with bankers might be good in an environment 
where access to credit is limited or where close relations help to reduce asymmetries of information. 
But once financial markets develop, these connections to lenders are less necessary” (Musacchio, 
2004: 29). On the other hand, Sicilia and Sallan (2007) study of the IBEX 35 in 2005 provides a 
similar result, that is, banks are no longer the most central firms in the network in that year. Once 
again, the samples are not identical but the results are comparable. Therefore, it can be said that the 
CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
125
network created by large Spanish firms has changed over time and that contrary  to the Continental 
model, banks are no longer at its core. The implications for practitioners are clear, there has been a 
change in the strategies boards have in recent years. When moving away from a government 
controlled firm to a privatised firm boards have changed their strategies which in turn, among other 
things, has changed the network interlocks create. For scholars, since now firms have to submit 
compulsory  reports about their corporate governance to the regulator, it  has become easier to 
analyse and research board behaviour. Prior to 2004 firms were not required to provide this 
information. A final implication for both scholars and firms is that since banks are no longer at the 
core of the network this means either there are other financial options or firms have other 
communication channels with banks.
Table 41 and table 42 analyse the number of interlocks by sector. We can see that in 2004 even 
though banks have 12,55% of the interlocks there are 14 of them, which can help us understand 
why, individually, they do not have a central position in the network. As for 2009, banks no longer 
have the highest number of interlocks as a group, which show us the evolution in the network and 
how banking firms have moved away  from the centre. Now, it is the construction sector the one 
with the highest number of interlocks with two firms in the top six as table 40 shows. Further 
analysis of table 39 and table 40 shows us that in 2004 there were five sectors with two firms: 
advertising, press, and RTV; banking; construction; oil, gas, and other sources; and 
telecommunications. Therefore, it cannot be said that in 2004 there was a dominant sector in the top 
10% of firms with a higher normalised degree. As for 2009, the power balance shifted: there are 
four construction firms in the top 10% followed by  three from the portfolio and holding sector. In 
both years, only a few firms maintain their high centrality. Out of the 18 firms in 2004 that were in 
the top 10% in centrality, eight were still among the top 10% in 2009. That is, 44% of them were 
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still among the most central firms after five years. In 2009, even though the real estate sector still 
has the highest number of firms, it no longer has the highest number of interlocks. This is now the 
construction sector, with only  eight firms. Now, the banking sector, which ranks fourth according to 
the number of firms, is seventh in terms of the number of interlocks. 
The hypotheses analysed in this dissertation are mainly rooted in resource dependence theory. 
Resources are limited and scarce. Firms try to obtain those resources which can help them to 
survive and improve performance. Even though the main focus in on resource dependence theory, 
other theories such as social capital, agency  theory, and new institutionalism can help  us better 
understand the processes at the top level of the firm, that  is the board. I posit one theory cannot 
explain all the processes boards go through and it is necessary a holistic framework since theories 
have limitations and therefore, we need to use several theories to be able to have a deeper 
understanding of the internal processes in corporate governance in general and in board of directors 
in particular. The results show that firm size is a very  relevant factor that  affects different parts of 
the equation. Firm size is related to the number of former government officials firms have in their 
boards, it is not sector regulation as it is expected; size also positively affects the number of 
interlocks the firm has as well as its degree centrality  and board size. Therefore, firm size leads to 
different strategies. 
Former government officials are predicted by resource dependence theory to add a specific value 
not found in other walks of life. They are not hired because of their expertise in some specific areas. 
They  are hired because of their links outside the firm and once involved in political activity firms 
will continue to do so over time. Is resource dependence theory relevant? Some of the hypotheses 
analyzed here are not supported by the results. Nevertheless, I believe resource dependence theory 
CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
127
is relevant. There must be a reason for firms to either hire more former government officials or 
increase their interlocks. Perhaps the answer is as simple as “if we don’t do it we are going to lag 
behind”. A more complete picture is necessary  to fully understand board dynamics and their hiring 
processes.
Banks no longer at  the core of the network created by interlocks. This is different to what Aguilera 
(1998) found. We must understand, nevertheless, that her study was made during a transition period 
in Spanish economy which led to an increasing number of privatizations. After this process has 
ended banks are now still relevant players in the network, but  not the most central players. This 
network, which changes continuously, has a very low density, that is, there are not many links 
among the members of the network. This result is different from the one Cárdenas (2012) provides, 
the reason being the samples being different. Here the research has analysed the larger firms in the 
stock exchange, whereas he analyses the 50 largest firms. As we have seen before, larger firms, 
IBEX 35, show a different behaviour than smaller firms. Nevertheless, his study is relevant since it 
shows that the largest of the larger firms, have a different behaviour than the rest of the network. At 
the same time, overall network density has barely changed in the period which tells us the network 
is already at a different stage from the one analysed by Aguilera (1998).
I posit there is specialisation in the board. Some board members focus on their links outside the 
firm whereas other board members focus on monitoring management. These two activities lead to 
different types of board configurations based on firm’s strategies. When firms need to increase 
monitoring they may  not have as many interlocks as other firms in the industry. On the other hand, 
when the strategy is to increase and improve access to information, firms may choose board 
members with interlocks.
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Finally, when trying to find a link between increased performance and some board characteristics, 
the number of former government officials or the percentage of outsiders, the results were in both 
cases negative. That is, nor a higher percentage of outsiders nor a higher number of former 
government officials in the board lead to better financial results. This final results are somehow 
counter intuitive to both resource dependence theory, social theory, agency theory, as well as new 
institutionalism. 
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CHAPTER 6: LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE LINES OF 
STUDY
This dissertation is not without limitations and it also offers a number of future lines of study. The 
first limitation is that this dissertation is cross sectional, looking at board composition at  two 
particular points in time. Further research is required to see whether such relationships exist over 
time. The larger firms in the Spanish stock exchange are analysed, therefore, all firms are, by 
definition, large in size. Large firms were chosen because they are leaders in their industry and 
leaders in the Spanish stock exchange. This bias, which was intentional, excludes medium-sized, 
small firms, as well as large firms which are not publicly  traded. Similar studies, with a focus on 
small and medium-sized firms, as well as non traded large firms, should be carried out to provide a 
better understanding of their strategies and behaviours.
It is also important to point out that even though the firms in the sample are the largest in the 
Spanish Stock Exchange, there are major differences in size among them. When size among these 
firms is used as a control variable, the results prove that firms with different sizes display different 
behaviours. For example, the number of isolates increases as firm size decreases. Timeframe is also 
a limitation. Only five years have elapsed between observations. Unfortunately, the specific data 
about board members was not compulsory in Spain until 2004. Further analysis should be carried 
out in the future to assess the evolution of the hypotheses developed in this dissertation. 
The free rider effect is not taken into consideration, that is, smaller firms in the sample may achieve 
the same level of performance without investing in political strategies. This opens the door for 
future research in this area. The size of the sample is another limitation. Only 181 firms in 2004 and 
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156 firms in 2009 are analysed. It might be interesting, from a scholar point of view, to expand the 
analysis including more firms. The analysis stops at the board level, that  is, top management is not 
included. This intentional bias also offers the opportunity to further research in this area. This is a 
descriptive study. In order to have a better understanding of how firms select board members, in-
depth analysis must take place through, for example, with interviews.
Hypothesis 1a focuses on the educational background former government officials have and it does 
not take into account any further learning or experience, former government officials may have 
acquired through the years, for example, specific industry knowledge. This is a limitation and also 
an opportunity for future research since the relevant  question is why  are former government 
officials selected to participate in committees not related to their area of expertise? This question 
opens a number of possibilities for future studies. Is it  because they have other expertise not 
included in their curriculums or is it part of their compensation package?
There has also been a shift  in the most common committee for former government officials. In 2004 
the executive committee accounted for 25,37% of all former government officials whereas in 2009 
this percentage was reduced to 13,04%. On the other hand, the appointments and remuneration 
committee accounted in 2004 for 25,37% of all former government officials and for 39,13% in 
2009. Further analysis is needed to understand these changes.
Future research may  want to focus on why senate members are less involved with firms. Are their 
profiles different from the rest? Why is there such an important gender gap? Most former 
government officials are by  far, males. Is it necessary to implement laws that  force firms to have 
more diverse boards? Similar laws are already in place in other European countries such as Norway 
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or Italy. In 2011, the percentage of elected women for congress was 35,4% still a smaller percentage 
than in previous elections. But this does not reflect in the number of women who join boards. 
Further analysis into the reasons for this lack of diversity is necessary. Since the number of women 
involved in politics has continuously  increased in recent years further research is necessary to 
understand why there are so few female former government officials selected as board members.
The fourth hypothesis, firms with former government officials in their boards have better financial 
results (ROA) than those firms without former government officials in their boards, does not take 
into consideration other factors such as economic climate, age of the firm, competition within the 
industry, etc. Further research in these areas may  help understand the results. If firms with former 
government officials do not have better performance the questions is what do former government 
officials really bring to the board? Further analysis is needed in this area. Scholars need to further 
analyse the activities within the board to fully understand why  former government officials are 
chosen. This dissertation paves the way for future research in, for example, human research 
management.
The fifth hypothesis, once involved in politically strategic management, firms will continue to do 
so, does not explain why firms become politically  active. Some firms in the period analysed started 
to be politically active. Why? On the other hand, some firms no longer have former government 
officials in their boards. Further research is necessary to understand why they became politically 
active or why they have stopped being politically  active. The analysis does not specify  if it  is the 
same former government officials in the same company over the period of time. Further research is 
needed in this area to understand the nature of the relationship  between the firm and the board 
member. Is new institutionalism the explanation for the increasing number of former government 
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officials in boards? Is imitation involved in this process? When firms see that hiring a former 
government official provides insights in fields unknown to them, other firms, the imitators, will use 
the same strategy.
In Hungary, Stark and Vedres (2012), politicisation reached a saturation level at  approximately 20% 
of companies. Is it  the same case in Spain? Are larger firms no longer striving to co-opt the political 
environment? Likewise, do firms with former government officials share more bonds, have more 
business relationships with other firms with former government officials?
Hypothesis 6b, the larger the board, the higher is the firm’s degree centrality, does not take into 
consideration other relevant factor which may  influence boards when choosing another member. 
Future studies may want to analyse what other factors are relevant in human resource management 
when deciding on hiring a new board member? Is upper echelon theory, for example, relevant when 
choosing a new board member? Can the results from this dissertation be extrapolated to other 
countries? As for hypothesis 6c, firm’s size affects board’s size, even though in most cases larger 
firms have larger boards it  is interesting to know in which cases this hypothesis is rejected, that is, 
in which sectors or industries we do not find this situation.
Hypothesis 7a proposes outsiders on corporate boards provide most of the interlocks the board has. 
If outsiders provide the interlocks they may not have time to monitor management. Is management 
mostly  monitored by insiders? Future research in this are is necessary  to understand the the 
dynamics in the board. One of the main advantages of interlocks is they provide better credit 
conditions when firms have ties with banks as well as the spread of strategies, for example, poison 
pills. This dissertation did not  analyse these phenomena and further research into these areas may 
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provide helpful and valuable insights into board’s strategies. Furthermore, due to the specific 
outsider classification in Spain, it will be valuable to both, scholars and practitioners, to know 
which type of outsider, share-capital, independent, and “other outsiders”, provides most interlocks. 
Likewise, if outsiders main role is to provide interlocks to the firm, further research into the 
busyness effect may be appropriate. Do busy outsiders fulfil their board duties?
A higher percentage of outsiders in the board does not lead to firm’s higher financial results (ROA). 
As in the case of the fourth hypothesis, it  does not take into consideration other factors such as 
economic climate, age of the firm, etc. Again, further research in these areas may  help understand 
the results. Are there so many outsiders because firms want to or because they  are force to comply 
with the regulator? Has the practice become institutionalised? The regulator provides overall 
guidelines but it does not specify a percentage of outsiders firms must have. We must them try to 
find other factors which are correlated with performance. For example, it might not be a higher 
percentage of outsiders but the quality of those outsiders.
Why do some firms decide to be isolated? The firms analysed here are all by definition large and 
still some of them do not have any interlocks. This implies firms have a specific strategy to remain 
isolated. Why are firms in the real estate sector so isolated? It  is also important to know why some 
of the largest firms remain isolated, contrary to both resource dependence theory and agency  theory. 
Further study is needed in this area.
Finally, banks no longer have a central position in the network. Why has the network changed? Was 
it social, political or economically motivated? Are construction companies used as a hub to 
exchange information? Further research in these ares is necessary.
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Overall, this dissertation, despite its limitations, aimed to enrich the knowledge we have of the 
network created by large Spanish firms and open the door to further analysis and studies. This 
dissertation should help scholars and practitioners to better understand board dynamics, in 
particular, how boards, once they  have decided a particular course of action, adapt their 
membership to include future members who will provide the necessary  resources to achieve their 
goals. Despite its limitations, this work nevertheless advances theory by establishing links, or in this 
case lack of links, between network characteristics, outsiders and former government officials, and 
performance.
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ACS, ACTIVIDADES DE CONSTRUCCIÓN Y SERVICIOS S.A.
ALTADIS, S.A.
AMADEUS GLOBAL TRAVEL DISTRIBUTION, S.A.
BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA ARGENTARIA, S.A.
BANCO DE SABADELL, S.A.
BANCO ESPAÑOL DE CREDITO, S.A.
BANCO POPULAR ESPAÑOL, S.A.





FOMENTO DE CONSTRUCCIONES Y CONTRATAS, S.A.
GAS NATURAL SDG, S.A.
GESTEVISIÓN TELECINCO, S.A.
IBERDROLA, S.A.
IBERIA LÍNEAS AÉREAS DE ESPAÑA, S.A.
INDRA SISTEMAS, S.A.
METROVACESA, S.A.




ANTENA 3 DE TELEVISION, S.A.
BANCO DE ANDALUCIA, S.A.
BANCO PASTOR, S.A.
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FIRM NAME
CEMENTOS PORTLAND VALDERRIVAS, S.A.
CINTRA CONCESIONES DE INFRAESTRUCTURAS DE TRANSPORTE, S.A.
COMPAÑIA DE DISTRIBUCION INTEGRAL LOGISTA, S.A
COMPAÑIA ESPAÑOLA DE PETROLEOS, S.A.
EBRO FOODS, S.A.
FADESA INMOBILIARIA, S.A.




SOCIEDAD GENERAL DE AGUAS DE BARCELONA, S.A.
SOL MELIA S.A.
TERRA NETWORKS, S.A.





BANCO DE CASTILLA, S.A.
BANCO DE GALICIA, S.A.
BANCO GUIPUZCOANO, S.A.
CAMPOFRIO FOOD GROUP, S.A.
CORTEFIEL, S.A.
FAES FARMA, S.A.
GRUPO EMPRESARIAL ENCE, S.A.
JAZZTEL, PLC.
OBRASCON HUARTE LAIN, S.A.
PROMOCIONES Y CONCIERTOS INMOBILIARIOS, S.A.
PROSEGUR, COMPAÑIA DE SEGURIDAD, S.A.
SOS CUÉTARA, S.A.
URALITA, S.A.
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FIRM NAME
BANCO DE CREDITO BALEAR, S.A.
BANCO DE VASCONIA, S.A.
BARON DE LEY, S.A.















AGRUPACIO ACTIVIDADES E INVERSIONES INMOBILIARIAS, S.A.




AYCO GRUPO INMOBILIARIO, S.A.
AZKOYEN, S.A.
BANCO DE PROMOCION DE NEGOCIOS, S.A. (PROMOBANC)
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FIRM NAME
CARROGGIO, S.A. DE EDICIONES
CARTERA HOTELERA, S.A.
CIRCULO DE VALORES MOBILIARIOS, S.A.
COMPANYIA D´AIGÜES DE SABADELL, S.A.
COMPAÑIA DE INVERSIONES CINSA, S.A.
COMPAÑIA DE INVERSIONES MOBILIARIAS BARCINO, S.A
COMPAÑIA ESPAÑOLA DE VIVIENDAS EN ALQUILER, S.A.
COMPAÑIA ESPAÑOLA PARA LA FABRICACION MECANICA DEL VIDRIO, S.A.
COMPAÑÍA LEVANTINA DE EDIFICACIÓN Y OBRAS PÚBLICAS, S.A.
COMPAÑIA LOGISTICA DE HIDROCARBUROS CLH, S.A.
DESARROLLO MOBILIARIO, S.A.
DINAMIA CAPITAL PRIVADO, S.A., SCR
DOGI INTERNATIONAL FABRICS, S.A.
DURO FELGUERA, S.A.
ERCROS, S.A.
ESPAÑOLA DEL ZINC, S.A.
FEDERICO PATERNINA, S.A.
FERSA ENERGIAS RENOVABLES, S.A.
FINANZAS E INVERSIONES VALENCIANAS, S.A.
FOMENTO BALEAR DE INVERSIONES, S.A.








INDUSTRIAS DEL ACETATO DE CELULOSA, S.A.
INDUSTRIAS DEL CURTIDO, S.A.
INMO DEALER, S.A.










INYPSA INFORMES Y PROYECTOS, S.A.
JOAQUIM ALBERTI, S.A.





MINERALES Y PRODUCTOS DERIVADOS, S.A.
MINERO SIDERURGICA DE PONFERRADA, S.A.











S.A. PLAYA DE ALBORAYA
S.A. RONSA
SERVICE POINT SOLUTIONS, S.A.
SNIACE, S.A.
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FIRM NAME
SOCIEDAD ANONIMA HULLERA VASCO-LEONESA
SOCIEDAD ESPAÑOLA DEL ACUMULADOR TUDOR, S.A.
TAVEX ALGODONERA, S.A.
TUBOS REUNIDOS, S.A.
UNION CATALANA DE VALORES, S.A.
UNION EUROPEA DE INVERSIONES, S.A.
UNIPAPEL, S.A.
URBANIZACIONES Y TRANSPORTES, S.A.
URBAR INGENIEROS, S.A.
VALENCIANA DE NEGOCIOS, S.A.
BANCO DE VALENCIA, S.A.
COMPAÑIA VINÍCOLA DEL NORTE DE ESPAÑA, S.A.
CONSTRUCCIONES Y AUXILIAR DE FERROCARRILES, S.A.
CORPORACIÓN FINANCIERA ALBA, S.A.
EUROPISTAS, CONCESIONARIA ESPAÑOLA, S.A.
FLETAMENTOS MARÍTIMOS, S.A.
GAMESA CORPORACIÓN TECNOLÓGICA, S.A.
GRUPO FERROVIAL, S.A.
INDUSTRIA DE DISEÑO TEXTIL, S.A.
NH HOTELES, S.A.
RECOLETOS GRUPO DE COMUNICACIÓN, S.A.
RED ELÉCTRICA DE ESPAÑA, S.A.
REPSOL YPF, S.A.
SOGECABLE, S.A.
TAFISA, TABLEROS DE FIBRAS, S.A.
TECNOCOM,TELECOMUNICACIONES Y ENERGÍA, S.A.
TELEFÓNIA MÓVILES, S.A.
TELEFÓNICA PUBLICIDAD E INFORMACIÓN, S.A.
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ACS, ACTIVIDADES DE CONSTRUCCIÓN Y SERVICIOS, S.A.
ACTUACIONES ACTIVIDADES E INVERSIONES INMOBILIARIAS, S.A.
ADOLFO DOMINGUEZ, S.A.
AFIRMA GRUPO INMOBILIARIO, S.A.
AHORRO FAMILIAR, S.A.
LABORATORIOS ALMIRALL, S.A.
ALZA REAL ESTATE, S.A.
AMCI HABITAT, S.A.
AMPER, S.A.
ANTENA 3 DE TELEVISIÓN, S.A.
AVANZIT, S.A.
AYCO GRUPO INMOBILIARIO, S.A.
AZKOYEN, S.A.
BANCO DE SABADELL, S.A.
BANCO DE VALENCIA, S.A.
BANCO GUIPUZCOANO, S.A.
BANCO PASTOR, S.A.
BANCO POPULAR ESPAÑOL, S.A.
BANCO SANTANDER, S.A.
BANESTO, BANCO ESPAÑOL DE CRÉDITO, S.A.
BANKINTER, S.A.
BARON DE LEY, S.A.
BBVA, BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA ARGENTARIA, S.A.
BEFESA MEDIO AMBIENTE, S.A.
BME, BOLSAS Y MERCADOS ESPAÑOLES, S.A.





CAMPOFRIO FOOD GROUP, S.A.
CARTERA INDUSTRIAL REA, S.A.
CEMENTOS MOLINS, S.A.
CEMENTOS PORTLAND VALDERRIVAS, S.A.
CIE AUTOMOTIVE, S.A.
CIRCULO DE VALORES MOBILIARIOS, S.A.
CLINICA BAVIERA, S.A.
CODERE, S.A.
COMPANYIA D $AIGÜES DE SABADELL, S.A.
COMPAÑIA DE INVERSIONES CINSA, S.A.
COMPAÑIA DE INVERSIONES MOBILIARIAS BARCINO, S.A.
COMPAÑÍA ESPAÑOLA DE PETRÓLEOS, S.A.
COMPAÑIA ESPAÑOLA DE VIVIENDAS EN ALQUILER, S.A.
COMPAÑIA LEVANTINA DE EDIFICACION Y OBRAS PUBLICAS, S.A.
COMPAÑIA LOGISTICA DE HIDROCARBUROS CLH, S.A.
COMPAÑIA VINICOLA DEL NORTE DE ESPAÑA, S.A.
CONSTRUCCIONES Y AUXILIAR DE FERROCARRILES, S.A
CORPORACION DERMOESTETICA, S.A.
CORPORACIÓN FINANCIERA ALBA, S.A.
CRITERIA CAIXACORP, S.A.
DESARROLLOS ESPECIALES DE SISTEMAS DE ANCLAJES, S.A.
DINAMIA CAPITAL PRIVADO, S.A., SCR













FCC, FOMENTO DE CONSTRUCCIONES Y CONTRATAS, S.A.
GRUPO FERROVIAL, S.A.
FERSA ENERGIAS RENOVABLES, S.A.




GAMESA CORPORACIÓN TECNOLÓGICA, S.A.
GAS NATURAL SDG, S.A.
GENERAL DE ALQUILER DE MAQUINARIA, S.A.
GESTEVISIÓN TELECINCO, S.A.
GRIFOLS, S.A.
GRUPO CATALANA OCCIDENTE, S.A.
GRUPO EMPRESARIAL ENCE, S.A.




IBERIA LÍNEAS AÉREAS DE ESPAÑA, S.A.
IBERPAPEL GESTION, S.A.
INBESOS, S.A.




INMOBILIARIA DEL SUR, S.A.
INMOFIBAN, S.A.
INMOLEVANTE, S.A.





INYPSA INFORMES Y PROYECTOS, S.A.
JAZZTEL, PLC.
LA SEDA DE BARCELONA, S.A.








MINERALES Y PRODUCTOS DERIVADOS, S.A.






OHL, OBRASCÓN HUARTE LAÍN, S.A.
PAPELES Y CARTONES DE EUROPA, S.A.
PESCANOVA, S.A.
PLARREGA INVEST 2000, S.A.
PRIM, S.A.
PROMOTORA DE INFORMACIONES, S.A.
PROSEGUR, COMPAÑÍA DE SEGURIDAD, S.A.
PULEVA BIOTECH, S.A.
REALIA BUSINESS, S.A.
RED ELÉCTRICA CORPORACIÓN, S.A.
RENTA 4 SERVICIOS DE INVERSION, S.A.
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FIRM NAME






SERVICE POINT SOLUTIONS, S.A.
SNIACE, S.A.
SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA DAMM
SOCIEDAD ANONIMA HULLERA VASCO-LEONESA
SOCIEDAD GENERAL DE AGUAS DE BARCELONA, S.A.
SOL MELIÁ, S.A.
SOLARIA ENERGIA Y MEDIOAMBIENTE, S.A.
SOS CORPORACION ALIMENTARIA, S.A.
SOTOGRANDE, S.A.
TÉCNICAS REUNIDAS, S.A.
TECNOCOM, TELECOMUNICACIONES Y ENERGIA, S.A.
TELEFÓNICA, S.A.
TESTA INMUEBLES EN RENTA, S.A.
TUBACEX, S.A.
TUBOS REUNIDOS, S.A.
UNION CATALANA DE VALORES, S.A.
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Appendix III: Summary of the information for 2004


















highways 19 1 14 4 0 0 15
ACCIONA, S.A. Construction 11 4 2 5 0 0 6
ACERINOX, S.A. Metals 14 3 7 3 1 0 5
ACS, ACTIVIDADES DE 
CONSTRUCCIÓN Y SERVICIOS 
S.A.





7 2 1 4 0 0 2




and other 5 1 3 1 0 0 1
AGUAS DE VALENCIA, S.A. Water 14 14 0 0 0 2 0
AHORRO FAMILIAR, S.A. Real estate 8 2 3 3 0 0 0
ALDEASA, S.A. Retail 14 3 4 7 0 2 2
ALTADIS, S.A. Drinks and Tobacco 18 3 0 15 0 3 10





11 0 8 3 0 0 0
AMPER, S.A. Electronics and software 11 3 3 5 0 2 4




12 1 8 3 0 0 4
AVANZIT, S.A. Telecommunications 9 2 1 6 0 0 0
AYCO GRUPO INMOBILIARIO, 
S.A. Real estate 5 0 4 1 0 0 0
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9 1 2 6 0 1 3
BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA 
ARGENTARIA, S.A. Banking 15 3 0 10 2 0 2
BANCO DE ANDALUCIA, S.A. Banking 6 1 5 0 0 0 0
BANCO DE CASTILLA, S.A. Banking 5 1 4 0 0 0 0
BANCO DE CREDITO BALEAR, 
S.A. Banking 5 1 4 0 0 0 0
BANCO DE GALICIA, S.A. Banking 5 1 4 0 0 0 2




Insurance 6 3 3 0 0 0 0
BANCO DE SABADELL, S.A. Banking 11 3 1 4 3 0 2
BANCO DE VALENCIA, S.A. Banking 16 1 6 9 0 0 7
BANCO DE VASCONIA, S.A. Banking 5 1 4 0 0 0 0
BANCO ESPAÑOL DE 
CREDITO, S.A. Banking 11 3 2 6 0 0 4
BANCO GUIPUZCOANO, S.A. Banking 11 0 4 7 0 0 7
BANCO PASTOR, S.A. Banking 9 3 2 2 2 1 1
BANCO POPULAR ESPAÑOL, 
S.A. Banking 19 4 6 9 0 0 4
BANCO SANTANDER 
CENTRAL HISPANO, S.A. Banking 19 5 4 6 4 5 15





companies 3 3 0 0 0 0 0
BARON DE LEY, S.A. Beverages and tobacco 7 3 0 4 0 0 2
BEFESA MEDIO AMBIENTE, 
S.A.
Other market 
services 7 2 2 3 0 0 0
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BODEGAS BILBAINAS, S.A. Beverages and tobacco 4 2 1 1 0 0 0
BODEGAS RIOJANAS, S.A. Beverages and tobacco 9 2 4 2 1 0 1
BYADA, S.A. Agriculture and fisheries 5 2 2 1 0 1 1
CALPE INVEST, S.A. Real estate 5 2 1 2 0 2 10
CAMPOFRIO FOOD GROUP, 
S.A. Food 8 1 5 1 1 1 3
CARROGGIO, S.A. DE 
EDICIONES
Paper and 
graphic arts 4 1 0 0 3 0 0
CARTERA HOTELERA, S.A. Portfolio and Holding 13 0 4 9 0 0 4
CEMENTOS LEMONA, S.A. Construction materials 8 0 4 0 4 0 2




materials 15 3 7 5 0 0 4
CIE AUTOMOTIVE, S.A. Metals 10 1 8 1 0 0 1




highways 8 1 4 3 0 1 5
CIRCULO DE VALORES 
MOBILIARIOS, S.A.
Portfolio and 
Holding 5 1 4 0 0 0 0
COMPANYIA D´AIGÜES DE 
SABADELL, S.A. Water 13 0 6 0 7 0 1
COMPAÑIA DE DISTRIBUCION 
INTEGRAL LOGISTA, S.A
Transport and 
distribution 9 2 4 3 0 4 8
COMPAÑIA DE INVERSIONES 
CINSA, S.A. Real estate 5 1 0 4 0 0 0
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COMPAÑIA DE INVERSIONES 
MOBILIARIAS BARCINO, S.A
Portfolio and 
Holding 5 1 0 4 0 0 0
COMPAÑIA ESPAÑOLA DE 
PETROLEOS, S.A.
Oil, Gas and 
other sources 19 2 15 2 0 2 12
COMPAÑIA ESPAÑOLA DE 
VIVIENDAS EN ALQUILER, S.A. Real estate 6 3 2 1 0 0 0
COMPAÑIA ESPAÑOLA PARA 
LA FABRICACION MECANICA 
DEL VIDRIO, S.A.
Construction 
materials 6 1 5 0 0 0 0
COMPAÑÍA LEVANTINA DE 
EDIFICACIÓN Y OBRAS 
PÚBLICAS, S.A.
Construction 7 1 5 1 0 0 1
COMPAÑIA LOGISTICA DE 
HIDROCARBUROS CLH, S.A.
Transport and 
distribution 20 2 18 0 0 0 3
COMPAÑIA VINÍCOLA DEL 
NORTE DE ESPAÑA, S.A.
Beverages and 











Holding 11 3 3 4 1 4 6









companies 6 0 6 0 0 0 0
DINAMIA CAPITAL PRIVADO, 
S.A., SCR
Portfolio and 






9 3 1 3 2 0 1
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12 2 8 2 0 0 0





11 2 9 0 0 0 0
ENAGÁS, S.A. Oil, Gas and other sources 16 1 8 7 0 0 14
ENDESA, S.A. Electricity 15 2 1 12 0 0 14
ERCROS, S.A. Chemical industry 8 1 2 5 0 0 6





highways 12 1 11 0 0 0 9





10 4 4 2 0 0 6




Energy 10 4 6 0 0 0 0
FINANZAS E INVERSIONES 
VALENCIANAS, S.A.
Real estate 




distribution 7 3 0 2 2 0 1
FOMENTO BALEAR DE 




Construction 15 2 11 2 0 0 4
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and other 7 1 3 3 0 2 7
FUNESPAÑA, S.A. Other market services 8 3 1 4 0 0 0






10 1 7 2 0 0 3






13 2 7 4 0 0 0
GRUPO CATALANA 
OCCIDENTE, S.A. Insurance 14 3 11 0 0 0 0
GRUPO EMPRESARIAL ENCE, 
S.A.
Paper, wood 
and chemical 11 1 6 4 0 0 5
GRUPO FERROVIAL, S.A. Construction 11 3 3 5 0 1 6
GRUPO INMOCARAL,S.A. Real estate 9 4 2 3 0 0 0
HISPANA HOLDING, S.A. Portfolio and Holding 4 1 2 1 0 0 0
HULLAS DEL COTO CORTES, 
S.A.
Oil, Gas and 
other sources 5 0 0 2 3 0 2
IBERDROLA, S.A. Electricity 21 2 5 10 4 1 7
IBERIA LÍNEAS AÉREAS DE 
ESPAÑA, S.A.
Transport and 
distribution 12 2 6 4 0 0 15
IBERPAPEL GESTION, S.A. Paper and graphic arts 9 2 5 2 0 1 3





6 0 6 0 0 0 6
INDRA SISTEMAS, S.A. Electronics and software 12 3 2 7 0 1 6
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10 4 1 5 0 1 3





4 1 3 0 0 0 0





4 0 4 0 0 0 3
INMO DEALER, S.A. Real estate 6 1 2 2 1 3 21
INMOBILIARIA CARROGGIO, 
S.A. Real estate 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
INMOBILIARIA COLONIAL, S.A. Real estate and other 9 1 6 2 0 0 10
INMOBILIARIA DEL SUR, S.A. Real estate 18 1 11 2 4 0 0
INMOBILIARIA URBIS, S.A. Real estate 12 2 6 4 0 0 7
INMOCAHISPA, S.A. Investment funds 6 3 2 1 0 1 0
INMOFIBAN, S.A. Real estate and other 7 1 6 0 0 0 0




and other 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
INVERFIATC, S.A. Other services 11 3 6 2 0 2 1
INVERPYME SCR, S.A. Portfolio and Holding 10 1 3 6 0 0 0
INVERSIONES AZALBA, S.A. Portfolio and Holding 5 1 1 2 1 2 2
INYPSA INFORMES Y 
PROYECTOS, S.A.
Other market 
services 8 1 6 1 0 0 1
JAZZTEL, PLC. Telecommunications 9 2 3 4 0 0 1
JOAQUIM ALBERTI, S.A. Beverages and tobacco 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
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LA SEDA DE BARCELONA, S.A. Paper and graphic arts 16 1 11 4 0 1 0
LEUCAN, S.A. Other services 5 2 1 2 0 0 1
LIBERTAS 7, S.A. Real estate and other 8 2 3 3 0 4 8










7 3 2 2 0 0 0
METROVACESA, S.A. Real Estate 20 3 10 7 0 0 5





6 2 4 0 0 0 0
MINERO SIDERURGICA DE 
PONFERRADA, S.A.
Oil, Gas and 
other sources 9 1 0 8 0 0 0
MIQUEL Y COSTAS & MIQUEL, 
S.A.
Paper and 
graphic arts 10 2 6 2 0 4 28
MONTEBALITO, S.A. Real estate 4 1 3 0 0 0 0
NATRA, S.A. Food 7 1 4 0 2 0 1










6 2 1 3 0 0 2
OBRASCON HUARTE LAIN, S.A. Construction 12 2 5 5 0 0 4
PAPELES Y CARTONES DE 
EUROPA, S.A.
Paper and 
graphic arts 7 4 1 2 0 0 0
PESCANOVA, S.A. Food 8 2 5 1 0 1 8
POPULARINSA, S.A. Portfolio and Holding 9 4 3 1 1 4 5
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20 7 7 6 0 11 25
PROSEGUR, COMPAÑIA DE 
SEGURIDAD, S.A.
Other market 
services 9 4 3 2 0 0 7
PULEVA BIOTECH, S.A. Food 8 0 3 5 0 0 8





12 3 3 5 1 0 1
RED ELÉCTRICA DE ESPAÑA, 
S.A. Electricity 11 1 5 5 0 0 8
REPSOL YPF, S.A. Oil, Gas and other sources 14 2 5 6 1 1 11
RUSTICAS, S.A. Real estate 6 4 0 2 0 0 1
S.A. PLAYA DE ALBORAYA Real estate 5 0 2 3 0 0 3
S.A. RONSA Real estate 4 2 2 0 0 1 1
SACYR VALLEHERMOSO, S.A. Construction 14 5 8 1 0 1 11
SERVICE POINT SOLUTIONS, 
S.A. Retail 7 2 0 5 0 0 0
SNIACE, S.A. Paper and graphic arts 8 2 2 4 0 0 0
SOCIEDAD ANONIMA DAMM Beverages and tobacco 7 1 6 0 0 2 0
SOCIEDAD ANONIMA 
HULLERA VASCO-LEONESA
Oil, Gas and 
other sources 7 4 0 0 3 0 0





3 2 1 0 0 0 0
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SOCIEDAD GENERAL DE 
AGUAS DE BARCELONA, S.A.
Other market 










12 3 3 5 1 0 1
SOS CUÉTARA, S.A. Food and beverage 15 5 7 3 0 0 4
SOTOGRANDE, S.A. Real estate 12 1 6 2 3 0 8
TAFISA, TABLEROS DE FIBRAS, 
S.A.
Paper and 





12 2 6 4 0 0 0
TECNOCOM,TELECOMUNICACI




11 1 4 6 0 2 5
TELE PIZZA, S.A. Food and beverage 10 2 2 5 1 0 4
TELEFÓNIA MÓVILES, S.A. Telecommunications 14 1 8 5 0 1 14





8 1 2 5 0 0 3
TELEFÓNICA, S.A. Telecommunications 19 5 6 8 0 4 19
TERRA NETWORKS, S.A. Electronics and software 9 1 5 3 0 0 5
TESTA INMUEBLES EN RENTA, 
S.A. Real estate 12 3 6 3 0 0 5
TRANSPORTES AZKAR, S.A. Transport and distribution 10 2 8 0 0 0 5
TUBACEX, S.A. Metals 9 1 1 7 0 0 1
Appendix III: Summary of the information for 2004
165


















11 3 8 0 0 0 4
UNION CATALANA DE 
VALORES, S.A.
Portfolio and 
Holding 5 1 4 0 0 3 1
UNION EUROPEA DE 
INVERSIONES, S.A.
Portfolio and 
Holding 9 1 0 8 0 0 3
UNION FENOSA, S.A. Electricity 20 3 11 5 1 4 25
UNIPAPEL, S.A. Paper and graphic arts 11 2 3 6 0 2 3
URALITA, S.A. Construction materials 12 4 5 3 0 0 5
URBANIZACIONES Y 
TRANSPORTES, S.A. Real estate 5 1 2 2 0 0 0
URBAR INGENIEROS, S.A. Engineering and others 6 1 2 3 0 0 0
VALENCIANA DE NEGOCIOS, 
S.A.
Portfolio 





10 0 6 4 0 0 1










11 2 4 3 2 0 10
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Parking 20 2 14 4 0 1 15





15 1 10 3 1 0 5
ACS, ACTIVIDADES DE 
CONSTRUCCIÓN Y SERVICIOS, 
S.A.
Construction 19 4 9 5 1 2 17









8 3 3 2 0 0 3
AFIRMA GRUPO INMOBILIARIO, 
S.A.
Real Estate 
and Other 8 2 4 2 0 0 5




l Products 9 4 2 3 0 0 2
ALZA REAL ESTATE, S.A. Real Estate and Other 6 2 2 2 0 0 3
AMCI HABITAT, S.A. Real Estate and Other 4 0 4 0 0
AMPER, S.A. Electronics / Software 10 1 3 6 0 0 6
ANTENA 3 DE TELEVISIÓN, S.A.
Communicatio
n Media and 
Advertising





10 1 4 5 0 0 4
AYCO GRUPO INMOBILIARIO, 
S.A.
Real Estate 
and Other 5 0 4 0 1
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AZKOYEN, S.A. Equipment goods 9 2 4 3 0 2 4
BANCO DE SABADELL, S.A. Banks / Savings 13 2 2 7 2 0 3
BANCO DE VALENCIA, S.A. Banks / Savings 16 1 7 8 0 0 4
BANCO GUIPUZCOANO, S.A. Banks / Savings 11 3 7 1 0 0 7
BANCO PASTOR, S.A. Banks / Savings 9 2 3 4 0 0 1
BANCO POPULAR ESPAÑOL, 
S.A.
Banks / 
Savings 18 4 6 6 2 0 4
BANCO SANTANDER, S.A. Banks / Savings 19 6 2 10 1 4 7
BANESTO, BANCO ESPAÑOL 
DE CRÉDITO, S.A.
Banks / 
Savings 14 4 2 7 1 0 4
BANKINTER, S.A. Banks / Savings 11 2 3 5 1 1 2
BARON DE LEY, S.A. Food & Beverage 6 3 0 2 1 0 4
BBVA, BANCO BILBAO 
VIZCAYA ARGENTARIA, S.A.
Banks / 
Savings 13 2 0 10 1 0 0
BEFESA MEDIO AMBIENTE, 
S.A.
Engineering 
and Other 10 2 4 4 0 0 0
BME, BOLSAS Y MERCADOS 
ESPAÑOLES, S.A.
Investment 
Services 15 2 8 5 0 0 2
BODEGAS BILBAINAS, S.A. Food & Beverage 5 3 1 1 0 0 0
BODEGAS RIOJANAS, S.A. Food & Beverage 10 2 5 2 1 0 2
CAMPOFRIO FOOD GROUP, 
S.A.
Food & 
Beverage 9 1 5 3 0 0 1
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CARTERA INDUSTRIAL REA, 
S.A.
Portfolio and 
Holding 15 1 11 3 0 0 14









12 1 9 1 1 0 5
CIRCULO DE VALORES 
MOBILIARIOS, S.A.
Portfolio and 
Holding 5 1 4 0 0 0 0





9 3 3 3 0 0 0
COMPANYIA D ́AIGÜES DE 
SABADELL, S.A.
Water and 
other 13 0 8 0 5 0 1
COMPAÑIA DE INVERSIONES 
CINSA, S.A.
Real Estate 
and Other 3 3 0 0 0 0 0
COMPAÑIA DE INVERSIONES 
MOBILIARIAS BARCINO, S.A.
Portfolio and 
Holding 5 1 0 3 1 0 0
COMPAÑÍA ESPAÑOLA DE 
PETRÓLEOS, S.A. Oil 13 1 9 3 0 1 5
COMPAÑIA ESPAÑOLA DE 
VIVIENDAS EN ALQUILER, S.A.
Real Estate 
and Other 6 3 3 0 0 0 0
COMPAÑIA LEVANTINA DE 
EDIFICACION Y OBRAS 
PUBLICAS, S.A.
Construction 7 2 3 2 0 0 5
COMPAÑIA LOGISTICA DE 
HIDROCARBUROS CLH, S.A.
Transport / 
Distribution 20 1 19 0 0 0 6
COMPAÑIA VINICOLA DEL 
NORTE DE ESPAÑA, S.A.
Food & 





goods 10 3 2 2 3 1 4
CORPORACION 
DERMOESTETICA, S.A. Other Services 6 3 2 1 0 0 4
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Holding 12 4 4 4 0 6 7
CRITERIA CAIXACORP, S.A. Portfolio and Holding 16 2 8 5 1 1 11
DESARROLLOS ESPECIALES 





7 1 4 2 0 0 0
DINAMIA CAPITAL PRIVADO, 
S.A., SCR
Portfolio and 






8 3 2 2 1 0 1
DURO FELGUERA, S.A. Engineering and Other 11 2 6 3 0 0 0
EBRO FOODS, S.A. Food & Beverage 14 2 7 4 1 0 3
ECCOWOOD INVEST, S.A. Agriculture and fisheries 9 1 8 0 0 0 0
ELECNOR, S.A. Equipment goods 11 1 10 0 0 0 1
ENAGÁS, S.A. Electricity and Gas 16 1 6 8 1 0 4
ENDESA, S.A. Electricity and Gas 9 2 4 3 0 1 3
ERCROS, S.A. Chemical Industry 5 1 0 3 1 0 2
EXIDE TECHNOLOGIES, S.A. Equipment goods 3 0 3 0 0 0 0
FAES FARMA, S.A. Pharmaceutical Products 10 3 4 3 0 0 4
FCC, FOMENTO DE 
CONSTRUCCIONES Y 
CONTRATAS, S.A.
Construction 20 2 13 5 0 0 7
GRUPO FERROVIAL, S.A. Construction 12 3 2 7 0 1 10
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Energy 12 3 6 3 0 0 0
FINANZAS E INVERSIONES 
VALENCIANAS, S.A.
Real Estate 
and Other 4 0 1 3 0 0 2
FLUIDRA, S.A. Engineering and Other 10 1 6 3 0 0 0
FUNESPAÑA, S.A. Other Services 8 2 2 4 0 0 0




goods 10 2 3 4 1 1 9
GAS NATURAL SDG, S.A. Electricity and Gas 17 2 9 6 0 2 7
GENERAL DE ALQUILER DE 
MAQUINARIA, S.A.
Engineering 




n Media and 
Advertising
15 4 5 6 0 0 8
GRIFOLS, S.A. Pharmaceutical Products 9 3 1 4 1 0 1
GRUPO CATALANA 
OCCIDENTE, S.A. Insurance 14 2 12 0 0 0 0
GRUPO EMPRESARIAL ENCE, 
S.A.
Paper and 
printing 14 2 6 5 1 2 9
GRUPO EMPRESARIAL SAN 









Energy 15 1 8 6 0 0 4
IBERDROLA, S.A. Electricity and Gas 15 1 2 12 0 1 11
IBERIA LÍNEAS AÉREAS DE 
ESPAÑA, S.A.
Transport / 
Distribution 12 2 5 4 1 0 6
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IBERPAPEL GESTION, S.A. Paper and printing 7 1 2 4 0 1 1
INBESOS, S.A. Real Estate and Other 8 3 1 4 0 0 0










9 1 6 2 0 0 4
INDRA SISTEMAS, S.A. Electronics / Software 15 2 6 7 0 1 10
INMOBILIARIA COLONIAL, S.A. Real Estate and Other 11 3 4 2 2 0 1
INMOBILIARIA DEL SUR, S.A. Real Estate and Other 19 2 11 6 0 0 0
INMOFIBAN, S.A. Real Estate and Other 4 3 0 1 0 0 0
INMOLEVANTE, S.A. Real Estate and Other 5 1 1 2 1 0 0
INVERFIATC, S.A. Other Services 10 2 5 3 0 0 1
INVERPYME, SCR, S.A. Portfolio and Holding 6 0 4 1 1 0 0
INYPSA INFORMES Y 
PROYECTOS, S.A.
Engineering 





9 1 2 6 0 0 0




l Products 8 4 1 3 0 0 3
LIBERTAS 7, S.A. Real Estate and Other 9 1 3 4 1 1 1
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5 3 0 0 2 0 0
MAPFRE, S.A. Insurance 24 7 10 7 0 0 2
MARTINSA-FADESA, S.A. Real Estate and Other 8 1 6 1 0 0 1
MECALUX, S.A. Equipment Manufacturing 11 3 6 2 0 0 9
METROVACESA, S.A. Real Estate and Other 11 1 7 2 1 1 4





7 2 5 0 0 0 0
MIQUEL Y COSTAS & MIQUEL, 
S.A.
Paper and 
printing 10 2 4 3 1 2 27
MONTEBALITO, S.A. Renewable Energy 8 0 6 2 0 0 0
NATRA, S.A. Food & Beverage 9 1 7 1 0 0 4





13 1 7 4 1 1 6
NICOLAS CORREA, S.A. Equipment goods 7 2 3 2 0 0 0
OHL, OBRASCÓN HUARTE 
LAÍN, S.A. Construction 12 1 6 4 1 0 3
PAPELES Y CARTONES DE 
EUROPA, S.A.
Paper and 
printing 10 4 3 2 1 0 1
PESCANOVA, S.A. Food & Beverage 13 1 10 2 0 0 12
PLARREGA INVEST 2000, S.A. Real Estate and Other 3 1 1 1 0 0 0
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n Media and 
Advertising
14 5 6 3 0 6 17
PROSEGUR, COMPAÑÍA DE 
SEGURIDAD, S.A. Other Services 8 2 3 2 1 2 4
PULEVA BIOTECH, S.A. Biotechnology 12 0 9 3 0 0 9




Gas 10 1 3 6 0 0 1
RENTA 4 SERVICIOS DE 
INVERSION, S.A.
Investment 
Services 9 3 0 5 1 0 0
RENTA CORPORACION REAL 
ESTATE, S.A.
Real Estate 
and Other 10 4 1 3 2 0 0
REPSOL YPF, S.A. Oil 16 2 6 8 0 2 18
REYAL URBIS, S.A. Real Estate and Other 9 3 3 3 0 0 3
RUSTICAS, S.A. Real Estate and Other 7 3 1 0 3 0 0
S.A. RONSA Portfolio and Holding 4 2 1 0 1 2 0
SACYR VALLEHERMOSO, S.A. Construction 13 2 10 1 0 1 8
SERVICE POINT SOLUTIONS, 





9 2 2 5 0 0 0






7 3 0 1 3 0 0
SOCIEDAD GENERAL DE 
AGUAS DE BARCELONA, S.A.
Water and 
other 13 2 9 2 0 2 5
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12 3 3 6 0 0 6
SOLARIA ENERGIA Y 
MEDIOAMBIENTE, S.A.
Renewable 




Beverage 15 3 9 1 2 0 4
SOTOGRANDE, S.A. Real Estate and Other 8 0 5 3 0 0 2










17 3 4 8 2 0 7
TESTA INMUEBLES EN RENTA, 
S.A.
Real Estate 










11 1 6 2 2 0 3
UNION CATALANA DE 
VALORES, S.A.
Portfolio and 
Holding 5 1 4 0 0 1 0
UNION EUROPEA DE 
INVERSIONES, S.A.
Portfolio and 
Holding 9 1 5 3 0 0 2
UNIPAPEL, S.A. Paper and printing 10 2 8 0 0 1 5
URALITA, S.A. Building materials 12 4 5 3 0 0 2
URBAR INGENIEROS, S.A. Engineering and Other 6 2 1 2 1 0 0
URBAS GUADAHERMOSA, S.A. Real Estate and Other 9 1 2 3 3 0 0
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n Media and 
Advertising





10 0 7 3 0 0 1
VISCOFAN, S.A. Food & Beverage 8 1 6 1 0 1 4
VOCENTO, S.A.
Communicatio
n Media and 
Advertising
16 1 11 3 1 0 3
VUELING AIRLINES, S.A. Transport / Distribution 12 0 7 4 1 0 3
ZARDOYA OTIS, S.A. Equipment goods 9 1 6 2 0 0 5
ZELTIA, S.A. Pharmaceutical Products 11 2 4 4 1 1 4
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Appendix V: List of board members who were former government officials for 
2004




ABEL MATUTES JUAN BANCO SANTANDER CENTRAL HISPANO, S.A. Banking IBEX 35 Minister
ALFREDO PASTOR BODMER SOL MELIA S.A. Leisure, tourism and hospitality Group 1 Secretary of State





Oil, Gas and other 
sources Group 4 Parliament
ANTONIO MASA GODOY IBERIA LÍNEAS AÉREAS DE ESPAÑA, S.A.
Transport and 
distribution IBEX 35 Parliament
ANTONIO SOTILLO MARTI TAVEX ALGODONERA, S.A.
Textile, clothing 
and footwear Group 4 Parliament
ANTONIO ZABALZA MARTÍ ERCROS, S.A. Chemical industry Group 4 Secretary of State
CARLES GASÒLIBA BÖHM MIQUEL Y COSTAS & MIQUEL, S.A.
Paper and graphic 
arts Group 4 Senate
CARLOS ALFONSO GILA 
GONZALEZ
ESPAÑOLA DEL ZINC, 
S.A. Metals Group 4 Parliament





Oil, Gas and other 
sources Group 1 Minister






distribution Group 4 Minister
EDUARDO PUNSET CASALS SOL MELIA S.A. Leisure, tourism and hospitality Group 1 Minister
ESTANISLAO RODRÍGUEZ- 
PONGA SALAMANCA
TESTA INMUEBLES EN 








highways Group 1 Minister
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FRANCISCO JAVIER DE 
IRIZAR ORTEGA
URBANIZACIONES Y 
TRANSPORTES, S.A. Real estate Group 4 Senate
FRANCISCO RUIZ RISUEÑO CORPORACIÓN MAPFRE, S.A. Insurance IBEX 35 Senate
GUILLERMO DE LA 
DEHESA ROMERO
BANCO SANTANDER 
CENTRAL HISPANO, S.A. Banking IBEX 35 Secretary of State
GUILLERMO DE LA 
DEHESA ROMERO UNION FENOSA, S.A. Electricity IBEX 35 Secretary of State
GUILLERMO DE LA 
DEHESA ROMERO
CAMPOFRIO 
ALIMENTACIÓN, S.A. Food Group 2 Secretary of State
GUILLERMO DE LA 
DEHESA ROMERO TELE PIZZA, S.A.
Food and 
beverage Group 3 Secretary of State
IGNACIO BAYÓN MARINÉ REPSOL YPF S.A. Oil, Gas and other sources IBEX 35 Minister




and R.T.V. IBEX 35 Minister
JOAQUIM MOLINS I AMAT JAZZTEL P.L.C. Telecommunications Group 2 Parliament
JOAQUIM MOLINS I AMAT CEMENTOS MOLINS S.A.
Construction 
materials Group 3 Parliament
JOSÉ LUIS DEL VALLE 
PÉREZ
ACS, ACTIVIDADES DE 
CONSTRUCCIÓN Y 
SERVICIOS S.A.
Construction IBEX 35 Parliament





Oil, Gas and other 
sources Group 1 Minister
JOSÉ MANUEL FERNÁNDEZ 
NORNIELLA ENAGÁS, S.A.
Oil, Gas and other 
sources IBEX 35 Parliament
JOSÉ MANUEL FERNÁNDEZ 
NORNIELLA ENDESA, S.A. Electricity IBEX 35 Parliament
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JOSÉ MANUEL FERNÁNDEZ 
NORNIELLA
IBERIA LÍNEAS AÉREAS 
DE ESPAÑA, S.A.
Transport and 
distribution IBEX 35 Parliament
JOSÉ MANUEL FERNÁNDEZ 
NORNIELLA EBRO PULEVA, S.A. Food Group 1 Parliament
JOSÉ MANUEL SERRA PERIS RED ELÉCTRICA DE ESPAÑA, S.A. Electricity Group 1 Secretary of State
JOSÉ MANUEL SERRA PERIS GRUPO EMPRESARIAL ENCE, S.A.
Paper, wood and 
chemical Group 2 Secretary of State
JOSÉ MANUEL SERRA PERIS URALITA S.A. Construction materials Group 2 Secretary of State
JOSÉ MANUEL SERRA PERIS NATRACEUTICAL, S.A. Pharmaceuticals Group 4 Secretary of State
JOSE MARÍA LAFUENTE 
LÓPEZ SOL MELIA S.A.
Leisure, tourism 
and hospitality Group 1 Senate
JOSÉ PEDRO PÉREZ-
LLORCA
IBERIA LÍNEAS AÉREAS 
DE ESPAÑA, S.A.
Transport and 
distribution IBEX 35 Minister





and R.T.V. IBEX 35 Secretary of State






distribution Group 4 Minister





Holding Group 4 Senate
JUAN MIGUEL VILLAR MIR OBRASCÓN HUARTE LAIN, S.A. Construction Group 2 Minister
JUAN PEDRO HERNÁNDEZ 
MOLTÓ METROVACESA, S.A. Real Estate IBEX 35 Parliament
JUAN RAMÓN QUINTÁS 
SEOANE ENDESA, S.A. Electricity IBEX 35 Parliament
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JULIÁN GARCÍA VARGAS AVANZIT, S.A. Telecommunications Group 4 Minister
LUIS CARLOS CROISSIER 
BATISTA JAZZTEL P.L.C.
Telecommunicati
ons Group 2 Minister





and footwear Group 4 Minister
LUIS MARÍA ATIENZA 
SERNA
RED ELÉCTRICA DE 
ESPAÑA, S.A. Electricity Group 1 Minister
LUIS SOLANA MADARIAGA AMPER, S.A. Electronics and software Group 4 Parliament
Manuel Varela Uña PROMOTORA DE INFORMACIONES, S.A.
Advertising, press 
and R.T.V. IBEX 35 Secretary of State
MARCELINO OREJA 






Construction IBEX 35 Minister
MARCELINO OREJA 
AGUIRRE REPSOL YPF S.A.
Oil, Gas and other 
sources IBEX 35 Minister
MATIAS PEDRO 
RODRÍGUEZ INCIARTE
BANCO ESPAÑOL DE 




CENTRAL HISPANO, S.A. Banking IBEX 35 Minister
MIGUEL ÁNGEL PLANAS 






distribution Group 4 Minister
MIGUEL ROCA JUNYENT
ACS, ACTIVIDADES DE 
CONSTRUCCIÓN Y 
SERVICIOS S.A.
Construction IBEX 35 Parliament
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LOSADA BANCO PASTOR, S.A. Banking Group 1 Parliament
PEDRO ANTONIO MARTÍN 
MARÍN
ANTENA 3 DE 
TELEVISION, S.A.
Advertising, press 
and R.T.V. Group 1 Parliament
PEDRO PÉREZ FERNÁNDEZ TESTA INMUEBLES EN RENTA, S.A Real estate Group 1 Secretary of State
PÍO CABANILLAS ALONSO ALDEASA, S.A. Retail Group 2 Minister
RODOLFO MARTÍN VILLA SOGECABLE S.A. Advertising, press and R.T.V. IBEX 35 Minister
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Appendix VI: List of board members who were former government officials for 
2009




ABEL MATUTES JUAN BANCO SANTANDER, S.A. Banks / Savings IBEX 35 Minister
ALFREDO PASTOR BODMER SOL MELIÁ, S.A. Leisure / Travel / Hospitality Group 1 Secretary of State
ANTONIO DIEGO MASA 
GODOY 
IBERIA LINEAS AEREAS 
DE ESPAÑA, S.A.
Transport / 
Distribution IBEX 35 Parliament
ANTONIO ZABALZA MARTI ERCROS, S.A. Chemical Industry Group 4 Secretary of State
CARLES-ALFRED 
GASÒLIBA BÖHM
MIQUEL Y COSTAS & 
MIQUEL, S.A.
Paper and 
printing Group 4 Senate
CARLOS PÉREZ DE BRICIO 
OLARIAGA
BANCO ESPAÑOL DE 
CREDITO, S.A. Banks / Savings IBEX 35 Minister
CARMEN CALLEJA DE 
PABLO
INYPSA INFORMES Y 
PROYECTOS, S.A.
Engineering and 
Other Group 4 Parliament
EDUARDO PUNSET CASALS SOL MELIÁ, S.A. Leisure / Travel / Hospitality Group 1 Minister
EDUARDO SERRA REXACH ZELTIA, S.A. Pharmaceutical Products Group 2 Minister
ENRIQUE LACALLE COLL FERSA ENERGIAS RENOVABLES, S.A.
Renewable 




Gas IBEX 35 Secretary of State
ESTANISLAO RODRÍGUEZ-
PONGA Y SALAMANCA INDRA SISTEMAS, S.A.
Electronics / 
Software IBEX 35 Secretary of State
ESTANISLAO RODRÍGUEZ-
PONGA Y SALAMANCA
TESTA INMUEBLES EN 
RENTA, S.A.
Real Estate and 






printing Group 3 Minister
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FRANCISCO RUIZ RISUEÑO MAPFRE, S.A. Insurance IBEX 35 Senate
GUILLERMO DE LA 
DEHESA ROMERO
BANCO SANTANDER, 
S.A. Banks / Savings IBEX 35 Secretary of State
GUILLERMO DE LA 
DEHESA ROMERO
CAMPOFRIO FOOD 
GROUP, S.A. Food & Beverage Group 2 Secretary of State




S.A. Banks / Savings IBEX 35 Minister






Other IBEX 35 Minister
JESÚS ACÍN BONED INBESOS, S.A. Real Estate and Other Group 3 Parliament
JESÚS QUERO MOLINA FERSA ENERGIAS RENOVABLES, S.A.
Renewable 
Energy Group 3 Senate
JOAQUIM MOLINS I AMAT CEMENTOS MOLINS, S.A.
Building 
materials Group 2 Parliament
JOSE BORRELL FONTELLÉS ABENGOA, S.A. Engineering and Other IBEX 35 Minister
JOSÉ FOLGADO BLANCO RED ELECTRICA CORPORACION, S.A.
Electricity and 






Other IBEX 35 Minister
JOSE LUIS DEL VALLE 
PÉREZ
ACS, ACTIVIDADES DE 
CONSTRUCCION Y 
SERVICIOS, S.A.
Construction IBEX 35 Parliament
JOSE MANUEL FERNANDEZ 
NORNIELLA
IBERIA LINEAS AEREAS 
DE ESPAÑA, S.A.
Transport / 
Distribution IBEX 35 Parliament
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JOSE MANUEL OTERO 
NOVAS
COMPAÑIA ESPAÑOLA 
DE PETROLEOS, S.A. Oil Group 1 Minister
JOSÉ MANUEL SERRA PERIS CORPORACIÓN FINANCIERA ALBA, S.A.
Portfolio and 
Holding Group 1 Secretary of State
JOSÉ MANUEL SERRA PERIS GRUPO EMPRESARIAL ENCE, S.A.
Paper and 
printing Group 3 Secretary of State
JOSÉ MANUEL SERRA PERIS NATRACEUTICAL, S.A. Pharmaceutical Products Group 4 Secretary of State
JOSÉ MANUEL SERRA PERIS MARTINSA-FADESA, S.A.
Real Estate and 
Other Group 4 Secretary of State
JOSÉ MARÍA LAFUENTE 
LÓPEZ SOL MELIÁ, S.A.
Leisure / Travel / 
Hospitality Group 1 Senate
JOSE PEDRO PÉREZ 
LLORCA
IBERIA LINEAS AEREAS 
DE ESPAÑA, S.A.
Transport / 
Distribution IBEX 35 Minister







IBEX 35 Secretary of State
JOSEBA ANDONI 
AURREKOETXEA BERGARA ENAGAS, S.A.
Electricity and 
Gas IBEX 35 Senate
JOSEP PIQUE CAMPS VUELING AIRLINES, S.A.
Transport / 
Distribution Group 3 Minister
JUAN MIGUEL VILLAR MIR OBRASCON HUARTE LAIN, S.A. Construction IBEX 35 Minister
LUIS CARLOS CROISSIER 
BATISTA REPSOL YPF, S.A. Oil IBEX 35 Minister
LUIS CARLOS CROISSIER 
BATISTA
TESTA INMUEBLES EN 
RENTA, S.A.
Real Estate and 
Other Group 2 Minister








LUIS DE GUINDOS JURADO ENDESA, S.A. Electricity and Gas IBEX 35 Secretary of State
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Gas IBEX 35 Parliament





Gas IBEX 35 Minister
MARÍA JOSE ELICES 
MARCOS AVANZIT, S.A.
Telecommunicati
ons and Other Group 4 Senate
MATIAS PEDRO 
RODRÍGUEZ INCIARTE
BANCO ESPAÑOL DE 




S.A. Banks / Savings IBEX 35 Minister
MIGUEL ÁNGEL PLANAS 
SEGURADO CIE AUTOMOTIVE, S.A.
Mineral / Metals / 
Processing Group 3 Parliament
MIGUEL BOYER SALVADOR REYAL URBIS, S.A. Real Estate and Other Group 2 Minister
MIGUEL ROCA JUNYENT
ACS, ACTIVIDADES DE 
CONSTRUCCION Y 
SERVICIOS, S.A.
Construction IBEX 35 Parliament
MIGUEL ROCA JUNYENT ENDESA, S.A. Electricity and Gas IBEX 35 Parliament
MIGUEL SALINAS MOYA SOS CORPORACION ALIMENTARIA, S.A. Food & Beverage Group 3 Parliament
MIGUEL SANMARTIN 
LOSADA BANCO PASTOR, S.A. Banks / Savings Group 1 Parliament
NARCIS SERRA SERRA GAS NATURAL SDG, S.A.
Electricity and 






Construction IBEX 35 Parliament
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printing Group 3 Secretary of State











Other Group 3 Parliament
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